Abstract: This paper proposal aims to produce an analytical framework that shall contribute to the understanding of the hard and soft institutions of international development cooperation policies of six countries (South Africa, China, India, Mexico, Brazil and Turkey). The timing is particularly conducive to debate about this topic, since such countries have begun to invest as emerging donors, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in several development sectors (public health, formal education and university cooperation, non-formal education, technical assistance projects, agricultural development, etc.) and in partnership with countries from different regions of the world (especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America region). Therefore, because these “new powers” have started to play an increasingly important role in South-South cooperation, there is a need to understand more fully the reality of changes within the international development cooperation regime, especially regarding practices, discourses, visions and institutional constructions of these “rising states”. As a consequence, this paper aims at analyzing, from a comparative perspective, the institutions (organizations, norms, discourses, visions, practices) of development cooperation policies of six selected economies, and their interfaces with their foreign policy agendas.

28th March 2012
Introduction: the crisis of North-South development cooperation and emerging roles of new powers

Globalization processes produce dilemmas in different economic, social, cultural, political and environmental perspectives, thus calling into question the assumptions and instruments that have supported the understanding of and the action on the reality of development. “Development” and “progress” promised by multilateral and bilateral cooperation agencies have proved limited, exclusive, and sometimes perverse; this is particularly true when we consider the challenges that globalization poses to developing countries in their struggle to compete in the global market. In fact, the “crisis of development” results from the unequal integration of individuals and classes in national society, but also from inequalities amidst nations in the international system. Moreover, this crisis stems from the non-fulfillment of what the North-South Cooperation (NSC) had promised to its beneficiaries world-wide.

There are various interpretations for the crisis of development cooperation, its origins, assumptions and possible ways of overcoming it. A first interpretation emanates from authors who associate cooperation for development with the capitalist mode of production and its logic of accumulation. Therefore, overcoming the crisis would necessarily imply regulating capitalism or surpassing its production and distribution mechanisms (Amin, 1976; Comeliau, 1991; Hayter, 1971; Moraes, 2006; Pankaj, 2005). A second approach is based on the anthropological critique, and reveals the role of Western ethnocentrism in the definition of cultural values and political standards diffused and prescribed by international agencies. Development and its sociological corollary – modernization – are associated to a Western-driven political project, emphasizing the historical nature and supposedly universal character of modernity. For this school of thought, the principles of progress and civilization imposed rationalities
and willing-to-be-universal criteria in different socio-cultural contexts, engendering conflicts between indigenous peoples, local forms of knowledge and the Western rationale. In this sense, bilateral aid and multilateral cooperation policies would go hand-in-hand with foreign policy agendas and priorities of Western countries (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003; Escobar, 1994; Huntington, 1970; Kennan, 1971; Lancaster, 2007; Morgenthau, 1962; Naylor, 2011; Rist, 1996).

A third view highlights postmodern critiques of development, and warns against the idea of considering development as a universal value. Development is presented as the result of an Enlightenment utopia, which ended up favoring the interests of ruling classes over subaltern groups. The post-development movement believes that, as progress, development can produce effects on the lives and liberties of men and women, disguising the interests of some groups as though they were public and general interests (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Foucault, 2005; Guijt & Shah, 1998). A fourth approach presents a critique of development models prescribed by international agencies, which tend not to recognize universal values on the bases of diversity and contextual pluralism. Alternative social networks and contestation movements express the need for acknowledging the presence and existence of what is modern and universal also in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Domíngues, 2012; Milani & Laniado, 2006; Milani, 2008; Wallerstein, 2007).

