From Indivisibility to Partition?
Jerusalem & Kosovo as Contested Homeland Territories

Abstract:

This paper examines why protracted international disputes over seemingly indivisible territories may become the subject of popular domestic discourse that selectively favors partition. External political coercion can incentivize critical reexamination of once sacrosanct homeland narratives. Yet in Israel, increased willingness to compromise over peripheral Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem since the 1993 Oslo Accords has been coupled with an intensification of claims to critical religious and historical sites, namely the Temple Mount and surrounding Holy Basin. In Serbia, the loss of any effective sovereignty over Kosovo since 1999 and increased deference to European policing and Kosovo Albanian administration have been accompanied by stronger demands for Kosovo Serb self-determination and extraterritorial control of Serb heritage sites. Even as substantial pressures to resolve these conflicts may catalyze a broadening of domestic legitimacy for territorial concessions, they appear to augment the indivisibility of particular spaces within these territories. I argue that this outcome can be traced to the content of popular narratives that define the territorial scope and character of the national homeland. Only by comprehending the content of these narratives and the depth of popular engagement with them can these outcomes be fully explained.
On May 20, 2012, on the forty-fifth anniversary of Israel's capture of East Jerusalem, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu addressed a crowd assembled at the key 1967 battleground of Ammunition Hill. There he declared, "We will preserve Jerusalem because an Israel without Jerusalem is like a body without a heart. It was on this hill, 45 years ago, that the heart that unites our people began to beat again with full strength; and our heart will never be divided again." Such a rigid statement would seem to fly in the face not only of international demands for progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, but contemporary political realities on the ground. Although this discourse is hardly the rhetorical preserve of the Israeli right, since the failed 2000 Camp David negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, public discussion of the division of Jerusalem has become less taboo. Today nearly forty percent of Jewish Israelis are supportive of transferring control of Arab neighborhoods to Palestinian control in peace. So too, since Israel began constructing its West Bank security barrier, its path through the municipality has physically cut off several of these neighborhoods, in effect dividing the city. How can such sustained official opposition to division of the city be explained in light of these emergent realities?

A remarkably similar puzzle is posed by Serbia's continued refusal to accept the loss of Kosovo. Despite being under international administration since 1999, declaring independence in 2009, and receiving diplomatic recognition from the United States and most European Union members, Belgrade continues to assert that the Albanian-majority territory is an inseparable part of Serbia. As Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Irinej proclaimed during his induction on January 23, 2010, "Our first duty as a Church is to safeguard our Kosovo, a holy and martyred land, to help our state to defend it from those who wish to seize it… Without [Kosovo], Serbia is not Serbia, without Kosovo it is deprived of its heart and soul." Yet even as the Belgrade has consistently insisted it "will never recognize Kosovo's independence," it has engaged in European Union-monitored negotiations with Priština over the status of Serbs, security and judicial authority, and Serbian institutions in northern Kosovo, steps which many believe will lead to partition.

At face value, these trends appear to confirm the prevailing scholarly argument that territorial indivisibility is an artificial construct conceived, sustained, and often abandoned by powerful political actors to advance their interests. For some, portraying territory as indivisible is a rational strategy for belligerents who seek to increase bargaining leverage vis-à-vis opponents or fear the precedent of conceding land as a means to conflict resolution on the international stage. For others, indivisibility arises from domestic politics. Elites employ such language to rally constituents, defend political incumbency, and capture the hearts and minds of otherwise ideologically uncommitted citizens with culturally familiar if jingoist overtures. This can often have the effect, unintentional or otherwise, of institutionalizing and symbolically entrenching these claims. While the latter category of territorial claims are more likely to survive the elites who initially advance them and less likely to crumble in the face of costly external pressures, adaptation to international and domestic change remains a strategic imperative.

1 (Netanyahu, 2012)
2 (Ya’ar & Hermann, 2012)
3 (Hasson, 2011a)
4 (BBC, 2010)
5 (Tanjug News Agency, 2013a, 2013b)
7 (Goddard, 2010; Goemans, 2006; Hassner, 2006/07; Lustick, 1993; Newman, 1999; Snyder, 2000)
8 (Ambrosio, 2001; Lustick, 1993; Rynhold & Waxman, 2008; Shelef, 2010)
is the conviction that the sustained indivisibility of territory is rooted, first and foremost, in the material and political conditions of conflict. Although few argue that territorial policy is infinitely malleable, particularly in the longue durée, meaningful changes in these underling conditions and shifts in the composition and partisan character of governing coalitions, whether through democratic or revolutionary means, should also drive changes in the priority elites assign to the integrity of disputed territories.\(^9\)

The danger of these approaches is that they not only tend to overestimate the practical negotiability of "indivisible" territories but they neglect the popular ideologies that so often make them so.\(^10\) Indeed, while Jerusalem and Kosovo may seem to be on the verge of partition, analysis of the discourse of prominent political figures and the very contours of the compromises they propose reveal that the fundamental principle of indivisibility remains unaltered. In Israel, increased willingness to compromise over peripheral Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem since the 1993 Oslo Accords has been coupled with an intensification of claims to critical religious and historical sites, namely the Temple Mount and surrounding "Holy Basin." In Serbia, the loss of any effective sovereignty over Kosovo since 1999 and increased deference to European policing and Kosovo Albanian administration have been accompanied by stronger demands for minority Serb self-determination and extraterritorial control of Serb heritage sites. Even as substantial pressures to resolve these conflicts may catalyze a broadening of domestic legitimacy for territorial concessions, they have augmented the indivisibility of particular spaces within these territories.

