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Security and Defense Cooperation in South America: The Challenges of the New Security Agendas

PAPER:

Brazil and the South American Defense Council: cooperation as self-help or transformation in security identity?

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Abstract: This paper aims to analyze the strategic reasoning that based Brazilian proposal and leadership in creating the South American Defense Council (CDS\(^2\)), in late 2008. Since the creation of the Council, a new institutional framework for cooperation in defense emerged, distinct and away from the old hemispheric security architecture. Is it possible to verify changes in Brazilian preferences and/or identity towards cooperation in defense in that process? Is the creation of the South American Defense Council only an instrumental asset to foster its traditional security interests in the region? This paper promotes distinct theoretical explanations associated with the timing of events and policies that can help to explain Brazilian decision in favor of the CDS. We conclude that, although it may be too soon to observe clear changes in identity, there were changes in preferences, especially in how regional cooperation was valued for national and regional security and for broader foreign policy objectives.

Key-Words: South American Defense Council; Defense Cooperation; Brazil.

1. Introduction

The study of defense and international security played a significant role in the setting of International Relations as an academic field. Issues of war and peace, as well as of cooperation, occupy a central stage. In this area of inquiry, Latin and South America has been an extensive proving ground for theories and explanations of defense and security cooperation (Mares 1997; Kacowicz 1998; Hurrell 1998; Buzan and Waever, 2003). Along with an impressive number of institutions and regimes aimed at fostering cooperation, some countries play,

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\(^1\) The author would like to thank Prof. Thiago Lima (DRI/UFPB – Brazil) for his valuable comments on the first draft of this paper.

\(^2\) We preferred to use the acronym CDS instead of SADC because is common also in Portuguese as in Spanish.
sometimes, a decisive role in changing or maintaining patterns of defense cooperation in the region. In our study, Brazil is the case under study.

Brazil participates of a broad range of institutions, organizations and regimes that promotes defense and security cooperation in the hemispheric and regional levels. We understand this net of cooperative arenas as constituting the hemispheric defense architecture, marked fundamentally by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the cooperative mechanisms attached to it.

Although Brazil has been an active member of this architecture for several decades, in 2008 the country led the creation of an alternative institution with similar objectives to those of OAS, but excluded the U.S. and Canada from it. This new institutional novelty in defense cooperation is the South American Defense Council (CDS or *Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano*). CDS is part of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR - *União das Nações Sul-Americanas*).

CDS holds different features when compared to the previous defense and security architecture. One of those is the central role played by Brazil. By proposing and leading the CDS’ negotiation process, the country proved, in that period, his will for leading the region in high policy agendas, as defense cooperation. Although Brazil did played a significant role as a regional stabilizer, as a status quo defender and regional conflict mediator, the country never was so explicitly driven in its desire to lead and had never produced an institutional answer, as CDS.

It is not new that the Inter-American System has failed several times (Saint-Pierre 2006; Keplak 2007, 2008, 2012). Armed conflicts as the Cenepa War didn’t produced alternative conflict resolution institutions at the regional level. *Ad Hoc* initiatives, as the Rio Group provided multilateral responses for conflict situations in the region. In this sense, the need for reorganization of defense and security cooperation in the Hemisphere, and particularly in South America is previous than 2008. So, why only in 2008 has Brazil assumed the importance of an alternative institution that promotes and reorganizes regional defense cooperation?
The political events that resulted from Brazilian proposition for the creation of the CDS are still fresh. This is a problem for research due to the lack of documents and relevant information. But the political problem is here to be explained. To solve this puzzle, we use a research strategy that puts theoretical explanations to compete. The political result we want to explain is the Brazilian decision to propose the creation of the South-American Defense Council (CDS). By accepting Weber's postulate that social reality is complex, infinite and chaotic, we understand that only one theory wouldn't be enough to provide a deep explanation and shed light in the causal mechanisms that explains our problem. We used theories in a pragmatic manner aside with timing of events and policies.

In this paper, we assume that the Brazilian proposal can be explained by changes in government preferences. Especially those related to foreign policy and on the instrumental use of regional defense cooperation for achieving goals. The changes in this inter-subjective dimension resulted in policy initiatives regarding the construction of a minimum consensus between South America countries about the need for such institutional innovation. Although Brazilian officials claimed differently (Gama 2010) we understand that the CDS symbolizes a rupture with the hemispheric defense architecture.

