“Pacification” and the (re) production of the national state: re-inscribing Brazil’s engagement in the United Nations mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Maira Siman Gomes
'It may turn out then, that, going back could be a way to go forward'.

Marshall Berman

Through a post-positivist reading of foreign policy making, the paper argues that Brazil’s decision to play a leading military role in the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) reproduces and preserves a singular way of representing and dealing with ‘internal others’ and of building the (Brazilian) national state. The paper explores two Brazilian ‘pacification’ narratives trying to understand ‘pacification’ as a ‘foreign policy’ practice which, as part of a broader politics of identity, creates the conditions for the production and reproduction of the modern national State and its assumed pattern of being and behavior. It is expected that this specific gaze backwards not only helps going forward in understanding Brazil’s engagement in Haiti but, in accordance to the topic proposed for this Panel, also contribute, with a view from the ‘South’, to a more complex theorizing on international intervention, especially when considering the participation of post-colonial states in UN peace operations.

The paper is divided in four parts. The first part briefly presents the main points of a critical reading of ‘foreign policy analysis emphasizing a poststructuralist standpoint on ‘foreign’ policy. The second part proposes an understanding of ‘pacification’ based on an analysis of two 19th century Brazilian ‘pacification narratives’: the ‘Pacification of the Regency Rebellions’ and the ‘Pacification of Amerindians’. These narratives articulate specific understandings of the ‘other’ and a certain relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’. While the third part of the paper presents some conventional foreign policy explanations used to justify Brazil’s decision to play a leading role in MINUSTAH, the last part elaborates some ideas on the paper’s analytical proposition trying to (re)inscribe Brazilian engagement in Haiti inside a historical (and still lively) ‘logic of pacification’.

1 The argument proposed in this paper is part of my ongoing PhD dissertation at the Institute of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio).
1) **Foreign Policy, identity and the (re)production of the State**

Since the 80’s, a diversity of works in IR has been approaching the problematic of identity and/or alterity and its relation with the behavior of states in the international system. The relatively recent wave of so called post-positivist approaches in International Relations brought a new perspective to foreign policy theorizing. The works of David Campbell (1998), Roxanne Doty (1993; 1996), Iver Neumann (1996;1998) and Lene Hansen (2002), among others, have challenged the cognitive validity, empirical objectivity, and universalist and rationalist claims of idealist, realist, and neorealist schools alike in international relations” (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989, p. ix). Contesting the premise that there is a reality “out there”, where decision makers act, these works, heavily influenced by poststructuralism², consider that individuals always operate within a discursive space in which certain identities and meanings about the world are imposed on them, and where specific realities within which they make decisions, and act, are produced (Shapiro, 1988 cited in Doty, 1993, p. 303).

Lene Hansen, for instance, in her book “Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War”, affirms that foreign policy always need a narrative, a story, of the problems and questions that are being approached (Hansen, 2006, p. xvi) and, as a discursive practice, foreign policy is legitimated based in one, or many, identities. Advancing on a new relationship between identity and foreign policy, it is proposed that identities are understood as constituted and reproduced simultaneously with the formulation of foreign policy (Hansen, 2006; Campbell, 1998, Doty, 1993). The notion that “identity” and “foreign policy” are linked through discourse does not denote, nevertheless, the existence of a causal relation: “representations of identity are simultaneously the precondition for and (re)produced through articulations of foreign policy” (Hansen, 2006, p. 10). In epistemological terms, it means that it is impossible to define “identity” as a

² In very simple terms, one may say that Poststructuralism aim to disturb the conventional ways of knowledge production in IR and to understand how the questions and problems, and the very subjects of International relations, are constituted through discourses and by world politics texts (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989, p. ix).
variable separated from “foreign policy” and as a *cause* of a foreign policy decision. In this regard, differently from traditional constructivist theories, authors adopting a post-structuralist standpoint do not consider that foreign policy decision-makers construct, based on their pre-established identities, the “reality” inside which they deliberately and consciously act (Campbell, 1992).

According to Lene Hansen, the assumption that foreign policies draw upon representations of identity is linked to a conceptualization of identity as “*discursive, political, relational and social*” (Hansen, 2006, p.6). Identities are *discursive* and *political* because their representations place foreign policy issues within particular a particular interpretative perspective – “one with consequences for which foreign policy can be formulated as an adequate response” (Hansen, 2006, p.6). As a *discourse*, identities are not objective facts, located in some extra-discursive realm, and cannot be used to measure behavior. Identities are *relational* because they are always given through reference to something is not and social since it is established through a set of collectively – not individually - articulated codes (Hansen, 2006, p.6).

Moreover, concerned mainly with the formation of the identity of the state, poststructuralists’ scholars have tried to show how foreign policy discourses are *discourses of difference*, that work differentiating a ‘self’ from an ‘other’ in a way to emphasize a particular identity of the State, or even (re)produce this very State – taken as a given in traditional studies of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). According to Karin Fierke, identity exists inside a *relationship*: as a social category, identity is not only the expression of the meaning that the actor gives to itself (Fierke, 2007, p. 76). “Self-definitions” are related to both to the definitions that actors give to others and to definitions given to the actor by others (Fierke, 2007, p. 76). This relational dimension suggests, moreover, that identity is in some sense constituted by *difference*. Identity – of an individual, of a State or another social group – is always established in relation to a series of socially recognized differences; and it is specifically those differences that support the existence of the identity in question, once an identity only exists in relation to another entity (Connoly, In: Fierke, 2007, p. 77).
Bahar Rumelili, explores a division between ‘liberal constructivists’ and ‘critical constructivists’ (which include authors using post-structuralism) considering the importance and meaning that each group gives to ‘difference’ in the process of identity formation. According to her, ‘liberal constructivists’ do not worry about the constitutive role of difference in the formation of identities - the ‘other’ is not constituted in relation to difference (Rumelili, 2004). The formation of identity is understood as a socialization process in which an individual (or the State) see itself according to the way other see him. The ‘other’ merely represents another subject that only takes part in the constitution of the ‘self’ when it names and recognizes it – the ‘other’ does not represent an alternative and different identity. In this ‘liberal constructivist’ perspective the terms ‘self’ and ‘other’ do not indicate the existence of a constitutive relationship between identity and difference and ‘self’ and ‘other’ are usually used to denote any kind of relation between any two States. Differently, “critical constructivist” works, based mostly in post-structuralism, support that meanings and senses articulated in relation to difference are central to the production of the ‘self’. While ‘liberal constructivist’/’conventional constructivists’ still believe in the existence of an autonomous subject - such as the State - that, informed by its identity, decides over its action and behavior, critical authors do not admit the possibility of a pre-conceived State, with a defined and fixed identity. Subjects and identities are effects of foreign policy decision making processes (Campbell, 1998 In: Fierke, 2007, p. 87).