I argue that these outcomes can be traced to the content of popular narratives that define the territorial scope and character of the national homeland. Deeply embedded in nearly every nationalist movement is the belief that the political community it professes to represent is uniquely indigenous to the land in question and therefore entitled to its control. Such sanctification of homeland is actively fostered not simply as a sovereign prerogative of statehood but a constitutive value of national identity. Not all spaces to which a state lays claim are necessarily integral to national identity and not all homeland territories are necessarily indivisible. Yet it is the character of the popular valuation of these spaces, expressed in terms of territorial narratives, and not the interests and maneuvers of policymakers alone that ultimately determine whether partition is domestically legitimate and politically viable.

The article proceeds as follows. First, it offers a justification for my emphasis on narrative, demonstrating the centrality of narrative constructions of reality to both individual cognition and popular national discourse and its relevance for the protraction and resolution of international territorial conflict. The next two sections offer diachronic analyses of Israeli and Serbian political discourse and policy regarding Jerusalem and Kosovo with a particular emphasis on the mid-1990s to the present. For Israel, this represents a period of growing openness to idea of military withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 and the creation of a Palestinian state. Although Israelis have remained largely receptive to continued negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, the division of Jerusalem has been a consistently contentious issue. For Serbia, this period has been one of dramatic upheaval and change. From the disintegration of communist Yugoslavia to the emergence of Serbian democracy, perhaps the only political constant has been popular opposition to Kosovo's independence. It is found that elite discourse in both countries related to these territories have been dominated by homeland narratives throughout. While this has been a decisive factor in blocking concessions on critical

\(^9\) Goddard, 2010; Hassner, 2006/07; Lustick, 1993; Newman, 1999

\(^{10}\) A particularly nuanced exception is offered by (Shelef, 2010)
sites in both Jerusalem and Kosovo, it has enabled meaningful compromise in others. It concludes by reevaluating the elite politics approach and offering policy implications for the resolution of homeland conflict.

A "Storied" World: Narratives in Individual Cognition and National Politics

Narratives, simply put, are stories about the world around us. From children's bedtime stories to the news media, from religious parables to history textbooks, from dinner table conversation to parliamentary political debate, narratives saturate the human experience. "So natural is the impulse to narrate, so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report of the way things really happened," suggests Hayden White, "that narrativity could appear problematical only in a culture in which it was absent." As a near-universal tool to recount and transmit knowledge, narrative can be seen as the primary means by which humanity translates "knowing into telling," enabling broad understanding between individuals and cultures of ideas that might otherwise seem incomprehensible or "exotic.

In the strictest structural sense, "narrative is the representation of at least two real or fictive events or situations in time sequence, neither of which presupposes or entails the other." Yet narrative is always more than a recounting of chronologically ordered events. Fully formed narratives, suggests William Labov, are composed of an abstract summarizing the story, orientation providing the time, place, persons, and activity included, complicating actions describing events, and resolution concluding the story, with a coda bridging the gap between the story and the present, and evaluative materials interwoven throughout communicating the narrator's value system. Although not every public or private retelling includes each element, narrative clauses rarely stand without evaluative material. Evaluation provides the "so what?" of storytelling; the reason for which the narrative was expressed. Whereas narratives translate everyday events and conflicts into coherent accounts, evaluative material offers the sources and causes of these occurrences as well as the means and morals toward their resolution.

Because reality is not itself narrative in form, narration requires this degree of elucidation and creative interpretation, constantly substituting "meaning for the pure and simple facsimile of narrated events." Such interpretations inevitably distort the historical record even where unintended. Shaul Shenhav insists, "Even if we assume that an event or series of events can be precisely described, the very choice of describing certain events and not others establishes a particular viewpoint." Although representations or interpretations of reality are only as "accurate" as the story-teller's own interpretation and understanding of the world, their very subjectivity speaks to the social function they so adeptly fulfill. They allow people to make sense of everyday experiences and occurrences by overlaying what may otherwise be a string of unrelated, chronologically ordered events with causal linkages, moral lessons, and practical applications for the future.

The intuition that human beings have a natural tendency to "story the world," thinking less in terms of logical arguments or lawful formulations, and rather in terms of narrative

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11 (White, 1980, p. 5)  
12 (Barthes, 1975, p. 269; White, 1980, pp. 5-6)  
13 (Prince, 1982, p. 4)  
14 (Labov, 1972, pp. 362-370)  
15 (Barthes, 1975, p. 267)  
16 (Shenhav, 2006, p. 248)
structures, finds a firm basis in cognitive psychology. Theodore Sarbin contends that "human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to narrative." This allows people to impose structure upon their flow of experience and offer "reasons for their acts as well as the causes for their happening." Jerome Bruner suggests that narratives offer "a version of reality whose acceptability is governed by convention and 'narrative necessity' rather than empirical verification and logical requiredness." This approach emphasizes that "we cannot take as our unit of analysis the isolated individual operating 'inside his or her own skin' in a cultural vacuum. Rather, we must accept the view that the human mind cannot express its nascent powers without the enablement of the symbolic systems of culture." Individual preferences and decision-making then, cannot be reduced to a value-neutral rational calculus absent a culturally-informed narrative frame.