Of course many of the points analyzed within these four critical approaches intersect. And within this intersection lies a starting point for our understanding and analysis of the role of South-South Cooperation (SSC) policies currently implemented by large peripheral countries and emerging powers, such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. The timing is particularly conducive to debate about this topic, since such countries have begun to invest as emerging donors, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, in several development sectors (public health, formal education and university cooperation, non-formal education, technical assistance projects, agricultural development, etc.) and in partnership with countries from different regions of the world (especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America region). Therefore, because these “new powers” (Narlikar, 2010) or “rising states” (Alexandroff & Cooper, 2010) have started playing an increasingly important role in South-South cooperation, there is a need to understand more fully the reality of changes within the international development cooperation system, especially regarding their practices, discourses, visions, goals, institutional constructions and negotiating power. As a consequence, this paper aims at analyzing, from a comparative perspective, the institutions (norms, discourses, visions, practices) of development cooperation policies of six selected countries, and their interfaces with their respective foreign policy agendas. The first step in this research project is to set up a theoretical and methodological framework for the comparative analysis of SSC foreign policies of the selected countries, which is the main objective of this paper.

Comparative politics and comparative foreign policy: theory and method

Institutions, and their discourses, norms and strategies, are the foundation of political behavior of states in the international order. Institutions define those who are able to participate in politics; what their particular rights and obligations might be; or how citizens can influence policy outcomes. Nonetheless, institutions are not aseptic rules but structures that are permeable to history, economics and power relations. The same institutional structure may produce different effects in different historical periods. Comparing the similarities and differences between political phenomena across
countries allows social scientists, and political scientists in particular, to judge if, when and how the experience of some states is similar to that of others and to assess whether theoretical models of how states make decisions change the international order, and how. Comparisons allow the examination of how institutions, both hard (formal rules and organizations) and soft (practices, political culture), vary between states and the effect that different institutional practices have on the outcomes of political process in different societies (Bara & Pennington, 2009; Mény & Surel, 2009).

Some authors suggest that the actual process of ‘comparing’ represents a method in itself (Hopkin, 2002), after all, comparisons are made in many disciplines, especially in social sciences. “Among the several fields or subdisciplines into which the discipline of political science is usually divided, comparative politics is the only one that carries a methodological instead of a substantive label” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 682). Nevertheless, the field of comparative politics suggests that there is something specific about looking at institutions and other political phenomena in different countries, time periods or levels of political activity and explaining why it is, for example, that decision making is carried out differently in presidential or parliamentary systems, democratic or authoritarian regimes, and so forth. Charles Ragin (1987, p. 6) holds that comparative knowledge “provides the key to understanding, explaining and interpreting”. Comparison tries to overcome the shortcomings of approaches focused purely on case studies of individual countries and of those that build purely abstract theoretical models of decision-making.

Political scientists use the comparative approach as a means of analyzing similarities and differences. There are a number of particular reasons why analysts compare countries at a macro political level, such as the desire to find out more about politics in different countries, which has obvious applications in terms of aiding appreciation of
how different practices operate. This is also believed to help understanding our own
country, Brazil in my case. Moreover, politicians want to learn from successes or
failures of institutions in other countries, and to emulate practices having worked well
elsewhere. In academic literature, this phenomenon may be captured, \textit{inter alia}, through
the lenses of policy transfer (Dolowitz, Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2001). Policy reasons for
making comparisons among foreign policy agendas, according to Marijke Breuning
(2007, p. 17), include the fact that “leaders use analogies when trying to make sense of a
foreign policy situation that demands a decision”. Moreover, additional information and
observation help decision makers reexamine the lessons they have intuitively gleaned
from past experience.

It is difficult to be precise about exactly when comparative politics was first discussed
in the literature of political science$^{1}$. The development of comparative political methods
in the 20$^{th}$ century followed from a constitutional and legalistic phase (mainly
descriptive) to a second phase of behaviorism hegemony (1940s-1960s), a third phase of
neo-institutionalism (1980s-1990s), and nowadays a fourth more eclectic phase that
combines individual, institutional, cultural aspects and macro dimensions of politics
(Bara & Pennington, 2009). Studies may be more quantitative: according to Susan
Stokes and Charles Boix (2009) the greater the number of countries, the greater also the
need for statistical treatment, in order to demonstrate either analogies or differences, or