For Richard Ashley, the relationship between policies and identities/selves is not only a constitutive one, but it is above all a performative relationship (Ashley, 1987) in a way that it needs to be constantly performed through specific discursive practices - such as international interventions. In her book “Simulating Sovereignty”, Cyntia Weber helps understanding how the State, which is not a stable concept and does not have an ontological status, can be localized, constituted and have a stabilized meaning (Weber, 1995). According to Weber, there is a constant dispute for fixing a specific understanding of sovereignty and for ‘writing’ the State: “this is not a one-time occurrence which fixes the meaning of sovereignty and statehood for all time in all places; rather, this struggle is repeated in various forms at numerous spatial and temporal locales” (Weber, 1995, p. 3). In this regard, the question that should be asked is: “what forms of doing – state practices – legitimate forms of being – sovereign states”? (Weber, 1995, p. 4). Localizing the State in
the boarders between sovereignty and intervention, Weber explores the mutual dependency among these two terms, arguing that intervention is a practice (of foreign policy, one might add) that works stabilizing and fixing a specific understanding of sovereignty (Weber, 1995).

The work of Roxanne Doty has the merit to show how the relationship identity-difference supports binary and hierarchical representations between ‘self’ and ‘other’ and how these representations help to legitimate interventionist foreign policies (Doty, 1993). Discourses about international norms, such as those about the principles of democracy and human rights protection, are interlinked by binary structurations in which, for democracy to be a significant identity, the existence of its logical opposite is necessary: non-democratic. In this sense, a foreign policy which articulates the promotion of democracy and human rights is necessarily productive of two categories of identity – ‘a moral superior identity of democratic juxtaposed to the inferior identity of non (or less) democratic’ (Rumelili, 2003; p.31). Analyzing specifically the “imperial encounter” between colonizers and colonized subjects, Doty shows how the language articulates by the elite form the ‘North’ produces dichotomies through which difference (‘South’) is an inferior identity. In her work on North-American interventionism in the Philippines, Doty explores how practices of representation in the context of US foreign policy support binary oppositions in which “North” – constructed as rational/adult/good - is opposed to an irrational/child/bad “South” that needs to be, therefore, civilized, put under tutelage and modified (Doty, 1993).

In his 1992 famous book ‘Writing security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity’, David Campbell is worried about understanding how the State, or the inside, of the dichotomy inside/outside (Walker, 1992), is constituted as a collective self by practices of ‘foreign policy’. Looking at the historical production and reproduction of the United States self, Campbell argues that State’ identities results from practices of exclusion through which elements that contradict and disrupt the security of the ‘self’ on the ‘inside’ are linked, by a discourse of fear, to dangers identified and placed on the “outside” (Campbell, 1992, p.68). Based on this argument, Campbell makes an interesting differentiation between “Foreign Policy” (with capital letter) and “foreign policy”. The last one (that may be called “micro foreign policy”) give the discursive economy or the grade of
intelligibility in which the first one (macro-foreign policy) is realized and reproduced. “Foreign Policy” is close to dominant understandings in the foreign policy studies and, therefore, is less related to the production of the State’s identity: this “macro” Foreign Policy acts, according to Campbell, reproducing the identity made possible by “micro” foreign policies or, even, containing threats against the representations of this identity. While ‘foreign policy’ refers to all modes of exclusion and all kinds of practices of differentiation articulated in the ‘internal’ domain of the State, ‘Foreign Policy’ - usually identified with diplomats’ and decision makers’ actions - is interpreted as a practice of creation of borders essential to the preservation of the identity in whose name it operates. In other words, ‘Foreign Policy’ works protecting and reproducing identities created by “foreign policies” that deals with “internal” others (Campbell, 1992). According to Campbell, the two foreign policy understandings are essential and inseparable in order to analyze foreign policy in the making. Both understandings have to be taken into consideration when thinking about the identity and the behavior of the State.

Campbell’s insights re-signify traditional interpretations of foreign policy: foreign policy is not about the interaction between pre-conceived state units, with a-historical and stable borders. For the author, foreign policy/Foreign Policy does not refer to the establishment of bridges between an “inside” and an “outside” and should rather be seen as a boundary making policy which produces, simultaneously, the very State, the international system and its ‘others’. Foreign policy is, therefore, a politics of identity that, through specific representations and discourses, constitute events and actors as ‘foreign/strangers’. Differently from traditional foreign policy explanations, actors and events are not seen as “external” and/or foreigners because they are placed ‘outside’, or in opposition to, the State: the constitution of what it is considered ‘foreign’, or of what is ‘outside’ is in itself the result of practices that constitute the domestic/internal and the State self (Campbell, 1992).

According to Campbell, in order to ensure that the ambiguities and contradictions of the imagined national self be kept hidden and controlled, discourse and politics of security must articulate a dangerous and “external” “other” (Campbell, 1992 p.9). In this perspective, ‘foreign policy’ is a discourse of danger and fear in which it is precisely the representation of the other as a threatening entity that creates the conditions of possibility
for the modern State to exist. States are specially, but not uniquely, reproduced by the articulation of ‘radical alterities’ or by otherness - process through which the construction of the other is based in discourses of enmity and antagonism, in which difference is equated to danger: it is the negative identification with the other that guarantees the differentiation and separation of the (national) self.

Although most of the literature is focused on how identity may be reinforced through the negation of the other (or by what identity is not), Lene Hansen complexities this approach by affirming that the production of identities by foreign policy practices does not need to follow a pattern of radical alterity (Hansen, 2006). Identity may be articulated by different degrees of alterity, from fundamental, and almost absolute, difference between self and other to a degree of less radical difference. In the same line, Nizar Messari suggests that political identity does not always operate in relation to a completely different and threatening other (Messari, 2001). Messari argues that identity can also be reinforced through the articulation of allied “others” and, therefore, by the affirmation of links and characteristics emphasizing positive identification between self and other (Messari, 2001). In a discussion on the position adopted by the United States during the Bosnian War, Messari affirms that the identity of the State may be produced through the articulation of others represented as allies (such as happened with the muslims in Bosnia) (Messari, 2001).