Even if elites are ultimately responsible for enacting policies that block territorial partition, political agency cannot be separated from the public discourses that endow these territories with meaning. Such shared ways of comprehending the world are rooted in the very language of popular politics and play a central role in shaping the popular resonance and mobilizational power of political rhetoric. Insist Patterson and Monroe, "Stories about the origin and development of a nation provide a shared sense of who we are, where we came from, and how we fit together. These narratives permeate culture and are essential to any kind of collective functioning." From Benedict Anderson's famous description of nations as "imagined communities" to post-modern critiques of the very idea of nationhood, the source and power of collective identity is consistently characterized as narrative in form. They offer the foundation from which collective political action is both conceived and legitimated.

In democratic territorial politics in particular, narratives act as critical intermediaries between international and domestic inputs and policy outputs, regulating how deeply material, institutional, and normative pressures to renounce disputed claims influence state behavior. Rather than one interest among many to which political elites must cater, these narratives provide the rhetorical framework within which actors must operate to meaningfully engage the voting public. For this reason, contenders for political office frequently and successfully market their candidacy on themes speaking to their embodiment of broad national ideals: heroism, piety, honesty, ambition, etc. In turn, voting behavior is significantly influenced by the proximity between voter narrative preference and those expressed by parties during electoral campaigns.

**Homeland Narratives, Popular Resonance, and Territorial Policy**

In appealing to their constituents' understandings of the nature of conflict over particular territories, politicians must justify claims in terms of concrete objectives and values that resonate with popular understandings of their value, content, and meaning. Territorial narratives provide these elements by recounting a history of the space under dispute situated in the broader context of the cultural, social, political, and strategic experience of the national group to whom it is told.

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17 (Bruner, 1991; Chafe, 1990; Hevern, 2004; Mishler, 1995; Sarbin, 1986; Shenhav, 2006)
18 (Sarbin, 1986, pp. 8-9)
19 (Bruner, 1991, p. 20)
20 (Patterson & Monroe, 1998, p. 322)
21 (Anderson, 1991)
22 (Brubaker, 1996; Campbell, 1998; Somers, 1994)
23 (Cornog, 2004; Schuessler, 2000)
24 (Sheafer, Shenhav, & Goldstein, 2011)
They also offer both a cause and justification for conflict as well as why, if at all, the territory is worth fighting for. The strategic employment of popular narratives justifying contentious territorial claims may also trap policymakers: having roused a sympathetic domestic audience in support of these claims, political punishment can be expected for relinquishing them.25 Yet the mere recitation of such narratives is hardly sufficient to block compromise. Nor do all such narratives justify conflict protraction.

Many prominent voices in the Israeli political and security establishment opposed a unilateral disengagement from Gaza, warning that it would compromise Israel’s strategic depth and instigate a new wave of Palestinian terrorism. Despite contentious debate in the Israeli parliament and considerable public protest, the removal of the territory’s nine thousand Israeli civilian residents and withdrawal of all military units was completed in August 2005 with a significant degree of popular support. Although the narrative discouraging withdrawal was compelling for many, more dominant was an opposing security narrative arguing that the cost of a continued occupation for Israel’s international diplomatic standing, military morale, and Jewish-Arab demographic balance made disengagement a strategic and national imperative.26 So too, when Montenegro held its May 2006 referendum on separation from Serbia, many Serbian politicians vocally expressed their opposition, believing the move to be a sharp violation of a once shared national aspiration that all Serbs should live together in one state.27 When independence was declared, the verdict was officially accepted without dispute. Although Greater Serbia continued to resonate with some nationalists, most Serbs had abandoned this idea after a decade of unprecedented bloodshed, territorial dispossession, and political turmoil.

For spaces from which the public fears foreign attack or domestic insurrection, politicians are considerably more likely to employ security narratives that highlight the strategic benefits of territorial control and the military cost of their abandonment then they are to oppose withdrawal through vague declarations of national pride. In turn, advocates of territorial withdrawal are likely to employ their own security narratives highlighting the material and strategic costs of continued occupation in the face of international resistance or local resistance. Yet for territories deemed central to homeland, the threat of partition is considerably more resonant when framed as an attack on the legitimacy and historical continuity of the nation than as amplifying strategic vulnerability. In emphasizing the identity-resonant aspects of such spaces, homeland narratives privilege sacred and historical sites even as they de-prioritize other territorial prerogatives.

Indeed, the factors that render homeland narratives resonant among domestic audiences often far predate contemporary conflict. Even when thrust into the political spotlight by contestation of territory, they are generated and sustained less by the material conditions of conflict than by the frequency and intensity of their repetition in the canon of national memory. Such "memories," particular those of antiquity, treat history as "homogenous, empty time" wherein the nation is "conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history" such that groups with similar territorial boundaries and names are held to be the direct ancestors of the current national community in question.28 Ancient battles, empires, and mythology are taken as factual (or at the very least culturally constitutive) accounts of collective history such that the biblical Judean Kingdom and the Nemanjić Dynasty are seen not only as the forbearers of the contemporary states of Israel and Serbia but of their respective national communities.