\footnotesize

$^{1}$ One of the most quoted in literature is Aristotle, whose work introduces us to one of the most widely
practiced techniques employed by comparative analysts: the establishment and application of
classification systems or typologies. Aristotle classified governments in tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule
(ruling according to ruler’s interests), and monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (ruling according to
interests of all citizens). Mill's text is widely considered to be the first systematic formulation of the
modern comparative method. Mill, however, thought that the methods of difference and the concomitant
variations could not be applied in the social sciences because sufficiently similar cases could not be
found. These two methods may be respectively denominated, the method of agreement, and the method of
difference (Mill, 1888). Of course all classifications are imbued with the author’s own preferences. Max
Weber classified authority (legal, traditional, charismatic). Other authors classified governments into
liberal democratic, totalitarian, and autocratic governments (Bara & Pennington, 2009).
both. Qualitative methods are considered to be better at capturing meaning, process and content, allowing political scientists to contextualize their analysis.

We situate our research in this second trend. We believe that contexts matter: “the context-ignorant comparativist is likely to be wrong, however, in the interpretation and, in its wake, in the explanation” (Sartori, 1994, p. 25); however, against the most exaggerated versions of postmodernism and following Charles Tilly and Robert Goodin (2006), we argue that context and contextual effects lend themselves to systematic description and explanation, hence their proper understanding facilitates discovery of true regularities in political processes. “Political scientists should shift their attention away from empirically grounded general laws to repeated processes, and toward efficacious causal mechanisms that operate at multiple scales but produce their aggregate effects through their concatenation, sequences, and interaction with initial conditions” (Tilly & Goodin, 2006, p. 19).

Comparative methods may be used to both inductive theory building and deductive theory test. According to Jean Blondel (2003) and Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil (1994), between 1970 and 1990, the best comparativists have advocated empirical theory, that is, theory tested by empirical evidence. In our research, however, we advocate the need to combine history, theory and data; the comparative method is adopted with the purpose of learning from others’ experiences, and thus setting up profiles of negotiation behavior and categories of political goals. We also believe that comparative methods assume a probabilistic causality – meaning that a given set of

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2 The contradiction should be developed: “Should we leave this as saying that the contextualist and the comparativist both discover half-truths? Certainly not. But we now need a theoretical framework that accommodates the two halves” (Sartori, 1994, p. 25). “The methodological point remains, to be sure, that we are confronted with an alternative between individualizing and generalizing. (...) Thus, in order to make a concept more general, namely, to increase its traveling capability, we must reduce its characteristics and properties. Conversely, in order to make a concept more specific (contextually adequate), we must increase its properties and characteristics (idem, p. 26).
conditions will modify the likelihood of the anticipated outcome – not a deterministic causality, that is, that a given set of conditions may produce the anticipated outcome (Dogan & Kazancigil, 1994, p. 2).

Giovanni Sartori (1994, p. 17) recalls that we compare “in order to assimilate and to differentiate to a point”. Among the many difficulties in the way of comparisons, one might recall the number of cases and reliable available data; the need to follow a common framework (consistency and specificity); problems of cultural relevance (meaning of liberal democratic in different contexts, for instance); interdependence (which may produce convergence of practices among states due to globalization, but also resistance and revisionism); inappropriate indicators; selection bias; value judgment. Such difficulties may generate what Giovanni Sartori (1994) calls the four major problems in comparative political analysis: parochialism, misclassification, problems of degree, and conceptual stretching. How to avoid such problems? By organizing the conditions into independent, intervening, and dependent variables; by treating some causal conditions as parameters, parametric constants or givens that are assumed not to vary in order to assess their influence upon dependent variables. Giovanni Sartori (1994, p. 22) reminds us of the fact that “in the most similar strategy, the researcher brings together systems that are as similar as possible in as many features (properties) as possible”.