Considering identities as representations negotiated at a specific moment and in a given space, Messari argues, based on Tzvetan Todorov’s insights, that the construction of the self implies three attitudes towards difference: a) indifference towards the other; b) complete exclusion; c) assimilation (Messari, 2001)\(^3\). For the purpose of this paper’s argument, the most relevant point elaborated by Messari is the idea that the act of dealing with difference (both in the ‘domestic’ realm and in the ‘international’ arena) “(...) may

\(^3\) According to Todorov, the relation with the other does not occur in one sole direction. Three different axes of otherness exist: the first axis is axiological; the second paraaxiological; the third is epistemic. In the first axis, the other is good or bad and superior or inferior. In the second, there is the action of rapprochement or distancing of the self from the other. In a politics of rapprochement, the self may adopt values of the other (subordinating itself to the other) or may assimilate the other, imposing its own image and values (Todorov, 2003:269). In the third, epistemological axis, the self either ignores or knows the other. In this axis, there is an infinite gradation of inferior and superior knowledge about the other (Todorov, 2003 p.270).
take the form of both a desire to transform the dangerous other into the self (exclusion); and of assimilation, when the other is seen as a ‘friend’ (Messari, 2001, p.230). In this last option, not all difference is transformed into otherness, and assimilation becomes a possibility in foreign policy making: “Assimilation and otherness are the two facets of foreign policy making” (Messari, 2001, p.234).

Hansen’s and Messari’s ideas deal with limitations in Campbell’s arguments which give too much centrality to the logic of otherness in the production of State identity. In fact, in spite of recognizing that affirmative discourses emphasizing shared elements between self and other also act in identity construction processes, Campbell and other poststructuralist authors clearly considers that discourses of exclusion and fear are more efficient towards building the identity of the state. In this sense, one may argue that this approach may be insufficient to understand the (re)production of the State ‘self’ in (discursive and material) contexts where ‘others’ do not need to be essentially articulated through representations and discourses of danger and as entities that need to be excluded or contained⁴ - such it might be the case of Brazil in its own process of identity formation and reproduction via foreign/Foreign policy/Policy practices.

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⁴ Nevertheless, one should add some points - not considered by Hansen and Messari – that help to justify - but also to put into question – the importance given by Campbell to conditions of otherness in the production of identity. For instance, it is necessary to consider that when Campbell emphasizes that most effective foreign policies are those that are able to articulate threatening others, he is referring to an identity produced in a specific place and time: in the United States during the Cold War. As the author affirms, the Cold War is a hallmark period in the production and reproduction of the North-American identity, whose character did not essentially depend on the representation of the Soviet Union. The modes of representation of communism and of the URSS - as threatening others - reproduce a logic found in historical articulations of danger (Campbell, 1992). On the one hand, it is clear that the way US foreign policy makers represent the Soviet Union is related to the fact that communist material practices operate in opposition to capitalism and liberal policies. On the other hand, one should consider that Campbell’ s genealogical gaze over historical forms of identity production, is guided by a desire the answer a question regarding conditions of the present – i.e., the rivalry between the United States and the URSS. Therefore, it is possible to say that the logic of radical alterity which produce United States’ identity is, in some sense, informed by modern articulations of US foreign policy to the Soviet Union. Moreover, beyond these aspects, which stresses the contingency of the logic of “radical alterity”, one may consider that Campbell’ s views on the formation of national identity is inevitably influenced by the material position occupied by the United States in the post-Cold War international system. The ‘United States’, as a collective identity, is produced from a site in which the constant exclusion and negation of “others” is supposed to be an essential condition for the preservation of its identity as a hegemonic power.
2) “Pacification” as a state-building (foreign) policy

The 19th century is usually defined as the primary Brazilian state-building period during which a geographical and cultural identity for “Brazil” was intensively (re)written. It is not uncommon an image of the Brazilian Empire as composed of a multitude of peoples which, due to their multiple differences, almost constitute “nations apart” (Souza, 2008, p.282). The possibilities of articulating a collective self called ‘Brazil’ is discussed through the presentation of two ‘pacification’ narratives that say about attempts of securing the integrity and cohesion of the State’s territory and its imagined ‘national community’. As it will be presented ‘pacification’ discourses have worked to produce local/regional insurgent groups and native peoples as collectivities in need of being integrated to the nation state under construction and as collectivities that need to be “civilized” and brought into modernity.

2.1.1) “Pacifying” the “Regency rebellions”: bringing order to the domain of anarchy

After its independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil was declared a constitutional monarchy under the head of Emperor Pedro I. In April 1831, the Emperor abdicated to the throne and, leaving behind his 5 years old son, forced the establishment of a government of regents between 1831 and 1840. This period was tormented by rebellions under various motivations, menacing to breach traditional social hierarchies and the territorial integrity of the nation State. The sequence of three Regencies reinforced old disagreements between liberals and conservatives on the better way to construct and maintain political and social order. During this period, nineteen regional/local rebellions broke out in the Empire5.

5The fear of territorial fragmentation and social convulsion was spread among the political elite, which struggled against the ‘culture of liberty’ cultivated by provincial groups, including local elites, middle classes composed by small businessmen (some of them mestiços/mulatos), and in some circumstances, slaves, ex-slaves and indigenous peoples. During Regency, nationalism was also exacerbated and led to a diversity of insurrections, both of popular nature, for example the Cabanagem (1833-1836), the Sabinada (1837-1838), and the Balaiada (1839-1841), as well as others of a separatist and republican nature, such as Guerra dos Farrapos (1835-1845).
In her studies regarding the role of Luiz Alves de Lima, future Duke of Caxias (known as The Pacificator), on the ‘pacification’ of local rebellions, Adriana Barreto de Souza constructs an understanding of ‘pacification’ as an administrative action in which coercive and peaceful actions are integrated in order to ‘civilize’ a population (Souza, 2008). According to her, pacification appears in this context as a political and military action supported by a discourse of order which articulates the submission of a territory to specific political principles (Souza, 2008). Mostly associated to a military strategy, the discourse on the “pacification” of rebels is, according to the historian Ilmar Mattos, a discourse that disqualifies politics and emphasizes an administrative action, especially because it speaks about the administrative liberties of the provinces and their populations (Mattos, 2004). In fact, in the context of Regency Rebellions, ‘pacification’ refers to the possibility of managing, through military and civil instruments, broader socio-political challenges and changes emerging at the level of the Province.

In these ‘pacification’ narratives, the ‘rebel’ is usually represented as an irrational and rude individual, incapable of containing his/her passions, who challenges the order envisaged by the center, and is unable both to govern a territory and to control a population. Rebels are frequently articulated in pacification discourses as ‘barbarians’ and ‘savages’ that are seen as potential contaminators of the spirit of order diffused ‘inside’ the sphere of the nation State. Violences committed under the label of ‘pacification’ is frequently portrayed in racial terms. A negative connection is forged between the ‘color’ of some rebel groups and their intellectual capacities. In fact, it is common to find official historical documents mentioning how ‘pacification’ strategies had to be applied to suppress

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6The academic literature on the “pacification” of Regency Rebellions is very scarce. Most of the studies look from a military perspective the innovative role of military during this period and emphasize military tactics of each “battle”/“pacification movement”. Additionally, a significant amount of military analysis praise the role played by Duke of Caxias in pressing the rebellions. Critical analyses on the “pacification” of regional and local rebellions are dispersed in the work of some historians debating 19th century state-building practices in Brazil.