25 (Fearon, 1994; Goddard, 2006, 2010; Huth, 1996; Powell, 2006)
26 (Rynhold & Waxman, 2008)
27 (B92 & Beta News Agency, 2006; Beta News Agency, 2006; Morrison, 2009, p. 219)
28 (Anderson, 1991, p. 26) Also see (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Panossian, 2002; Smith, 2009)
The constitutive narratives of national memory are frequently recited in official state publications and political rhetoric as well as popular media. They are also readily found in cultural mediums such as national myths, poetry, artwork, music, and popular symbology.\(^{29}\) National memory is constantly subject to reexamination and reinterpretation regardless of the antiquity or modernity of actual events.\(^{30}\) Yet because such "memories" derive their power from popular understandings of the past, political elites are considerably constrained in the production of "official versions" that significantly deviate from them.\(^{31}\) Moreover, even if the meanings associated with such narratives vary, the locations in which they are said to have taken place rarely do. National memory may sacralize (or at the very least endow with significant popular meaning) particular locations such that any subsequent interpretation of events must be anchored in its specific geographic context. Above all, these narratives come to define the physical expanse and major focal points of homeland in the collective national imagination.

Although the homeland's cultural (as opposed to contemporary political) boundaries are often ambiguous, the specificity and consistency of these narrative is reinforced by the presence of readily identifiable physical landmarks, whether natural or man-made. Religious shrines, ancient tombs, national monuments, historic battlefields, and archaeological excavations whose origins have been ascribed to particular national groups as well as the production of maps and construction of museums make the locations and meanings accorded to these spaces even more apparent.\(^{32}\) Where such spaces are well-defined and deeply embedded in the national memory, employment of homeland narratives associated with them should be domestically resonant if not dominant. By contrast, where these spaces are poorly defined, contested, or largely absent from the national memory, such narratives should speak to a more limited audience, if any at all.

This means that although defense of homeland is a value embedded in the very idea of nationhood, the scope of such claims is geographically and culturally constrained. Because homeland narratives are only meaningful to broad domestic audiences when they occupy a consequential place in the national memory, politicians have a difficult time justifying cultural claims to space beyond these boundaries. As important, spaces that are so valued are likely to be a persistent rallying point for popular mobilization regardless of the underlying material conditions of conflict. Even when threat is perceived to be low or when the pursuit of territorial claims is materially or politically impossible given external or internal constraints, political and cultural discourse surrounding these territories will be dominantly informed by homeland narratives. In turn, the contours of any domestically legitimate compromise over these spaces will necessarily be shaped by their content.

Jerusalem and Kosovo are critical to the investigation of these hypotheses not simply because popular nationalist claims to them have been consistently characterized by homeland narratives, but because their impending partition would seem to contradict all expectations of a narrative-centered theory of territorial indivisibility. Indeed, if homeland narratives fail to explain indivisibility in cases such as these where nationalist rhetoric is seemingly so gratuitously employed and popularly received, all the more so should such narratives be considered spurious in accounting for protracted conflict elsewhere. If, however, it can be

\(^{29}\) (Konstan & Raaflaub, 2010; Tilmans, Vree, & Winter, 2010)
\(^{30}\) (Connerton, 1989; Zerubavel, 1995)
\(^{31}\) (Schudson, 1989)
\(^{32}\) In particular, see Chapter 10, "Census, Map, Museum" of (Anderson, 1991) Also (Abu El-Haj, 2001; Bieber, 2002; Breen, 2008; Handelman & Shamgar-Handelman, 1997; Hassner, 2009)
demonstrated that these narratives have substantially contributed both to conflict protraction and the contours of emergent compromise, the narrative approach has considerable merit.

In the sections that follow, I endeavor to do just this, tracing the development of Israeli and Serbian political discourse and policy regarding Jerusalem and Kosovo particularly from the mid-1990s to the present. Both remain integral to popular conceptions of the national homeland and mainstream parties have consistently opposed significant concessions concerning their future political status, however both societies have grown increasingly receptive to compromise. Yet even as acceptance of the partition of these territories is gradually apparent both on the ground and in popular political discourse, those spaces most central to their respective homeland narratives appear more indivisible than ever. This paper will demonstrate that these outcomes cannot be adequately understood absent the constitutive power of popular narrative to structure both elite discursive strategies and the "legitimate" range of policy options available to them.

**Jerusalem: The Eternal Capital**

For many observers, the struggle over Jerusalem represents the very essence of the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict. In it, they see two utterly irreconcilable claims to a space that both side claim as integral to their homeland and identity. As the subject of two thousand years of prayer and longing in the Jewish tradition, for most Israelis, secular and religious, left and right, it impossible to imagine their country without Jerusalem as its capital. Jerusalem is exceptional not only in its preeminent emotional resonance but in that it is the only space in Israeli political and popular discourse for which the state's sustained opposition to partition has been justified almost solely through homeland narratives. Because Israeli attachments to Jerusalem are primarily derived from the content of national memory and not the material and political calculus of territorial control, today Israelis are increasingly prepared to surrender those spaces not deemed integral to the homeland, namely peripheral Palestinian neighborhoods, while rejecting deep compromise over the Temple Mount and other critical religious and historical sites despite the diplomatic and strategic burdens they entail.