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3 “Social scientists often face a fundamental dilemma when they conduct social research. On the one hand, they may emphasize the complexity of social phenomena – a common strategy in ethnographic, historical and macro social research – and offer in-depth case studies sensitive to the specificity of the things they study. On the other hand, they may make broad, homogenizing assumptions about cases, and document generalities – patterns that hold across many instances” (Ragin, 1998, p. 105). “In comparative sociology and comparative politics, for example, a frequency distribution showing the numbers of studies with different size Ns reveals a clear U-shaped pattern. (...) There are very few comparativists who conduct studies of 10 or 20 countries, but many who study 1 or 2 or 75 (i.e. enough to permit the use of conventional qualitative methods)” (Ragin, 1998, p. 106). The technique he proposes (called Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA) is presented as a middle path between complexity and generality.
Nevertheless, defining variables is more complex today than in the past. Globalization has become an independent variable in all the national contexts that we are studying (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey). It has disarticulated domestic and international politics, creating more levels of correlation between variables, levels that are not necessarily connected with each other, particularly in the field of development/underdevelopment (Randall, 2004; Kopstín & Lichbach, 2008; Nolte, 2010). From this process of opening/closing borders and territories results a contemporary world politics not any more invested and occupied exclusively by nation-states, but reconfigured into a truly “plurilateral structure” (Cerny, 1995, p. 595). It also shows an incremented complexification of today’s world political order where the classical and Realist in/out divisions tend not to make complete sense of the empirical and historical reality. The notion of an unconditioned sovereignty built under an imaginary of modernity, as well as our ontologies in crafting theoretical frameworks to understand the world reality, need a profound revision. Realism is not a problem because it insists on the role of the nation-state in world affairs, but mostly because it does not develop in a consistent fashion a theory of what defines and forms the State, how it is built, what its contradictions might be (Walker, 1993).

In such a context, it becomes less plausible to establish what constitutes an independent cause of a dependent outcome. Comparative politics is encountering issues with confronting the political problems of a globalized world. Its methods and theories face difficulties when applied to processes that transcend state borders and undermine the structure of the traditional political relations on which comparative politics is based (Hassenteufel, 2005). As Vidya Nadkarni and J. Michael Williams (2010) have recalled, in the United States, International Relations (IR) and Comparative Politics (CP) have been considered as a subfield of Political Science. Both developed around the concern
with the nature of the state. IR focused on nature, sources, dynamics of inter-state relations, whereas CP delved into the structure, functioning, and development of the state itself.

Kenneth Waltz (1996) insisted that he was developing a theory of international relations, not of foreign policy. But can one separate domestic and international politics today? Given the impact of international phenomena on development trajectories, scholarly exploration of the state, foreign policy, and international politics have examined the interaction among domestic and international variables. Context-specific understandings of states and regions have been indispensable for richer analyses of foreign policies and international politics. Therefore, there is a pressing need for cross-fertilization of IR and CP. James Caporaso (1997) also calls for a greater integration between IR and CP, and has examined three such attempts: (i) strategic interactions and two-level games (*Double-Edged Diplomacy*, by Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam); (ii) the second-image reversed (Ronald Rogowski’s *Commerce and Coalitions*); (iii) the domestification of IR (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, Walter Mattli, Joseph Weiler).

Moreover, Philipp Schmitter (2009, p. 40) reaffirms that “comparison between ‘real-existing polities’ will also remain the best research method for analyzing similarities and differences in behavior and for inferring the existence of patterns of regularity with regard to the causes and consequences of politics”. Polities are more than only states, since they include norms, institutions, policies and contexts. How can one study environmental policies in Europe without referring to regulations set up by the European Commission? How can one study human rights in Africa with no reference to conditionalities by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies? This means that comparative exercises in political science must not reject complexity: “I can see no viable alternative
for us comparativists than to confront the messy and noisy world in which we live and design our theories accordingly” (Schmitter, 2009, p. 45). Complexity includes globalization and interdependence, but also multiple loyalties and identities within nation states, as well as a pluralistic approach to agency and actorness. According to Philipp Schmitter (2009, p. 50), globalization narrows the potential range of policy responses, undermines the capacity of (no-longer) sovereign national states to respond autonomously to the demands of their citizenry, and, thereby, weakens the legitimacy of traditional political intermediaries and state authorities; further to that, globalization widens the resources available to non-state actors acting across national borders and shifts policy responsibility upward to transnational quasi-state actors – both of which undermine formal institutions and informal arrangements at the national level, and promote the development of transnational interests and the diffusion of transnational norms.