7 The rebellions contested the execution of decrees approved by the political and administrative center (in Rio de Janeiro), as well as the superiority of the Empire in deciding about the organization of law and politics in the locality. The military suppression of the uprisings aimed to reinforce political centralization based on the practice of alternating the conservative and liberal parties in (central) power.
movements dominated by ‘people of color’ considered incapable of ruling themselves (Souza, 2008).

In some narratives, the famous Duke of Caxias (then Luiz Alves de Lima and today the patron of the Brazilian Army) is consecrated the creator of a *distinct form of repression*\(^8\). Caxias is frequently interpreted as a very unusual military, capable to efficiently apply strategies of *negotiation* and *reconciliation* (including with rebel leaders) in order to deal with a stratified society and to reorganize and preserve its (hierarchical) nature (Souza, 2008). The ‘conciliatory’ discourse articulated in the narrative of the pacification of Regency rebellions, put great emphasis on the (supposedly) neutral and diplomatic character of the military activity. In fact, in the narrative of Caxias as “The Pacificator”, his legacy resides in a specific understanding of the military as capable to induce a rapprochement of winners and losers and to negotiate their interests in the post-conflict context (Carneiro, 2010)\(^9\). Nevertheless, detached from any social egalitarian purpose, ‘pacification’, as a narrative, is configured as a political strategy aiming the reestablishment and conservation of social privileges and of the economic disparities sustaining them.

‘Pacification’ discourses of the Regency help to build an understanding of ‘pacification’ as a ‘foreign policy’ practice by which specific territories are constructed as being ‘external’ domains of anarchy, represented as sites of ambiguity in need to be assimilated and domesticated by the national State. Although one may argue that ‘pacification’ discourses in the case of the Regency Rebellions may differ from traditional enmity and antagonistic security discourses, it *does not* mean that ‘pacification’ practices are completely different from ideas and politics of conquest and war. The representation of “pacification” a involving a rapprochement between ‘self’ and ‘other’, in which some form of conciliation aspect is emphasized, *does not* at all reduce the multiple violences involved

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\(^8\)In traditional military conceptions, the ‘pacification’ of national territory and populations was not originally an intentional practice. It was with Duke of Caxias that it stopped being articulated as an *ad hoc* police procedure performed by the army and became an “action of command”, with specific directives and doctrine, extending to the post-conflict context. These words were collected from an interview made with Coronel Luiz Carneiro, in 13 August 2011.

\(^9\) One may not forget that Caxias’ innovative role in the repression of local rebellions was made possible by the autonomy and influence he had accumulated by his simultaneous position as military commander and president of the rebelled provinces.
in practices of assimilation. Actually, ‘pacification’ must be seen as a discourse that depoliticizes violence inherent to all kinds of identity/state-building practices.

2.1.2) Pacification of Amerindians: attracting and domesticating

The so-called ‘Pacification of Amerindians’ has been analyzed inside a broader narrative on the occupation and integration of specific proportions of the Brazilian national territory. Until the last quarter of the 19th century, Brazil’s interior was seen by state authorities in Rio de Janeiro as a foreign country, separated by enormous distances and varied beliefs and allegiances (Diacon, 2004, p.10). This narrative of the “expansion of the frontier” (…) towards “unoccupied” lands (Wegner, 2000) involved not only the penetration and reproduction of capitalist dynamics but also a desire to civilize and domesticate the native, both in the sense of bringing the ‘other’ into the domestic jurisdiction of the nation state in the making and as a mechanism of disciplining.

The historical and sociological literature on the ‘pacification’ of Amerindians is roughly divided between, on the one hand, those that praise the so-called ‘Pacifiers’ and emphasize the innovative and positive aspects of ‘pacification’ practices in the extension of citizenship to marginalized peoples; and, on the other hand, those that criticize these very individuals and their projects as reproducing multiple kinds of (veiled) violence towards the native and necessarily involved in the building of national State. Great part of the literature – ‘critical’ or not – on the ‘pacification’ of Amerindians tends to highlight, directly or implicitly, the role played by Marshal Cândido Mariano Rondon in the expansion of State authority and his effort to “contact, pacify and incorporate indigenous peoples” into the imagined Brazilian nation (Diacon, 2004)10. Sociologists, anthropologists and military have produced different interpretations on the

10 Although Rondon’s job, as a military engineer, was to build an infrastructure of roads and telegraph lines that could connect the vast hinterlands with the Brazilian coast, he spent much of his time developing policies to manage the contact with indigenous groups still not interacting with the white man. It is worth mentioning that Rondon, together with Caxias, is broadly known in the national imaginary as the “Pacifier”.

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(supposed) innovative methods, strategies and policies developed by Rondon to govern indigenous-white relations in Brazil.

A more ‘orthodox’ and laudatory interpretation depicts Rondon as the symbol of a broader movement regarding the protection of indigenous peoples placed under threat in their contact with the white man. In this narrative, ‘pacification’ is constructed as a non-coercive form of assimilation which aims at helping these people to overcome their temporary stage of (low) social evolution and prepare them to live inside modernity. In this positivist ‘pacification’ discourse native people - considered as sovereign nations (nações livres) with the right to resist incursions onto their land, are ‘invited’ to adopt Positivism – and its tutelage – by free will. Although native peoples would be allowed under Positivism to practice their own religion, speak their own language and follow their customs, ‘pacification’ narratives produce a paternalistic view over these peoples, with the native represented as a child, which needs to be educated and provided with all improvements modernity has achieved. In the process of attraction and gradual assimilation, indigenes would be then be transformed into ‘civilized’ Brazilians, becoming small farmers, cattle ranchers, telegraphers, maintenance workers or, in other words, sedentary peoples.

Rodón’s ‘pacification’ policies were praised for decades in the Brazilian literature, but more recently a critical perspective gained a broader audience. Most ‘revisionist’ interpretations argue that...
studies harshly criticize Rondon’s beliefs and the policies implemented by him through the Telegraph Commission and the Indian Protection Service. Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima affirms that Rondon’s ‘pacification’ discourse and practices are much more related to the necessity to expand state power than to assist indigenes. Lima affirms that Rondon warred against indigenes through the building of a “great wall” of state power, by building a ‘siege of peace’ which the author calls _poder tutelar_ (tutelary power) (Lima, 1995). In Lima’s view, ‘pacification’ essentially refers to the implementation of a ‘trusteeship’ power by a state which intends to be represented as “national” (Lima, 1995).