Prior to the founding of the state, Jerusalem was synonymous with the Land of Israel in the Jewish religious and cultural imagination. Taking its very name from one of the hilltops upon which the city was founded nearly five thousand years ago, the Zionist project of returning to the land of Israel was, from the beginning, intimately connected to the symbolism of Jerusalem as the spiritual gathering place of the Jewish people. Recorded in the biblical narrative as the site from which King David ruled the first Israelite kingdom and where King Solomon built the Jewish Temple in the Eleventh Century BCE, Jerusalem became the center of Jewish religious authority and ritual practice to which all Jews were expected to make pilgrimage three times annually. Existing in various incarnations until the Temple's final destruction in 70 CE during a Judean revolt against Roman rule, Jerusalem remained pivotal to Jewish folklore, prayer, and commemorative ritual over the next two millennia.

Several prominent historians and political scientists point out, however, that this symbolic preeminence hardly translated into Jerusalem becoming an "indivisible" space in either practical Zionist or Israeli politics. They cite the Zionist movement's acquiescence to the designation of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* under international stewardship in the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan and Israel's tacit acceptance of Jordanian control of East Jerusalem including the
Old City following the 1948-49 Israeli War of Independence.\textsuperscript{33} What these perspectives all too often conflate is the material incapacity of the Zionist movement to prevent such division with the deep acceptance of its legitimacy. Indeed, ample evidence demonstrates that the Zionist movement initially accept the internationalization of the city as a strategic concession which would almost certainly be reversed by popular referendum owing to its pre-1948 Jewish demographic majority.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, the Zionist leadership was profoundly uncomfortable with the possibility that such a concession would be taken as an ideological abandonment of Jewish title to the historic heart of the city, a sentiment echoed across the political spectrum even amidst the War of Independence.\textsuperscript{35}

Between 1949 and 1967, with Jerusalem divided between Israeli and Jordanian rule, the Israeli leadership never officially expressed revisionist aims and even made a concerted effort to solidify western "Jewish Jerusalem" as a symbolic stand-in for the lost historic center.\textsuperscript{36} Yet there are multiple indications that this part of the city failed to replace the Old City in the Israeli imagination as the normative eternal capital of the Jewish people. Notable among them were the highly visible military division of the city,\textsuperscript{37} the rise and fall of the Tomb of David as a significant national pilgrimage site,\textsuperscript{38} and the enormous popularity of Naomi Shemer's pre-Six Day War song recounting the idyllic biblical space of ancient Jerusalem,\textsuperscript{39} to say nothing of the national elation expressed in massive popular pilgrimages and exuberant official rhetoric that followed the city's reunification in 1967.\textsuperscript{40} Nowhere is this sentiment more clearly addressed than in Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's address to Knesset on June 12, 1967. There he declared, "For the first time since the establishment of the State, Jews pray at the Western Wall, the relic of our sacred temple and our historic past, at Rachel's Tomb. For the first time in our generation, Jews can pray at the Cave of Machepela in Hebron, the city of the patriarchs. The prophecy has been fulfilled: 'There is recompense for the work, the sons have returned to their borders.'"\textsuperscript{41}

Observations such as these cast serious doubt on any assessment of Israeli politics that deny the broad symbolic resonance of Jerusalem as an integral homeland territory, but they do not in themselves constitute proof of territorial indivisibility. Even in their conflation of normative attitudes and material circumstances, indivisibility theorists demonstrate that because elites often do acquiesce to partition of spaces as symbolically laden as Jerusalem, they are divisible. Yet in treating the question of divisibility as a binary, they can only offer leverage to explain the most basic of outcomes. By contrast, the narrative approach presented here offers insight not only into when territory is likely to be treated as divisible or indivisible, but by which normative metrics division will be seen as both feasible and legitimate. This comparative advantage is readily apparent once examining the modalities of Israeli intransigence and compromise over Jerusalem since the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

\textsuperscript{33} (Friedland & Hecht, 1996; Goddard, 2010; Golani, 1999; Lustick, 1996; Shlaim, 1988; Wasserstein, 2002)
\textsuperscript{34} (Bovis, 1971, p. 61; Eytan, 1958, p. 69; Sebag Montefiore, 2011, p. 555)
\textsuperscript{36} (Klein, 2007, p. 180) Also see (Lorch, 1991, pp. 549, 551-552, 557, 561-562, 565-568)
\textsuperscript{37} (Segev, 2007, pp. 169-172)
\textsuperscript{38} (Bar, 2004, pp. 266-270; Israeli, 2002, pp. 5-7)
\textsuperscript{39} (Gaviuely-Nur, 2007; Oren, 2003, pp. 53, 61)
\textsuperscript{40} (Segev, 2007, pp. 432-433)
\textsuperscript{41} (Eshkol, 1969, pp. 119-120)
Prior to making the Oslo negotiations public, Prime Minister Rabin gave a speech on June 23, 1993 in which he insisted that although Israel was willing to take calculated risks for peace, it could not make concessions on Jerusalem. Justifying this claim entirely in terms of the homeland narrative, he asserted, "More than anything else, if there is something which symbolizes the Jewish people, the Jewish faith, the Jewish belief and the Jewish hope, it is Jerusalem. Jerusalem is the heart, the soul of the Jewish people and therefore, whoever believes that any Government of Israel can compromise on united Jerusalem under our sovereignty, fools himself." This determination was apparent even in Israel's peace negotiations with Jordan. In the treaty, Israel recognized a "special role" for the Hashemite Kingdom in administering Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites, but still asserted the unity of Jerusalem. Presenting the terms of the impending peace before Knesset on August 3, 1994, PM Rabin insisted not only that the government remained "firm in its resolve that Jerusalem will not be open to negotiation," but that construction in Jewish neighborhoods beyond the Green Line would continue as a fulfillment of the biblical vow, "If I forget thee, 0 Jerusalem, may my right hand wither." Given the explicit demands of the Arab world and the Palestinian Authority at the time that such construction be halted, the language employed to justify this move, and Rabin's own personal commitment to the peace process, the impact of the homeland narrative on policymaking here is clear.