**Studying south-south cooperation and foreign policy agendas in Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey: designing a comparative matrix**

Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy (1981) mention five possible strategies in the development of comparative research: case study, binary comparison, comparison among similar countries, comparison among contrasting countries, and conceptual homogenization in a heterogeneous group of countries. Charles Tilly (1984) proposes four strategies: individualizing comparison, universalizing comparison, comparison of variations, and encompassing comparison. Bertrand Badie and Guy Hermet (2001) argue for a dialogue between general explanatory variables and national or local cultural contexts, since concepts do not have an endless elasticity, and their application in
different national contexts require epistemological vigilance and methodological alertness. This means that the actual process of building explanatory categories should not neglect a previous contextual analysis (Tilly & Goodin, 2006). Mamoudou Gazibo (2002, p. 439) proposes the construction of a matrix composed of a dependent variable, independent variables, dimensions of the independent variables, and indicators for each dimension, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The phenomenon the research intends to understand and explain. It is normally associated with a research question.</td>
<td>Different factors that influence the behavior of the dependent variable.</td>
<td>They are either obstacles and shortcomings, or facilitating factors for each independent variable.</td>
<td>They are quantitative or qualitative factors or variables that provide a reliable means to measure and assess achievement, process, changes or performances of political actors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Comparative matrix model (source: Gazibo, 2002, p. 439).

Patrick Hassenteufel (2005) recalls that there are several challenges in setting up and conducting comparative research: (i) social scientists tend to emphasize continuity at the expense of change; (ii) they tend to ignore the transnational dimension produced by globalization processes and non state actors; (iii) the need to carefully construct the object, thus avoiding conceptual over stretching; (iv) the development of the empirical research, which should never neglect the local context; (v) the actual parameters for the final report (the presentation of separate national cases or the common definition of general entry criteria). More than that, Patrick Hassenteufel (2005) suggests that qualitative comparative analysis should avoid biased comparisons, that is, comparisons based on theoretical models that already indicate *ex ante* what the probable answers are.

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4 Hassenteufel (2005, p. 117) affirms that (...)“tout phénomène politique est indissociable de la culture dans laquelle il s’inscrit ; pour le comprendre, il est nécessaire d’être en mesure de reconstruire les modes de pensée et de raisonnement étrangers, ce qui suppose une immersion, plus ou moins longue, selon les cas, les capacités intuitives du chercheur et le degré de familiarité de celui-ci avec le phénomène étranger observé. Il faut être en mesure d’appréhender le ‘non-dit’ et le ‘non-écrit’ du fait de l’importance des manières de penser et de sentir intérieurs par les acteurs. La compréhension des contextes et des styles de raisonnement implique donc l’apprentissage sur le terrain”.
In such cases the researcher “ne laisse pas parler la comparaison, il la fait parler, ou plutôt, il parle à sa place” (Hassenteufel, 2005, p. 118).

Based on these relevant methodological suggestions, our central research question could be phrased as follows: how do “new powers” integrate SSC strategies in their foreign policy agendas? The category “new powers” here refers to states that must react to the international hierarchy within a broad commitment to some change in status quo (Narlikar, 2010). These countries do not accede to a Western-centric order, and they do not consider that they benefit from the established liberal international order, which does not necessarily imply a foreign policy of fundamental rejection (Alexandroff & Cooper, 2010). This category includes a series of six states which may have a clear non status quo foreign policy behavior (Brazil, China, India, South Africa), may be revisionist states (China, India), middle powers (Mexico, Turkey) or global players (Brazil, China, India). They all share a past political history directly or indirectly related to the non-alignment movement, the Third World diplomacy and the New International Economic Order debates within the United Nations. The six selected countries can also be considered “rising states” (Alexandroff & Cooper, 2010), since they are regional or global powers, part of the intermediate per capita revenue list of countries, and members of the G20.