2. Debates on the South American Defense Council: competing explanations

In this section, we analyze several explanations about why Brazil proposed the CDS (outcome). But before analyzing them, we would like to propose two theoretically guided lines of explanation. The first one opts to explain the outcome as a turn in preferences towards “cooperation as self-help”. This view was designed by political scientist Glaser (1994), producing a variation in neo-realism, which he called Contingent Realism.

Cooperation as self-help allows explaining, in a neorealist manner how cooperation is possible and durable. This is particularly important because conventional understanding of neorealist principles one of the main problems with intergovernmental cooperation is the risk of defection and the possibility of
a previous partner possessing strategic advantage over the other state with who he used to cooperate. In Glaser analysis, cooperation itself can be useful not only to increase the State security, but also to ameliorate the security dilemma. He claims that,

“Even if cooperation leaves the adversary’s uncertainty about a state’s motives unchanged, cooperation is valuable if it reduces the adversary’s insecurity by reducing the military threat it faces. Moreover cooperation is valuable if it can reduce the adversary’s uncertainty, convincing it that the first state is motivated more by insecurity than by greed; this would further reduce the probability of conflict caused by an opponent’s insecurity.” (Glaser 1994, 60).

By using this same logic, the proposal of South American Defense Council can be explained as Brazilian cooperative strategy to assure its own security and increase its defense capabilities without invoking a security dilemma. This would be achieved by maintaining stable the offensive-defensive balance and by producing information about defense and military capabilities. This can be made possible by exposing the actor’s motivations and avoiding risks of misperception (Glaser 1994, 111-114).

“In short, the essentially rational actors posited by structural realism will under certain conditions be able to use cooperative or their unthreatening military policies to improve understanding of their motives. For states motivated primarily by security, such opportunities will be especially attractive when cooperative policies can also enhance their military capabilities.” (Glaser 1994, 70).

In the case of Brazil, the restructuration of the Armed Forces and modernization of military equipment doesn’t go unnoticed by the neighbors. According to Glaser’s logic, CDS can be an example of cooperation as self-help
for Brazil, if it allows Brazil to increase its military capabilities without producing balancing movements against it.

On the other hand, Brazilian proposal for the CDS can be the outcome of a deeper process of changes in Brazilian strategic identity and culture. Strategic Culture can be understood as,


In this sense, CDS can be seen as related to changes in Brazilian strategic culture, related to the issue of foreign policy especially related to defense cooperation. Broader changes in foreign policy directions and priorities can point to changes in how the country sees itself in the world and what is it role in it.

It is possible for a country to change its preferences and keep its strategic culture and identity. Cooperation as self-help implies on reevaluating the role of international cooperation for national defense and security, but isn’t related to changes in identity. By the other side, changes in strategic culture and identity implies in changes in preferences and on the strategies designed to achieve then. But how these lines of explanations would dialogue with a closer literature over the issue under study? The academic debate about the CDS can be understood as part of a broader debate about Brazil and Defense Cooperation. Though recent, the debate about the CDS presents distinct interpretations and explanations.

Cervo (2008) studying defense and security cooperation before the CDS existence, gives us a helpful hint about the importance of the interrelation between foreign policy, security and defense. According to Cervo (2008, 119), Brazilian security policy for the region was divided in three phases: “collective security”, “security nationalization” and “multilateral security”. Cervo saw a deep connection between Foreign Policy and Defense since the times of Barão de

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3 Other countries as Chile, Peru and Venezuela have invested in increasing arms build-up. The impact of this process over the region will be analyzed in other papers and in my thesis. For now, we shall focus only in Brazilian perceptions and actions towards defense and security in South America.
Rio Branco, noting that “More than the statesman that created the Republic, Rio Branco elevated the concerns about security to the highest level of his diplomatic activity”\(^4\) (2008, p.126).

In his analyses about U.S.-Brazil cooperation in regional arena, Cervo emphasizes the main Brazilian dilemma related to the country international objectives and national defense. He says that “the dilemma that security issues formulated to foreign policy during the second half of the XX century was about building or not means of power, in other words, means for defense and deterrence”\(^5\) (Cervo 2008, 128). The relations between Brazil and the United States appears as an essential issue to Cervo’s explanatory strategy. Based on this, the author discusses Brazilian participation in the inter-American security and defense system. In this context, during much of the time from the forties to the early sixties, Brazil relied heavily in the logic of “collective security” and it utility during the “hot” years of the Cold War.