For Laura Maciel, ‘pacification’ is a form of domestication, supported by political decisions of conquest, occupation of space, subjugation and domination” (Maciel, 1998, p.134). The project of nation elaborated by Rondon is one that foresees the expansion of the _frontiers_ of the country (Galeti, 2000), both in the sense of the occupation of a space inhabited by _barbarian_ groups and as the exploration of new and wealthy lands. In this same line, Arruda affirms that the ‘pacification’ of indigenes aimed to promote the opening of new fronts of colonization and the distension of conflicts between colonizers and native peoples (Arruda, 2005). As a public policy of inclusion from the perspective of control, ‘pacification’ is based on a geopolitics of covered war. Seen from this critical perspective, ‘pacification’ practices conceals the inherent violent nature of Rodon’s project and which has as a final goal the extinction of indigenous peoples and cultures (Lima, 1995).

The state-building political imagination cultivated by ‘pacification’ discourses reinforces the perception of a similar _other_. Constructed as _similar_ to the ‘self’, the ‘other’ is articulated, an entity that can be assimilated and integrated to the state ‘self’ after being ‘civilized’. ‘Pacification’ mirrors a nation project which recognizes the existence of some kind of diversity, even if this is expressed in a controlled and hierarchical form. This interpretation seems different from the extermination and segregationist discourses and practices reproduced elsewhere, such as during the North-American colonial period.

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15 According to Lima, the exercise of tutelary power involves having the monopoly to define and control the population over which this power will be exercised (Lima, 1995).

16 In this regard it is interesting to emphasize that the very idea of building an ‘Empire’ in Brazil supposes in some sense the existence of great difference/diversity _within_. Compared to the sovereign nation-state imaginary, Empires are not usually represented as a homogeneous unity, but it is usually recognized as a heterogeneous structures of identity and authority.

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regarding indigenous peoples. ‘Pacification’ is thought as a politics of identity which, from a permanent assimilationist movement, articulates the existence of a heterogeneous, non-homogenized, collective self. In sum, one may say that ‘pacification’ narratives regarding native peoples build an imaginary in which (disruptive) difference is appeased and violence is disguised.

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Based on Messari’s (and Todorov’s) ideas and looking to Brazil’s historical experience and narratives on ‘pacification’ of specific national populations, I propose in this paper a fourth ideal type of relations between self and other. I will call this relation ‘complex assimilation’. In such a framework, the other is neither seen as an enemy nor as a friend, but as a similar entity. Two predominant logics derive from this idea:

1) By constructing ‘self’ and ‘other’ as similar entities, pacification discourses sustains an appeasing logic in the sense of eliminating/camouflaging violence under a narrative of conciliation, negotiation, integration, reparation and forgiveness;

2) The integration of the (similar) other to the ‘self’ is not articulated by a ‘pacification’ discourse of uniformity/homogeneity. ‘Pacification’ elaborates a specific civilizational logic in which the assimilation of the “savage” other inside the “civilized” self is supposed to conserve some heterogeneity/diversity, while maintaining multiple hierarchies and exclusions.

One may argue that Brazilian ‘pacification’ discourses and practices do not construct a representation of a nation State where difference within has to be erased and uniformity has to be imposed. The State which has been constantly (re)produced by ‘pacification’ discourses and practices is pictured as a place where disruptive identity differences are converted into a “controlled diversity”. In this regard, one may say that pacification civilizational narratives produce a reduction of (more evident) contrasts – those that frequently denounce the gulf between representations of “savages” versus “civilized” subjectivities – and reinforce an imaginary of preservation of diversity (even if a mostly folkloric perspective of diversity!). In this sense, I will call this politics of identity
generated by “pacification” discourses of "complex assimilation” or, in other terms, “assimilation without homogenization”.

3) Brazil’s engagement in MINUSTAH: conventional foreign policy narratives

The Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH) was established on April 30, 2004 by the UN Security Council resolution 1542. The mission was established with the primary purpose of promoting national reconciliation and the full return to democracy. MINUSTAH’s mandate included ensuring political stability and the maintenance of public order, a critical step for national reconciliation. According to Resolution 1542, the peacekeeping mission should provide the necessary support to achieve general elections, following democratic standards. It should also help the transitional government to disarm warring groups, protect human rights, restructure the Haitian National Police and restore public order. MINUSTAH came to replace the international military contingent of 3,600 individuals deployed during the previous ‘Multinational Interim Force’, led and composed mainly of Americans, backed by troops from Canada, Chile and France. Although MINUSTAH’s initial activities were mainly related to the maintenance of law and order and to the support of ongoing international humanitarian activities in the country, the Mission was conceived to serve as a model of contemporary and multidimensional peace operations. In fact, MINUSTAH is comprised of a mix of distinct elements – military, police and civilian – aiming to work in close partnership with UN agencies.\(^{17}\)

The support given by Brazil to the Multinational Interim Force (that was substituted by MINUSTAH) had been restricted to the diplomatic level especially because - as expressed in the Brazilian Federal Constitution - national forces are not allowed to be deployed in ‘peace enforcement’ operations, or what it is commonly called ‘Chapter VII missions’, where force may be actively employed. Although MINUSTAH was explicitly

\(^{17}\) (see: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/)
based on Chapter VII, Brazilian interpretation was that it could still be categorized as a “peacekeeping” mission. According to Eugenio Diniz, this understanding was made possible once ‘Chapter VII’ was only mentioned in the seventh operative paragraph of Resolution 1542 (Diniz, 2006: 327). According to Kenkel, the interpretation was that this would place only that paragraph under a peace enforcement mandate, allowing Brazil to participate in the mission without all of it qualifying as a Chapter VII mission (Kenkel, 2013). With this semantic and legal manoeuvre, Brazil accepted to lead the military arm of the peace operation in Haiti.

The engagement of Brazil as the military leader of the UN mission in Haiti has been traditionally explained by the perspective of mainstream International Relations theories that privilege justifications which: a) are focused on the relative position of a state in the international power hierarchy and the Brazilian desire to obtain more power and prestige in the international system (Diniz, 2005; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007); b) analyze identity change processes which have been favoring the recent acceptance of some interventionist humanitarian norms (Souza Neto, 2010; Kenkel, 2011); c) look at the growth of institutional and economic gains derived from regional integration processes and so-called South-South cooperation (Rocha, 2009; Hirst, 2007; Lima & Hirst, 2009); d) emphasize the construction by Brazil of a new diplomatic Kantian “ethos” called “solidarity diplomacy” (Seitenfus, 2006).