The six countries also share the legacy of North-South relations, and manifest some sort of geopolitical dissatisfaction. They showcase regional and international leadership and negotiation capabilities, and all have traditional foreign services and a history of national diplomacy. Other countries could also be part of such a list (for instance, Argentine, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia or Thailand), but as Marijke Breuning (2007, p. 19) recalls, the selection of only six countries is justified by the fact that “comparisons of smaller numbers of cases allow for more detailed analyses of
similarities and differences among both the independent and dependent variables of the cases”. As Vicky Randall (2004, p. 46) recalls, these are some features that help “justify studying the politics of Third World countries together as a separate group”.

Within this framework, how do “new powers” conceive and implement their south-south cooperation strategies? How are these development cooperation strategies linked to foreign policy agendas? Can the six selected rising powers, through their SSC strategies, step up and accept leadership, as well as collective commitment and decision making? Do these countries challenge the cooperation for development system with innovative practices and new rules of the game? Have they learned from past mistakes made within the framework of traditional NSC strategies? Viable answers to questions of this sort require serious attention to the contexts in which the crucial political processes operate.

As Charles Tilly and Robert Goodin (2006) recall, it is fundamental to collect and organize systematic political knowledge of different contexts that are compared and analyzed. The six selected countries all present domestic political cultures that profile their own national interpretations of history; they have had their respective encounters with the West and colonization, and situate their experiences at the margins of the liberal international order. As Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil (1994, p. 11) recall, “history is the greatest generator of national configurations. The older a country, the more it has been shaped by its history. Two or several countries may have many features in common, but they are never identical, because the attributes are combined differently for each country”. That is the reason why in international comparisons we should be able to distinguish anomalies, deviant cases and exceptional cases, depending on the degree. Exceptional cases refer to the accumulation of several deviances in
systemic or contextual characteristics, forming a configuration (Mattei & Kazancigil, 1994).

The six selected countries also show some distinctive capabilities to project hard and soft power on the regional and global levels. According to Ryan K. Beasley et al. (2002) in a multipolar system, such powers “often have the most autonomy and regional influence because there is greater choice in alliance partners when the major powers are competing”. Middle powers may worry, however, that the great powers will cooperate and rule the international system like an oligarchy, ignoring their interests, an aspect which may showcase the dialectics between interdependence and asymmetry in the international order.
### Research questions

| Historical | Foreign policy priorities and diplomatic history. Political autonomy and collation building. Multilateral experience. | The legacy of North-South relations, struggle for decolonization, the fight for a new international economic order in the sixties and seventies, the input of dependency theory and world-systems theory, among other independent variables, play a significant historical role (a) in the framing (social representation, national history) of international problems and (b) in the conception of viable alliances and coalitions. |
| Geopolitical | Relationship with international and collective security. Regional integration processes and national leadership. Relationship with trade and investment priorities. Relationship with internationalization of business and market access to national companies. | The definition of SSC strategies follows a complex decision making process in which geopolitical and economic factors work as key intervening variables (economic relevance and geopolitical agency). SSC strategies implemented by “new powers” also depend on their national and collective capabilities (material and economic strength), geographical location (regional priorities), and cultural affinity (being part of a community). |
| Profile | Nature of aid (grants, loans on concessional basis, technical cooperation). Emphasis on bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Amounts invested. Sectors and public policies (health, culture, infrastructure, education, etc.) that are privileged. Emblematic projects. | SSC strategies are not homogeneous: they may assume the specific shape of technical cooperation, may be more focused on bilateral cooperation, and also the result of the internationalization of public policies. There is a need to empirically analyze such development cooperation schemes and set up empirical typologies which may reveal distinct country profiles in terms of political behavior and soft power projection. |
| Institutional | Hard institutions: establishment of an aid agency? Soft institutions: norms, values and concepts proposed. | Institutional experience is heterogeneous, and is related to (a) the national political and bureaucratic relevance of each ministry of external relations, (b) the existence and relative autonomy of an aid agency, (c) the multilateral experience of each country, (d) the support to self-determination and sovereignty in international relations, and (e) the demands of domestic actors (professionalization, transparency). |
| Domestic politics | Negotiation and decision making process: leader’s personality and worldview; the role of advisors; the role of the ministry of external relations and other ministries or agencies (bureaucratic politics); sub national entities and rules of federalism; social legitimacy, non state actors and public opinion. | Democratization and internationalization of bureaucracies and societies are key variables for political participation in SSC decision making. The politics of domestic actors in each country influences the negotiation and implementation behavior of States. Leaders, their personalities and beliefs also play a relevant role in this process. Regime and government changes (dramatic regime change or change through elections) have effects on foreign policy agendas and SSC strategies. |