In a general sense, Cervo understands that the relation between Brazilian foreign policy and its defense preferences has to do with the question between alignment with the U.S. or seeking an autonomous path. In order to analyze distinct preferences in relation to this issue, he uses the idea of “strategies of association” versus “nationalization of security” (Cervo 2008, 134). The understanding of such dilemma was relevant to comprehend preferences and their changes in the defense policies of the post-Cold War period.

During President Cardoso’s government, Cervo observed the preference for “multilateral security”. The author claims that the word “multilateral” means the belief that the multilateral architecture should induce the creation of a global security order, in which universal confidence building measures would play a key role in peace and security (2008, 142). This understanding of security order would not last, and it shifted towards the “nationalization of security” paradigm. This change took place slowly in the final years of President Cardoso government. Cervo claims that “a mixture of realism and idealism, in which the role of leadership in South American and the need of pushing back the United

\(^4\) “Mais do que os estadistas que fundaram a República, Rio Branco alçou as preocupações com a segurança ao nível mais elevado de sua atuação diplomática.” (2008, 126).

\(^5\) “O dilema que a segurança formulou à política exterior durante a segunda metade do século XX foi de construir ou não meios de potência, ou seja, de defesa e dissuasão.” (2008, 128).
States entered in the calculus of means, ends and risks.” (Cervo 2008, 142). In this sense, preferences for alignment and the acceptance of the multilateral security started to lose credit in Brazilian policy-making. According to the author, the hallmark for such change was the 1996 National Defense Policy (Brasil 1996). Some policies proposed in that document, as building deterrence capabilities could complicate and possible induce a competition for influence in South America between Brazil and the U.S. The distance between both countries was clear when Brazil hosted and led the First Meeting of South American Presidents, in 2000. This event was seen as a new launching of South American regionalism.

Although Cardoso wasn’t Cervo’s object of analysis, his analyses about changes in regional defense cooperation and foreign policy are relevant to analyze the creation of the CDS as a possible rupture with the previous pattern of hemispheric cooperation. Using Cervo’s typology we can state that a change from “strategy of association” to a more autonomous path and a regional governance of defense issues was in its way.

In a similar manner, to explain regional security and Brazilian actions in Defense, as the CDS, Fiori (2010) departs from a perspective of competition between Brazil and U.S. By using the concept of “competitive pressure”, Fiori claims that since President Lula’s government, competition for regional leadership is increasing and that affects Brazil directly, including in issues of security and defense. It is interesting to note that this pressure does not have to do only with the United States, but also with South-American contenders, as the regional project of Hugo Chávez Venezuela. This pressure has its origins in the hemispheric (U.S.) and regional (Venezuela) levels. The principal effect of it is the deceleration6 of regional integration and the increasing U.S. presence in the region (mainly military).

According to Fiori (2010), Brazilian foreign policy to the region is now more robust when is about defending its regional integration project. The author highlights the expansion of Mercosur, the creation of Unasur and the CDS during President Lula’s administration. The author also points that Brazilian efforts were successful in putting to an end the Free Trade Area of the

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6 Especially when speaking of deepening of regional integration.
Americas (FTAA) initiative. He also points to the reduced relevance of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in the period. Again, Brazilian attitude of proposing the CDS is explained in the context of Brazil-U.S. relations, with a minor role played by regional contenders. As does Cervo (2008), Fiori (2010) gives emphasis in factors from the system levels (hemispheric and regional). Soft balancing and cooperation as an self-help strategy appears to be in place here.

Other perspective was developed by Argentinian analyst Calle (2010). He questions if Brazilian proposal was possible because U.S. delegated responsibilities in regional security governance towards Brazil or, on the contrary, it is related to a process in which Brazil rises as a regional power with global aspirations. The author claims attention to the fact that South America doesn’t play a central role in U.S. foreign policy nor in its defense agenda. Albeit this may be true, it doesn’t mean that the region is irrelevant to the U.S. government. On the other hand, South America has been for a long time a priority for Brazilian administrations.