Although the scope of this paper does not permit to explore these different foreign policy explanations, one should notice that the most widespread argument about Brazil’s decision to engage in Haiti is related to the country’s desire to play a more prominent role in the international arena and, specially, to conquer a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Brazilian media and scholarly analysis have reproduced the notion that the deployment of peacekeeping forces is an essential element to any “emerging power” - such as Brazil has been conceived – wishing to expand its leverage in regional and international decisions: “Peace operations predominantly serve the instrumental goal of increasing the country’s global decision-making influence and cementing its standing as a voice for the global South” (Kenkel, 2013, p.5).
Moreover, foreign policy experts and military have also frequently justify Brazil’s military leadership in MINUSTAH based on the idea that Haiti may work as laboratory to test Brazilian innovative public policies - not only public security policies regarding, for instance, the use of the military to address urban violence related to drug trafficking but also recent social and development practices, such as specific national policies formulated to combat poverty and hunger. These interpretations, which presuppose a dynamics of ‘knowledge transfer’, converges with broader explanations emphasizing the economic and technical expertise gains supposed to derive from the adoption by Brazil of a more assertive ‘South-South’ diplomacy. According to Kai Kenkel:

‘Haiti has become somewhat of a testing ground for a distinct Brazilian approach to peacebuilding and development aid, which to some extent mirrors its successful domestic development initiatives’. (...) In addition, with over half of MINUSTAH’s troops hailing from Central and South America, MINUSTAH is seen as affording Brazil the opportunity to exercise regional leadership; indeed coordination efforts around MINUSTAH represent the farthest advance so far for multilateralism in defense issues in the region (Kenkel, 2013).

An interesting understanding elaborated regarding Brazil’s decision to engage in Haiti concerns the concept of “non-indifference”. When debating the Brazilian foreign policy position regarding the mission in Haiti, Paulo Esteves asks: “How could a country that for such a long time adopted a non-interventionist position get a leadership position at MINUSTAH? What discursive transformations have allowed Brazil to play this new role?” (Esteves, 2011). The hypothesis presented by Esteves is that Brazil’s new willingness to engage in peacekeeping must be understood through the articulation of the concept of “non-indifference” which, as introduced by the then Chancellor Celso Amorim, tempers the tradition of “non-intervention”, historically emphasized in Brazilian foreign policy (Esteves, 2011).

The concept of non-indifference first emerged in the framework of the African Union as a response to the weaknesses of its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, which failed to halt conflicts in the region. Non-indifference was reinforced by Oumar Konare, the former chairman of the African Union Commission, who struggled for a new attitude concerning non-intervention in order to avoid previous mistakes (Murithi, 2009: 92, In: Ekström & Alles, 2012). In the context of the African Union, the General
Assembly, or any member state, has the legitimacy to request assistance and, if approved, the intervention will be monitored by the African Union Peace and Security Council, such as expressed in the Organization constitutive charter. Allowed, therefore, to intervene in issues usually defined as ‘internal affairs’ of states, the African Union can act in circumstances in which states and governments are putting the safety of their populations at risk or are failing to protect them accordingly.

In Brazil, the principle of non-indifference was used to qualify a foreign policy orientation towards states that have experienced some kind of failure and tragedy, not necessarily defined as mass human rights violations, such as war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Differently from the African Union rationale, intervention in another country could occur only if Brazil was formally invited to do it, and if the Brazilian state considered that it has enough national capacities to provide external assistance.

Some Brazilian foreign policy analysts have seen the use of the “non-indifference” principle in the official diplomatic discourse as a simple grammatical change and especially as a way out to avoid a discussion on the principle of non-intervention – clearly emphasized in the Brazilian supreme charter. For Kenkel, the rhetoric of ‘diplomacy of solidarity’, ‘non-indifference’, and ‘South-South’ cooperation was used to justify MINUSTAH’s actions, especially when the (...) use of force by the Brazilian MINUSTAH contingent increased, creating tensions with Brasília’s official rejection of Chapter VII (...). (Kenkel, 2013, p.4). Differently, some analysts have stressed the normative and moral rationale of “non-indifference” emphasizing how the concept was incorporated to diplomatic discourses to re-signify interventionism itself in a way not to restrict it to security matters but to complement it with actions regarding the promotion of better prospects of governance and development in hosting societies. In the case of Haiti, Brazilian diplomats have put considerable emphasis on the tripod ‘security, reconciliation and development’ frequently expressing the view that Latin American engagement in the Caribbean country aimed beyond stabilization to promote political dialogue and support the economic, social and institutional reconstruction of the country. In Amorim’s words,

This same concern to incorporate a social dimension and economic stabilization processes led Brazil to participate, as the protagonist, of the United Nations effort in
Haiti. (...) Moved by active solidarity: the principle that I call “non-indifference”, as I see it is as important as the “non-intervention.” In fact, just as it does not interfere with the sovereign right of each people to solve their own problems, we need to show our neighbors and friends willingness to help whenever called upon, especially when there are evident signs of political and social crisis. (Amorim, 2005).

According to Paulo Esteves, “Brazil’s manoeuvre was, then, to understand development beyond the liberal frame, trying to incorporate practices and emulate specific policies designed to combat poverty and hunger” (Esteves, 2011). In this line, “non-indifference” reflects the perception that developing states, such as Brazil, are capable of implementing a pattern of interventionism perceived as less ‘hostile’ by the international and local communities.

Although very diverse, these conventional interpretations have similar understandings of ‘Foreign Policy’ and tend to consider it as merely the external and pragmatic orientation of a pre-established collective entity called ‘Brazil’, with pre-defined interests and a demarcated and secure identity. Essentially concerned with explaining why particular decisions resulting in specific courses of action were made, these foreign policy narratives preclude an analysis of how discourses of power are constitutive of the State itself (Doty, 1993:298). Moreover, beyond considering the national state an accomplished and non-contingent entity, these interpretations take for granted particular modes of being, the background of historical, social and discursive practices and meanings that make possible specific foreign policy decisions to take place - such as decisions related to international interventions.

Based on the premise that discursive articulations are not superficial rhetorical phenomena behind which one may find real causes or real explanations to actors’ behaviors - such as tangible interests related to desires to acquire more power in the international arena or to create a different sort of diplomacy - one should not ask what the intentions and motivations of Brazilian policy makers were when deciding about the country’s participation in MINUSTAH. Differently, one may ask:

*What subjects and identities – ‘self’ and ‘other’ - were constructed through such discursive articulations; and how this very construction has made possible the adoption of a politics*
of ‘pacification’ and excluded other possibilities such as, in one extreme, a purely diplomatic action and, in the other extreme, a simple military intervention?