Table 2: Qualitative analytical matrix (source: elaborated by the author).
Moreover, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey experience challenges and transformations both internally and externally. In this wake, foreign policy analysis should be seen as a distinct area of inquiry which connects the study of international relations with the study of domestic politics. The first step in any comparative investigation of foreign policy in the field of SSC strategies is to define what we mean by the term “foreign policy”, particularly today when “contemporary politics has blurred the line between what is foreign and what is domestic” (Beasley et al., 2002, p. 3). This does not mean, however, that there is no longer a difference between foreign and domestic policy. At the heart of this distinction is the target of the policy; if the primary target lies outside the country’s borders, it is considered foreign policy, even if it has secondary consequences for politics inside the country. Similarly, if the primary target is inside the country, it is considered domestic policy, even if it affects others outside the country’s borders. Many policies, of course, have multiple targets (inside and outside, towards state, governmental and non-governmental actors…). Another difficulty concerns the status of territorial borders, particularly within integration processes. It is also important to define “policy”, avoiding the traditional trap of restricting the definition to actions of governments, governmental institutions, and government officials.

Further to the challenge that Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil (1994, p. 9) have put forward, “the researcher must provide us with an illustration of comparative imagination”, we have set up an analytical matrix (table 2) that summarizes our main research questions, the five dimensions (historical, geopolitical, profile, institutional and domestic politics), issues and variables, and assumptions. It is based on this matrix that we intend to continue our study in the coming years, considering that this research
project is funded to be developed between 2011 and 2015. This matrix is also based on what Christopher Hill (2003, p. 10) has formulated as an assumption, i.e. “foreign policy analysis can and should be open, comparative, conceptual, interdisciplinary and range across the domestic-foreign frontier”.

**Concluding remarks**

This research is based on a series of assumptions (summed up on table 2). Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey have distinct motivations to develop their SSC strategies (Ayala et al., 2009; Ayllón, 2009; Chin, 2010; Chisholm & Steiner-Khamsi, 2009; Hirst, 2009; Hurell, 2010; IPEA/ABC, 2010; Lima, 2005), but we understand and analyze them within the framework of comparative foreign policy, integrating comparative and international politics (Caporaso, 1997; Hassenteufel, 2005; Nadkarni & Williams, 2010). This does not mean that States are exclusively moved by selfish interests, since SSC can also be framed as a tool for revitalizing regional integration processes, for producing regional public goods, and restoring or reinforcing shared historical and cultural identities.

One cannot ignore, as table 2 suggests, that foreign policies are also subject to domestic politics. This implies answering a number of questions, such as: who are the players of this foreign/domestic politics? How are “transferred” experiences and *expertises* of public policies received in beneficiary countries? Paraphrasing Pierre Lascoumes and Patrick Le Galès (2007) or Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour (2006), how do concepts like “*transcodage*” and “*traduction*” help us to understand discursive strategies (reports on SSC, catalogues of best practices or SSC policy papers published by “new powers”) that mobilize and legitimize public action (the actual projects and
programs being implemented)? Who are the operators of such “traduction” or “transcodage”, through seminars, meetings with non-governmental organizations and think tanks?

Another final issue that also deserves attention from the researcher is related to the growing importance of SSC in the international agenda (it would represent around 10% of total foreign aid in 2009)\(^5\), and its capacity to propose patterns and norms that challenge the traditional North-South Cooperation (NSC), from which SSC tries to make a rhetorical distinction: do SSC strategies conceived and implemented by Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey actually differ, in norms and practices, from NSC schemes? If so, how can we empirically analyze this? These are research questions that our project intends to answer and develop in detail, theoretically, historically and empirically.

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