When analyzing President Lula’s government, Calle speaks of the importance of Brazil as a regional moderator in the region (Calle 2010, 313). He also points to projects for modernizing national defense structures in Brazil, and says that those are important dimensions of changes in the country, particularly a clear desire to pursue a regional power and leadership status. Differently from Cervo (2008) and Fiori (2010), Calle (2010) doesn’t stresses on the centrality of U.S.-Brazil competition for influence in South America. In this perspective, CDS can be explained by changes in Brazilian objectives and the related strategies of foreign policy in reaction to hemispheric and regional politics.

Cervo (2008), Fiori (2010) and Calle (2010) bases their analyses based in Brazilian reactions to events in the region of hemispheric levels. Although changes in the system produce changes in foreign policy preferences or strategies, it seems that a soft balance strategy prevails in the context of creation of the CDS. Other possible explanation can depart from the analyses of international organizations, especially on how their failure can demand for institutional responses. In her analyze of UNASUR, Herz (2010) states that “it is clear, however, that these actors are necessary, because there is potential
room for regional cooperation, or because the OAS is nowadays an organization that lacks legitimacy in the view of governmental elites in a major part of South America. As Herz (2010) points out, the regional crisis in Central America in the eighties and the failure of the conflict resolution mechanisms, mainly related to the OAS, was the starting point for the idea that South and Latin American countries needed to create their own security coordination mechanisms. The establishment of Rio Group in 1989, and the latter Contadora Group were important to show that regional cooperation for conflict resolution was possible (Herz 2010, 339).

Similar to Fiori (2010) and Calle (2010), Herz (2010) understands that events as the diplomatic crisis between Colombia, Equator and Venezuela, in March 2008, help to comprehend the need for an organism as CDS. But differently from Calle (2010), Herz (2010) understands that CDS can be understood in the context of changes and problems faced by the Inter-American system. In this view, the creation of an institution as CDS would be explained by factors exogenous from the countries, just as the historic functional failure record in OAS conflict resolution mechanisms. There would be little role in this explanatory model for changes in identities or in domestic preferences facing defense cooperation.

Still in the realm of explanations related to organizations and institutional performance, Hal Klepak (2007, 12) gives ammunition to the points claimed by Herz (2010). He says that the hemispheric security system is silent, and sometimes irrelevant in relation to the majority of defense and security issues faced. In a distinct manner from Herz, Klepak reduces the weight of the U.S. in explaining OAS systemic failure. He says that,

"Los EE.UU. desean ver un sistema mucho más eficiente, capaz de responder rápidamente y sin fisuras, a sus necesidades de apoyo en la región y en el mundo. Pero la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos no confía actualmente lo suficiente en Washington y en sus objetivos regionales o mundiales, como para involucrarse

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7 "fica claro, contudo, que esses atores são necessários, seja porque há um potencial de cooperação na região, seja porque a OEA é hoje uma organização com pouca legitimidade do ponto de vista das elites governamentais na maior parte da América do Sul."
Saint-Pierre (2006) is skeptical about this. He points that the continent is under U.S. hegemony. Latin-America, in this sense, is nothing but a backyard for the United States and it cannot tolerate either instability nor loss of freedom of action in the region. In Saint-Pierre view, one that Fiori (2010) seems to agree with, the U.S. can be faced by challenges from South America. Problematic States with tendencies for crisis could be a problem. On the other hand, emerging States capable of competing with the U.S. could implicate in that country loss of freedom of action in South America (2006, 194). Although this analysis is previous to the creation of CDS, it is convergent with others discussed until now and helps to understand CDS as a possible balancing movement.

Saint-Pierre and Castro (2008) also put emphasis in the problems of the hemispheric mechanisms of conflict resolution. But these authors claims that the Brazilian proposal was driven by national interest, not as a reaction to institutional failure\(^8\). Failure in conflict resolution by the OAS was a contextual feature, but didn’t have causal force. As a proposal related to national interest, Brazilian attitude was seen suspicious not only by the U.S., but by regional neighbors. Saint-Pierre and Castro (2008) conclude by saying that the Brazilian initiative is of strategic nature.

In spite of stressing in different factors and variables, in a broader sense, these explanations emphasize on the international (hemispheric or regional) level. The Brazilian initiative can be seen as a balancing movement towards the U.S. or other regional competitor, or as a response to institutional failure of the hemispheric security and defense architecture in preventing or solving conflicts. Alongside with these strategies of explanations, there are options that stress on domestic factors, especially related to Brazilian national defense policy and strategy transformations.