During Benyamin Netanyahu's first term as Prime Minister, he too relied on homeland narratives to justify claims to a united Jerusalem. In February 1997, the government authorized the construction of Har Homa, the first new neighborhood to be built in Jerusalem after the Oslo Accords. Justifying this decision before Knesset on March 12, 1997, Foreign Minister David Levy declared, "Let no one be misled, and say: In order to prevent violence and unrest, refrain from building in Jerusalem or change the government decision. […] Israel has the right to build in Jerusalem. The government decision is firm and abiding, and will not be altered even in the face of daily threats." Building in Jerusalem, he argued, had no link to violence or peacemaking. Rather, it was the uncontestable right of the Israeli people.

The most significant challenge to the paradigm of an undivided Jerusalem came during Ehud Barak's Labor government. In presenting the government's basic guidelines before Knesset on July 6, 1999, they maintained that "Greater Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Israel, will remain united and complete under the sovereignty of Israel." However, upon commencing talks with the PA over a final status agreement, a loosening of this insistence was apparent. In a statement by Ambassador Oded Eran at talks in Ramallah in November 1999, he asserted, "To all Israelis, regardless of their political views, Jerusalem is our capital and it should continue to be so. Under its sovereignty Israel has proven its sensitivity to all religions and to the sanctity of freedom of worship. We therefore maintain that it should remain united, open and under Israel's sovereignty."

Although still demanding a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, the idea of an "open" city had emerged. The first implications of this openness became apparent in May 2000, when Barak announced that Israel and the PA agreed that Abu Dis would serve as the capital of the emergent Palestinian state. Adjacent to Jerusalem, the town was excluded from the expanded

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42 ("Address by Prime Minister Rabin to Keren Hayesod Conference, 23 June 1993," 1993)
43 (Morris, 2001, p. 631)
44 ("Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin on the Washington Declaration, 3 August 1994," 1994)
45 ("Statement in the Knesset by Minister of Foreign Affairs Levy on the peace process, 12 March 1997," 1997)
municipality borders in 1967, allowing the government to argue that it had both preserved the unity of the capital and allowed the Palestinians to have their demanded capital in East Jerusalem. In Barak's words: "In any future settlement, Jerusalem will remain united as Israel's eternal capital. They [the Palestinians] will be in Abu Dis and we will be in united Jerusalem. We are committed to moving forward toward a peace agreement that will be 1,000 times better than any alternative."48

These efforts to differentiate between a separate Arab Jerusalem and the legal notion of a united Jerusalem broke down at the Camp David summit in July 2000. There, Barak offered Yasser Arafat sovereignty over outlying Arab neighborhoods in eastern Jerusalem and some control in core neighborhoods, an equal division of the Old City, and "sovereign custodianship" on the Temple Mount, in failed hopes of securing a final peace deal.49 This position was diametrically opposed to his pre-Camp David commitment to the Knesset to demand "a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty." Whatever the Prime Minister's sincerity, either before Knesset or at the negotiating table, Arafat's rejection allowed him to reassert upon his return his belief that Jerusalem's "unification in 1967 and our return to the holy places, under Jewish sovereignty after 2,000 years, were a kind of "big bang" that reverberated on the deepest of Jewish heart strings. The unity of Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the State of Israel, became the keystone of our national consensus."50

The failure of these accords spurred at least four distinct developments in Israel's Jerusalem policy: the construction of a security barrier in the north, east, and south, the passage of laws that considerably raise the legal bar for any formal division, the advancement of building and settlement projects to dictate the character of any division, and the introduction of more creative diplomatic initiatives to implement division. The first directly correlates with the outbreak of the Second Intifada. As violence swept the Occupied Territories, Israeli attitudes toward the Palestinian Authority and the prospects for a Palestinian state hardened even more than they had during the violent period in which the Oslo "peace" was being implemented. Attacks in Jerusalem including suicide bombings and sniper fire from surrounding Arab villages accelerated Israeli efforts to construct a security barrier between Israeli controlled territory and densely populated Palestinian areas. In June 2002, the Israeli government approved the construction of two segments, in the north extending some 10 kilometers along Route 443, the secondary highway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv that cuts through the West Bank and in the south for a similar length along Route 60 between the city and the Gush Etzion settlement bloc, separating Bethlehem from the highway. In September 2003, more extensive building was approved of a high concrete wall separating the Shu'afat and Qalandiya refugee camps and Kafr 'Aqib from the rest of the city.51