4) The ‘pacification’ of ‘Haitis’: re-inscribing Brazil’s engagement in the United Nations mission in Haiti

“(…)Haiti is here, Haiti is not here(…)”

Caetano Veloso, 1992

The theme “War in Rio” that emerged in the Brazilian media in 2003, and that has been frequently used since then, refers to the high level of violence coming from clashes of rival drug factions in control over the so-called ‘favelas’ (slums) and among the organized crime, the police and the local population. In 2003, in Brazil, more than 50 thousand people were murdered, most of them being young, black males and coming from ‘favelas’ and poor neighborhoods. These homicide levels add more fear and terror among the population, who have resorted to all kinds of protection strategies and engaged in different public manifestations requesting from the municipal government stronger attitudes in terms of the provision of public security. Brazilian middle class was vocal in this context, having (directly or indirectly) supported the use of repressive instruments against organized crime, including the use of Elite Squads such as the ‘Special Operations Battalion’ (BOPE). Narratives on a ‘parallel state’ / ‘parallel power’ described the favelas as non-governed

18 From the song “O Haiti”, written after the ‘Carandiru Massacre’ that took place on October 2, 1992, in Carandiru Penitentiary (São Paulo, Brazil). The massacre, triggered by a prisoner revolt within the prison, is considered a major human rights violation in the history of Brazil. The police made little if any effort to negotiate with the prisoners and 111 prisoners were killed (102 from gunshots fired by police).
spaces, outside the formal ruling of the national judicial system and inhabited by dangerous and immoral people.

These representations of war and disorder contributed to build an image of a fractured / fragmented state ‘self’, with its territorial and symbolic integrity put under threat. According to David Campbell, it is precisely in moments of crisis where there is a preoccupant rupture in representations of state identity that the necessity to reinforce and stabilize this very identity exists (Campbell, 1992). In moments of crisis, there is a pressing necessity to discipline ambiguities in order to conceal (always present) contradictions of the state ‘self’, and identity, and to reassert its integrity. There is a tendency to dislocate to other discursive spheres of action the identity that is questioned and disrupted.

Media narratives producing a discourse of war in Rio de Janeiro have been articulating an image of an unstable national ‘self’ and have put into question the assimilationist and integrationist character ascribed to Brazil in terms of its historical ‘pacifying’ engagement with difference. In these narratives, the favela and its population are increasingly articulated as radical ‘others’ and represented through discourses of enmity allowing for their exclusion and elimination. Traditionally represented as spaces occupied by a ‘similar’ ‘other’ – that differs from the ‘self’ in terms of social inequalities – favelas start being seen as excessively different from the national self; as too strange/foreigner in relation to ‘Brazil’. And, it is argued, the less similar the image of favelas are in relation to the ‘self’, the stronger will be the necessity to act protecting and reinforcing a desired (assimilationist and integrationist) state identity. Discourses of war and danger on drug trafficking have created, since the end of the 1990s, the condition of possibility for the intensification of repressive actions against criminal gangues, placing favelas’ population under police surveillance and control. By representing the favela as an opaque, unsecure and threatening entity, these discourses have legitimated exceptional policies of containment not always considered sufficient for those that feel under threat. Evident support from the Brazilian elite and middle classes existed for allowing the Army to help restoring order and peace in areas of intense urban violence. Nevertheless, this option regarding the absolute

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19 As proposed by José Murilo de Carvalho, a Brazilian historian, ‘diversity’ in Brazil has historically been muddled with ‘inequality’, more specifically ‘social inequality’.
militarization of public security was, at the time (2003-2004), considered neither constitutional nor yet desired by most political parties in the federal government.

Foreign policy decision to engage military in Haiti was taken by the Brazilian government when the fractures and ambiguities of the state ‘self’ were too visible and each day more disturbing, in terms of its territorial and symbolic cohesion. One may argue that the innovative decision to authorize the deployment of national troops to Haiti, under the umbrella of the UN and the Chapter VII of its charter, happened when the historically articulated “pacifying” identity of Brazil was most in crisis. Official and non-official “Foreign Policy” narratives at the time (including media and non-specialist texts) interpreted that Brazilian forces had the mandate to “pacify” Haiti. In fact, although the term officially used by the UN to define MINUSTAH’s mandate was, as the acronym says, “stabilization”, it was common to find Brazilian policy makers, as well as military and foreign policy analysts describing the role played in Haiti through a ‘pacification’ narrative. This narrative speaks to the urgent need to deal with the chaos installed in Haiti after the demise of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Emphasis is put on the necessity to control Cité Soleil and Bel Air, critical and violent neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, with almost half a million inhabitants. This initial mandate included the elimination of armed groups conducting illegal activities and harassing the population. To this initial (and more restricted) interpretation on Haiti’s ‘stabilization’, a broader ‘pacification’ discourse was added in which Brazilian action in the Caribbean country is represented as part of a long term mission which involves creating the necessary conditions for modernization and development to take place. In this regard, the initial phase of MINUSTAH (when force was used by the Brazilian military in a very robust way to apprehend rebels) was represented as only a first step towards a broader mission of governance and state-building.

In this paper, the engagement of Brazil in MUNSUTAH may be inscribed inside a continuous process of production and reproduction of a given national identity and a state ‘self’ via ‘foreign /Foreign’ policies, as proposed by David Campbell. The participation in the UN mission in Haiti can be seen as a novel form to reproduce an old way of representing and dealing with ‘internal’ others. The modes of representation that have produced Haiti/Haitians as a space and people in which a political (and military) intervention can be deployed, replicate past logics and configurations of identity.
'Pacification' narratives on the Brazilian intervention in Haiti construct the Caribbean country as dominated by 'spoilers', ‘uncivilized groups’ and ‘rebels’; as an ‘ungoverned space’, where the modern state project has failed; as a place where social violence has prevented modernization and development.

In many ‘Foreign Policy’ narratives, Haiti/Haitians are represented as similar others, in relation to the Brazilian self. This ‘discourse of similarity’ justifies the idea that Brazil can - and indeed should - lead the UN mission, not only because it shares some identity background with Haiti but, mainly because Brazil has been able to deal with the same ‘issues’ historically confronted by the Haitian society. This idea was more than once elaborated by Brazilian senators while debating if Brazil should – or should not – send troops to Haiti. Senators both in favor and against the engagement in MINUSTAH made reference to Brazilian ‘Haïtis’. For those against the intervention, Brazil should not spend so much money and time (of the Army) in Haiti, once so many internal ‘haitis’ still exist. In these perspectives, such as in Caetano Veloso’s song, Brazil still has multiple pockets of exclusion, where human rights are not respected and where social relations are ruled by violence. As commonly said in Brazil, ‘Haïti’ is here! For political parties in favor of sending troops to Haiti, the argument is that Brazil can share its experiences in dealing with ‘internal’ ‘haitis’ to the Haiti ‘outside’. This argument can also be read through the ‘non-indifference’ principle, building a perspective in which Brazil cannot be ‘indifferent’ to those that are not completely different (and are, therefore, represented as similar ‘others’).