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\(^8\) According to this reasoning, a context marked by institutional failure wouldn’t be the main cause of the proposal. Instead, it could work as a intervenient variable in which context national interest would operate in.
Miyamoto (2010) views transformations in Brazilian defense policies as related to broader changes in the country’s foreign policy. National objectives are directed to gain more autonomy and decision power in world affairs. Miyamoto states that, “Junto al intento de ocupar más espacio en la arena política y económica mundial, en esta década Brasil se ha preocupado por otra variable que hasta hace pocos años merecía atención secundaria: la política de defensa y de reequipamiento de las fuerzas armadas.” (2010, 160). In this sense, foreign policy meets military power as the expression of national power. According to this reasoning, Brazilian preference for CDS can be explained as an outcome of foreign policy changes and Oliveira (2008) seems to agree with it.

According to Oliveira (2008), CDS must be understood in the context of changes in foreign policy and its impacts in defense policy during President Lula’s administration, especially in his second term in government. In the context of rising investments on military equipment and transformation of the Defense Ministry, South American Defense Council would have the finality to avoid the occurrence of armed conflict in the region and avoid balancing movements against Brazil. In other words, CDS could be a multilateral expression of Brazilian Defense policy. In short, CDS proposal is an expression of “cooperation as self-help”. This interpretative line gains ground when we analyze the speeches and academic papers of important members of President Lula government, as Special Advisor of the Presidency for International Affairs, Marco Aurélio Garcia.

Garcia (2010) speaks of the “regionalization of national interest” by Brazil. Although he introduces the National Defense Strategy (Brasil, 2008) as a “deterrence military doctrine”, in his words “the success of a national development project is now considered inseparable of the advances that can be achieved by the entire region” (2010, 300). In this sense, the deterrent effect wanted by the National Defense Strategy wouldn’t aim any neighbor. CDS

9 In a context without arms build-up the CDS would still have the effect of preventing regional conflicts, deterring extra-regional threats and producing information and confidence measures in the region (Teixeira Jr. 2011).
10 “o êxito de um projeto nacional de desenvolvimento do Brasil passou a ser considerado inseparável dos avanços que possam ser logrados no conjunto da região.” (2010, 300).
would be a proof and a mechanism of Brazilian desire of cooperation with the region. According to Garcia, “the creation of the CDS follows from one concern: to endow the region with an institution that could prevent, through negotiation, eventually created conflicts or tensions”\(^\text{11}\) (Garcia 2010, 303). For him, the South American Defense Council is the result of other vision of regional integration. Despite Garcia saying that CDS is result of another vision of regional integration, what could be related to changes in identity, South American Defense Council seems more as an instrumental and complementary institution of a regional strategy, related to foreign policy goals.

CDS, when related to Brazilian strategic vision has a double function (Medeiros Filho 2010). First, as a mechanism for consultation, cooperation and resolution of shared regional problems faced by the region. Second, CDS is a political instrument able to produce deterrence effects through regional cooperation. For Brazil, CDS has inner region orientation – preoccupied in boosting regional cooperation and a security community - and an extra-regional orientation, designed to produce conventional deterrence. Both perspectives are evaluated by Medeiros Filho (2010) as geopolitically inedited in the region.

It is clear till now that the academic debate presented here is not yet conclusive on what led Brazil to do propose the CDS. The debate provides a good amount of rival explanations, placed normally in different levels of analysis and stressing distinct variables.

In order to clear our understanding of the proposed object of analysis, we will analyze the changing meanings of security and defense cooperation held by Brazil during the years. We will map the changes in defense cooperation in the international, hemispheric, regional and domestic levels. We will put emphasis in the reconstruction of the timing of events and policies in order to define the direction of causality and explain the event that is the Brazilian proposal of the South American Defense Council of Unasur.