Acknowledging this developing reality, Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barakat suggested in late 2011 that Israel formally relinquish control of Palestinian neighborhoods outside the separation barrier. While rightist MKs blasted the mayor on both grounds of homeland and security for his "injury against the completeness and unity of Jerusalem" and for threatening to "turn all of Jerusalem into Sderot," leftist activists charged that the move would be "dangerous and cruel" as it would revoke the legal residency of some 70,000 Palestinians who are legally entitled to

48 ("Prime Minister Barak's statement to the cabinet regarding Abu Dis, 15 May 2000," 2000)
49 (Ben-Ami, 2006, p. 260; Morris, 2009, p. 137; Pressman, 2003, p. 18)
50 ("Address by Prime Minister Barak on the fifth anniversary of Rabin's assassination, 8 November 2000," 2000; "Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister Barak regarding the Camp David summit, 10 July 2000," 2000)
51 (B'tselem, 2011; Noy, August 11, 2010)
government services. Given growing Israeli belief that such areas are indeed not a part of their Jerusalem, unless these neighborhoods indeed become as threatening as Gaza, permanent Israeli administrative withdrawal seems likely. These "facts on the ground" have effectively divided the city and made obvious that there are indeed neighborhoods that are not considered by Israelis to be integral to their faith in a united Jerusalem.

Paradoxically, the second major development has been the legal hardening of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. On November 27, 2000, in anticipation of the resumption of talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in Taba, Egypt, the Knesset passed an amendment to the Basic Law on Jerusalem which specifically defined the city as those borders declared by the state on June 28, 1967. It stipulated that no authority of the state or the municipality may be transferred "either permanently or for an allotted period of time to a foreign body, whether political, governmental or to any other similar type of foreign body," and that this law could only be changed by a majority vote in Knesset. Since the passage of this amendment, several attempts have been made to increase its stringency, including proposals for increasing the majority necessary for revocation to 80 from 60 of 120 Knesset members, and to explicitly state that Jerusalem is the "unified capital of the Jewish people and the State of Israel."

As with the original Jerusalem Basic Law passed by the Knesset in July 1980 asserting the city to be the "complete and united" capital of the State of Israel, their supporters are adamant that it is necessary to defend the "eternal capital" and bind the government's hands in negotiations. Neither of these further amendments have yet been approved, but the Knesset did pass bills in December 2009 and November 2010 that require a popular referendum and a 60-person majority in Knesset to approve withdrawal from any sovereign Israeli territory. Although not enshrined in the Basic Law, these directives significantly raise the political cost to making any territorial concession in Jerusalem.

The third major development post-2000, Israeli construction and settlement, hardly represents a policy discontinuity as every Israeli government has built and defended the legitimacy of building in Jerusalem's expanded municipal borders since 1967. Indeed, even during the Israeli government's self-declared ten-month home building freeze in the settlements between December 2009 and September 2010 in a bid to jumpstart peace talks with the Palestinians, PM Netanyahu refused to apply it to construction in Jerusalem. However, with the significant exception of the contentious E1 area between Ma'ale Adumim and Jerusalem, Israel's official policy has shifted from building new outlying neighborhoods to concentrating development in and around existing neighborhoods and promoting geographic continuity between them with construction concentrated in Gilo and Har Homa in the south and Pisgat Ze'ev and Ramat Shlomo in the north.

While the fourth development, creative diplomatic initiatives to divide the city, has clearly not yet met with success, it has introduced to the Israeli political discourse the possibility of compromise while still maintaining, if not magnifying, Jerusalem's central role as a homeland territory. In the lead up to the January 2001 Taba summit between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, American President Bill Clinton enumerated a multi-point peace plan that would
come to be known as the Clinton Parameters. In them, he proposed that Israel maintain sovereignty over the city's Jewish population while the Palestinians assume sovereignty over its Arab population. Regarding the Temple Mount, he proposed "Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram (Temple Mount) and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall such that mutual consent would be requested before any excavation can take place." 58

This "over-under" solution formalizing de facto Palestinian control of the Mount while respecting Jewish convictions was not well received by Israel (nor the PA). Israel demanded that any agreement recognize not only the Western Wall but all of the ha'agan hakadosh ("holy basin") including the western and southern walls of the Temple Mount, the tunnels beneath, the adjacent archaeological sites of the Ofel Garden, City of David, and Tombs of the Kings and Prophets as well as the Mount of Olives.59 Before departing to the talks, the cabinet further committed itself to this principle on Jerusalem: "Prime Minister Barak will not sign any document which transfers sovereignty over the Temple Mount to the Palestinians."60 In short, Israel did not appear to be prepared to concede on those sites that it considered critical to the Jerusalem homeland narrative. However, in the agreement negotiated but not accepted at Taba, Israel again proposed the idea of an "open city" with "soft borders" that would not impede movement or commerce of its residents while serving simultaneously as a capital for both states. It also proposed a special regime for the Holy Basin including the Old City under some form of joint supervision that was rejected by the PA. By contrast, no agreement was reached on the Western Wall nor the Temple Mount.61