As a discourse of power, ‘non-indifference’ creates the conditions of possibility for Brazil to engage in the ‘pacification’ of Haiti. While Haiti is constructed in this discourse as an entity that needs to be ‘pacified’ and brought inside modernity, Brazil is seen as naturally prepared to lead the Caribbean country in this path. In other words, it is as saying that because Brazil (supposedly) ‘knows’ Haiti (even better than others), it can therefore help it. Nevertheless, by considering Brazil able to assist Haiti in its ‘journey’ to modernity, authority dynamics are reproduced: Brazil is inevitably placed in a site of authority in relation to Haiti. Although based on a desire to expand citizenship rights of the

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20In fact, it is common to hear in Brazil popular sayings and songs that emphasize how the country resembles Haïti (such as the song by Caetano Veloso which says “Haïti is here/Haïti is not here”) because it also experiences underdevelopment, racism, inequality, poverty, famine, violence. Moreover, Brazil is sometimes compared to Haiti not only by a “discourse of failure”, but also of resignation and lack of hope regarding envisaged changes.
Haitian society and to lead the country to development, Brazilian discourse of ‘similarity’ and ‘non-indifference’ necessarily conceals the multiple sites of violence and exclusion involved in the (re)construction of the (Haitian) State.

*Scenes from the next episode...*

In 2009 the front page of ‘O Globo’ - one of the biggest newspaper in Brazil - was: ‘Haiti is here’. Crime rate in Rio de Janeiro was still very high and, since 2008, the state of Rio de Janeiro has engaged in an ambitious program to control gangs in the ‘favelas’ called ‘pacification’ or UPP (Pacification Police Units). In general terms, ‘pacification’ involves retaking territories through interventions led either by SWAT-like units or the military itself, and subsequently handing daily policing to community police forces (through a ‘police of proximity’ model) while bringing much-needed public services to the area (Halais, 2013). Today, over 30 ‘favelas’ have already been ‘pacified’ and a vocabulary (and representation) of ‘urban battle spaces’, ‘failed’ or ‘fragile city’ is being replaced by narratives of ‘inclusion’, ‘integration’, ‘pacification’.

On the one hand, ‘pacification’ projects may be seen as occasions for the reproduction of a historical ‘foreign policy’ practice, in Campbell’s terms, of representing ‘others’ as those that can be ‘domesticated’ - both in the sense of bringing the “other” into the domestic jurisdiction of the national state under construction, and as a mechanism of control21. ‘On the other hand, this new public security policy reinforces historical militarization practices, including the use of military in the maintenance of the internal order.

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21 UPP projects have been followed by ‘UPP Social’ (‘Social UPP’), designed to promote urban, social and economic integration of the areas of the city benefiting from the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs). The UPP Social has the mission of mobilizing and articulating municipal services and policies in these territories in an attempt to reverse the legacy of violence and territorial exclusion in these spaces (http://uppsocial.org/about/)
Final Considerations - or, (re)theorizing intervention from the post-colonial ‘South’.

Considering that policy makers work inside a discursive space that imposes meanings on their world and, thus, creates reality (Shapiro, 1988:100-106 in Doty, 1993:303), it is argued in this paper that the Brazilian decision to lead the military arm of MINUSTAH resonates within traditional ‘pacification’ narratives and discourses historically articulated in Brazil. It is claimed that the engagement in the peace operation in Haiti can gain intelligibility through the analysis of discursive and non-discursive practices of state-building/identity-building, as traditionally conceived and applied in Brazil.

The paper also suggests that Brazil’s decision to military engage in Haiti can be understood as part of a broader effort to keep a specific representation of State, which is perceived integrationist, with a conciliatory nature when dealing with difference, war averse and that tends to settle peacefully its disputes. The state reproduced through pacification practices is one that does not see the ‘other’ as completely different and that accepts some kind of diversity inside. Framed inside a UN peacekeeping discourse, the ‘pacification’ of Haiti is seen as reproducing a state-building perspective in which public security policies are supposedly neutral and based on a desire to expand citizenship rights and the (re)conciliation with (similar) others.

As a practice of ‘writing security’, ‘pacification’ discourses are seen as producing borders between ‘self’ and ‘other’ by which ‘others’ are considered to be ‘outside’ the nation State project and its expected pattern of being and acting. As a practice of production of difference, pacification makes the State the main locus for the realization of political identity and, therefore, legitimates the exclusion (by inclusion) of alternative subjectivities. Through the analysis of some ‘pacification’ discourses, the paper showed that while ‘others’ exposed to practices of differentiation, hierarchization and normalization are contingent, the logic and exclusions by which they are constituted as (similar) ‘others’ persist. In this perspective, at the same time that ‘pacification’ discourses work constituting a specific national ‘self’, they function as regulatory ideals, through which contingency should be ‘domesticated’.
The paper argued that narratives of ‘pacification’ refer to endless processes that can gain additional relevance in times where there is a destabilizing rupture in national identity borders, such as in the episodes framed as ‘the war in Rio’. Through David Campbell insights, ‘pacification’ is seen as a ‘foreign policy’ practice which (re)produces attempts to constantly secure the integrity of the state’s territory and of the national (imagined) community. ‘Pacification’ narratives say about the protection of a particular spatial order and the disciplining of specific collectivities - such as local rebels, Amerindians, Haitians and, more recently in Rio de Janeiro, the population of the favelas controlled by drug trafficking. It is envisaged that this paper has helped to problematize this very ‘logic’ of ‘pacification’, eventually creating some estrangement and discomfort towards its reproduction.

The broader research project lying behind this paper envisages expanding the sites where “foreign policy” operates. It is expected that this paper helps questioning a certain kind of Foreign Policy narrative, which, by the reification of boundaries between inside and outside, is not able to reveal the multiple exclusions and practices of differentiation between a self (in the making) and an “other”. In other words, it is expected that this project not only allows one to put into question the assumptions sustaining traditional Brazilian Foreign Policy literature, but also to broaden the space where politics (and violence) is said to operate.

Finally, a last expectation derived from this paper directly refers to the topic of this Panel. The argument on the possibility to re-inscribe Brazil’s engagement on the UN Mission in Haiti tells about the necessity to reflect more deeply on how to understand and frame the growing participation of Global South states in international peace operations. It is of utmost importance that theorizing efforts on the inclusion of these states in the production of international order and peace go beyond the canons and methodology traditionally used to explain Western/Northern interventionism. These efforts should be able to see both the specificities and the ambiguities of post-colonial states interventionism.
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