3. Timing of events and policies: the hemispheric and regional levels

\(^\text{11}\) “A formação do Conselho [CDS] decorreu de uma preocupação: dotar a região de uma instância que pudesse prevenir, pela via da negociação, conflitos ou tensões eventualmente criados.” (Garcia 2010, 303).
Despite maintaining Westphalian characteristics in its foreign policy and State identity, historically Brazil uses international cooperation as a strategy for improving the country’s security and influence in both the hemisphere and world orders. During the Second World War, in 1942 Brazil participated in the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), an institution created by U.S. hemispheric influence and leadership. In 1946 was signed in Rio de Janeiro the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the so called Rio Treaty. Under the argument of hemispheric defense, the collective security system from which the Treaty was a mechanism had to do with broader geostrategic concerns, related to the Cold War. According to Cervo (2008) it is during this period that the logic of “collective security” would prevail in Brazilian strategic behavior towards the role of cooperation for national defense. This preference would stand from 1945 to the end of the sixties. In this historical context, Brazilian security is associated with the security of the western hemisphere. In this sense, defense and security cooperation and coordination was the option chosen to deal with that reality.

The Organization of American States was created in 1948. Brazil then began its participation in a hemispheric organization with a clear mandate in security issues and policies. Aside to these treaties and organizations, cooperative relations between singular branches of the armed forces were set in motion. Not only in the political level in the IADB, but in other initiatives as the Conference of American Armies, Inter-American Naval Conferences, System of Cooperation among the Air Forces of America. Military cooperation was also held in the U.S. Army School of Americas. Alongside with the OAS, the interaction of singular branches of the Armed Forces in the Americas would promote a first and systematic dialogue between then. It is important to stress that the focal point for cooperation was the communist threat and domestic subversion.

Cervo (2008) claimed that this hemispheric and security architecture, in this period, was orientated for collective security. Latin American countries incorporated and acted accordingly to U.S. Cold War strategy. In several moments, the hemispheric architecture was questioned and contested by Brazil, especially during the period known as “Independent Foreign Policy” (Política
Externa Independente) conducted by Chancellor Santiago Dantas, in the early sixties. This line of conduct was only to be retaken by military presidents Costa e Silva and Geisel, when Brazil step aside from its automatic alignment with the U.S.

During the eighties and the nineties in several occasions the inter-American system went through a difficult period. Its inability and institutional inadequacy to quickly act in face of armed conflicts and the heavy weight of the Cold War agenda set the System into paralysis. In the second half of the eighties, initiatives as the Contadora Group and the Rio Group made clear that new institutions and strategies were needed to deal with the region security in the final years of the Cold War and after it. Brazil, with other countries from South and Latin America, was successful in creating the Rio Group, a relevant ad hoc multilateral mechanism. The rise of regional and sub-regional multilateral security mechanisms denotes the absence of consensus in relation to perceptions and meanings about security, defense, threats and related policies between the countries of the hemisphere. Despite this new security reality, OAS didn’t lose its centrality in the region.

Other important initiative in defense and security cooperation in the hemisphere was the creation in 1994 of the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, which held its first meeting in Williamsburg, in 1995. In the following meetings, the plurality of perceptions on threats and the very concept of security and in the role of the Armed forces were made clearer. The distance between Brazilian and U.S. positions has also grown. The proponed idea of “multidimensional security”, articulated in the OAS during debates on deepening the concept of security, was turned in a broad conceptual umbrella for accommodating several perceptions about threat, risk and vulnerabilities in the Americas. Brazil endorsed a part of this rhetoric and world understanding by moving its security preferences towards “multilateral security”. This move is clear in 1996 National Defense Policy (Brasil 1996).

Despite of agreeing partially with this new understanding, Brazil and other South American countries have played a major role transforming regional security and defense cooperation. In the final years of the nineties, during its first term in government, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez proposed the
creation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization. This organization would have similar purposes like NATO and should count with a collective security mechanism. Although the idea was not welcome by several countries in the region, including Brazil, Venezuela went in search for broader its defense cooperation in the region. As a broader foreign policy objective, the country invested on spreading its own ideology and regional project, Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). On the other hand, Brazil, despite participating in ad hoc initiatives as the Rio Group didn’t challenge the hemispheric system and it leader, the U.S.

In fact, the centrality of the United States in the security and defense governance in the region and the prevalence of the OAS were to be questioned in a strong way in 2008, with the creation of the South American Defense Council. Brazil played a key role in this initiative. In 15 of December 2008, under Brazilian leadership the CSD was formally created as part of the political regional bloc, UNASUR. This new regional reality would bring implications to the traditional defense and security cooperation mechanisms and for the region itself.

Unlike the previous hemispheric architecture, the CDS abandons the concept of collective security and embraces the idea of cooperative security. By not having the intention of forming a traditional military alliance, the South American Defense Council created a more flexible cooperative mechanism to regional defense governance. As its main characteristics, we may stress that CDS cannot be seen as an “inclusive security regime” (Wallander & Keohane, 1999). Brazilian proposal, accepted by South American countries, excludes the U.S. and Canada and focus in defense cooperation in South America, for South Americans\(^\text{12}\).

In the next section, we will map the changes in policy and events in the domestic level that helps to explain the relation between Brazil and the South American Defense Council. We shall focus in the internal transformations in the Defense Policies and Strategies and in the role of regional cooperation for national defense.

\(^{12}\) We developed this analysis more deeply in Teixeira Jr. (2011)
4. Timing of events and policies: the domestic level.

Documents as the National Defense Policy (Brasil 1996; 2005) and the National Defense Strategy (Brasil 2008) reflect the evaluation that national elites do about the international scenario and prospective trends. Besides, these documents states Brazil's position in relation to defense and security and provides guidance for strategic behavior.

From 1989 to 1992 the world saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the U.S. as the Cold War victor and that country ascension to the condition of the lone superpower. The international power structure, identified by some as unipolar (Krauthammer 1990) and by others as uni-multipolar (Huntington 1999) brought new facts to defense decision-makers in Brazil.

Brazil created its first National Defense Policy very late, only in 1996, during the first government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The domestic political context wasn’t the better. It was on progress a very difficult political reality of establishing civil rule over the militaries, not only in the area of National Defense, but in the broader political arena. The first Defense Policy was created before the Defense Ministry, in 1999. In that Policy the issue of international cooperation appears as a continuation of the Brazilian commitment to the hemispheric architecture, in particular with OAS. The idea of “multilateral security” was put in motion in that period. Brazilian government understood that its security would be better guaranteed if the country participated in the major regimes that ordered international security. In that context, Brazil signed the Missile Technology Control Regime (1995) and later the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1998).

The National Defense Policy passed through its first revision during President Lula’s first government, in 2005. The document highlights South America as Brazil’s main concern and priority for cooperation. South America as a priority appears not only in traditional agendas, as of regional integration, but in defense and security too. With more importance that was given in the 1996 version, 2005 document advances in its comprehension of South American geopolitics and articulates better the country foreign policy objectives with national defense. The emphasis in the centrality of the Amazon region and
South Atlantic Ocean was related to the need of giving more attention to already existing cooperative structures, as the Amazon Cooperation Treaty\textsuperscript{13} and the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. In this Policy it is possible to see more clearly strategic priorities and more well develop guidelines for action. In a general sense, in 2005 National Defense Policy (Brasil, 2005) there is a perception that more attention is needed to regional instead of hemispheric security. Changes in strategies can be observed not only in the level of the Presidency (as seen in Garcia 2010) but in other parts of government, but not changes in identity.

In 2006, was released a document called “Cadernos NAE – gestão estratégica de longo prazo” (Brasil 2006), produced by the \textit{Núcleo de Assuntos Estratégicos} of the Presidency. It is possible to view in its differences in how Brazilian elite bureaucrats views defense and security cooperation. Under the title Projeto Brasil 3 tempos: 2007, 2015 e 2022 – cenários prospectivos”, the document lists several guidelines for advancing the country’s capabilities, development and international role. We give emphasis to the nº41 strategic topic, “National Defense System”, in which is proposed to,

\begin{quote}
[Brazil] Strengthen defense capabilities, by itself or as part of a collective defense system with neighbor countries, to face new threats and challenges, guarantee protection of the territory and endorse international negotiations\textsuperscript{14}. (Brasil 2006, 62).
\end{quote}

In the 2006 document it is possible to see an articulation between the national defense system and regional cooperation. We observe a connection between defense cooperation, military capabilities and foreign policy. The same evaluation and strategic proposal appeared again in other government policy paper from the \textit{Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República} (SAE). In the document “Agenda para o futuro do Brasil” (Brasil 2007), the same idea appears again now as the strategic topic nº 39. It is

\textsuperscript{13} Signed by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela.
\textsuperscript{14} “Fortalecimento da capacidade de defesa, isoladamente ou como parte de um sistema coletivo de defesa com os países vizinhos, para enfrentar novas ameaças e desafios, garantir a proteção de seu território e respaldar negociações de âmbito internacional. [grifo nosso] (Brasil 2006, 62).”
interesting to observe that in those documents although articulates regional cooperation with national defense objectives, they speak of collective security. But CDS speaks of cooperative security. A more clear idea of the CDS project was exposed by Defense Minister Jobim.

In 2008, the Defense Minister Nelson Jobim published in the journal *Interesse National* an article in which he presented to public debate some changes in the Brazilian government related to Defense issues. In the article *Plano Estratégico de Defesa* (2008) Jobim exposed Brazilian government reasons to the creation of a South American Defense Council, yet not a regional consensus at the time. A project, that Jobim presented and tried to sell by traveling to all South American countries (Moreira 2008).

The increasing focus on South America and in regional cooperation as a national defense complementary strategy was also presented in the National Defense Strategy (BRASIL 2008). Probably, till then this was the most important Defense document ever published in Brazil. In it is clear that now the priority was the regional level, not the hemispheric defense and security system and its mechanisms.

This document articulates a positive evaluation of regional integration for promoting military cooperation in South America. Along the main themes of cooperation, there is an emphasis in the integration of defense industrial bases, boosting cooperation in the so called strategic surroundings and the main objective of Brazil for promoting regional stability. The National Defense Strategy is explicit about South American Defense Council. It claims that,

> The South American Defense Council under debate in the region will create an advisory mechanism that will allow conflict prevention and promote regional military cooperation and the integration of the defense industrial bases, without the participation of any country foreign to the region. (Brasil 2008, 17).

The transformation of regional defense cooperation culminates with the formal creation of the South American Defense Council, in December 2008. For

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15 “O Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano, em debate na região, criará mecanismo consultivo que permitirá prevenir conflitos e fomentar a cooperação militar regional e a integração das bases industriais de defesa, sem que dele participe país alheio à região.” (Brasil 2008, 17).
this political outcome Brazilian attitude was crucial. Since the proposal to the creation of a minimum consensus about the CDS to the ongoing debate about regional deterrence and shared regional defense, Brazil is clearly changing the way it relates national defense with regional cooperation.

5. Preliminary conclusions

Before starting with the preliminary conclusions, it is important to stress that this paper doesn’t intend to be exhaustive. It is part of a broader research related to my Ph.D thesis (work in progress). Our intention here was to shed light about the reasons that led Brazil to propose the creation of the South American Defense Council, stressing of political changes from the hemispheric/international level, to changes in domestic politics in Brazil. For that, tracing the timing related to events and policies helped us to see the proposal of CDS by Brazil as part of a broader changing international reality, adaptation and changes in preferences.

We presented intergovernmental cooperation with focus in defense and security as a sensitive field in International Relations literature. Based on these debates, we thought it was useful to pay attention in institutional factors, material dimension of power (capabilities) and in historical cultural dimension in order to explain the proposed puzzle.

We have brought the debate more near to regional reality by analyzing distinct explanations. We’ve divided those between those that favor the hemispheric, regional and domestic levels of analysis. In these explanations, Brazilian proposal of the CDS can be explained as a soft balancing initiative (U.S. or regional contenders) or as a reaction to institutional failure (OAS). But the data analyzed till now pushes us to understand the proposal as a reaction motivated by changes in Foreign Policy strategy, reevaluation of the utility of force in the international system, coped with the role of regional integration/cooperation stressed by President Lula government. The analysis of policy documents, not only from the Defense Ministry helps us to see that the place of South America in Brazilian strategy was already shifting previous the diplomatic conflict between Colombia, Equator and Venezuela or the increasing
military presence of the U.S. in the region. We understand that what was in place were changes in preferences, but not of identity. Cooperation as self-help could be a more viable explanation then strategic culture and shift in identity.

We understand that more research is needed as well as more data to better sustain this explanation. It is clear that the international/hemispheric level and the events related to it were relevant. But as we see, they didn't have causal force to produce the outcome that is the Brazilian proposal for the CDS. We observed that the changes in preferences and the related strategies (foreign policy and defense) that resulted in the proposal are related to a deep and slow process of preference changes. In short, we state that probably the direction of causality proposed here goes from the domestic level to the regional one.

One more time, we stress that these findings are preliminary, more research and access to data are needed to more strong inferences. We hope to provide this in a latter moment of the research in my Ph.D thesis.

References


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