Although Israel was far from accepting a partition of the city along the lines demanded by the PA, it did demonstrate a moderation of its initial position. Those areas that played no part in the Jerusalem homeland narrative could be relinquished and those meaningful although not fundamental sites of national identity, i.e. everything outside the Temple Mount, could hypothetically be shared assuming there was a willing partner. Using the framework developed at Camp David and Taba as a starting point, former government ministers Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo from Israel and the Palestinian Authority respectively launched a private peace initiative, producing in December 2003 a document known as the Geneva Accord. In it, they propose concrete recommendations for the partition of Jerusalem including the formation of an "Inter-Religious Council" to govern religious issues in the city, the division of neighborhoods based on demographic character, a special regime for the Old City without any physical division, and a multinational presence to ensure the security and conservation of the Temple Mount. 62 Beilin admits that although the document and the process by which it was negotiated have come under considerable criticism, its very existence does prove that Israelis and Palestinians can negotiate the "nitty-gritty" details of a peace agreement.63

Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert too expressed his belief that peace with the Palestinian Authority is impossible without the division of Jerusalem. Speaking before a conference held by the Geneva Initiative in Tel Aviv on September 19, 2010, he insisted that there is no other practical formula to adopt that those conceived under the 2000 Clinton

59 (Morris, 2009, pp. 142, 146)
60 ("Israel's position on the Taba talks, 21 January 2001," 2001)
61 (Eldar, 2002)
62 See sections 4, 5, and 6 of (Baltianski & Foqaha, 2009)
63 (Beilin, August 17, 2010)
Parameters, namely that all Jewish neighborhoods of built after 1967 be under Israeli sovereignty and all the Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty. This, he argued, “Must be said, one way or another. Anyone who says that peace can be made without doing this is deluding themselves.” If Israel does not take this position, there will be no end to the conflict. He professed that nothing is closer to his heart than the ethos of Jewish and Israeli history in Jerusalem but that “we will not be able to reach an agreement if anyone exclusively claims the ‘Holy Basin.’” This whole area, he insisted, should be seen as one unit, and it must be under an international trusteeship, ensuring free access for all.64

Despite the growth of such creative solutions to the division of Jerusalem and increasing pressures from the international community to reach an agreement, current Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu ardently asserts that it is a matter of “national consensus” that Jerusalem remain united in any peace agreement with the Palestinians.65 This was strongly confirmed by campaign rhetoric during the recent 2013 Israeli parliamentary election. Although Netanyahu's joint Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu ticket failed to offer an electoral platform, he regularly asserted Jerusalem's indivisibility in the campaign.66 More noteworthy were statements by the ardently secular, political centrist Yair Lapid, whose new Yesh Atid party made the second strongest showing. In a campaign speech at the West Bank settlement of Ariel in October 2012, he declared, "Jerusalem will remain under Israeli sovereignty and will not be divided. Jerusalem is not only a place, it's also an idea, it is the heartbeat around which the new State of Israel was built. The return to Zion was not to [Tel Aviv's] Azrieli Towers but to the Tower of David, and the heart of Jerusalem is also the heart of Israel."67 Even the platforms of those mainstream parties seen as most amenable to negotiation over the status of Jerusalem, namely Labour and Tzipi Livni's Hatnua, took pains to confirm its status as Israel's "eternal capital", although Labour calls for the "holy basin" to be under a "special regime" with Jewish holy places under Israeli sovereignty.68

Taken together, this analysis demonstrates that homeland narratives have consistently and powerfully influenced Israel's Jerusalem policy. Rather than seize the opportunity to selectively forget or reassign the sacredness of Jerusalem in Israeli national discourse to alternative sites and national projects with the fall of the Old City in 1948, the state's governing elite largely, if inadvertently, reinforced popular commitment to remember what had been lost. Upon its re-conquest in 1967, the city returned to the center of cultural and political discourse with broad popular commitment to the image of Jerusalem as the eternal, united capital of Israel. Even since agreeing to negotiate over the political and territorial future of the capital, the concessions that the government has been willing to make have been consistently shaped by the belief that Jerusalem is integral to the Jewish homeland: offering to relinquish that which is marginal to the narrative and, at most, share under Israeli control that which is integral.

**Kosovo: Serbia's First Name**

Like Jerusalem for Israelis, it is nearly impossible to speak of homeland in the Serbian context without reference to Kosovo. Serbia's political claim to this space is even more

64 (Olmert, 2010)
65 (Netanyahu, 2011)
66 (Hoffman & Lidman, 2013)
67 (Ravid, 2013)
68 (Hatnua Party, 2013; Labour Party of Israel, 2012)
exceptional in that it has exercised no degree of formal sovereignty in Kosovo since its military forces were expelled in 1999 by NATO halting their ethnic cleansing of its Albanian majority. Although international peacekeepers were deployed ostensibly with the mandate to protect the population and to "respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," in practice, Kosovo was treated from the outset as a state apart; under international jurisdiction and local control by the Albanian majority.\(^6^9\) Since the fall of Milošević in 2000, Serbia has consistently demanded Kosovo's formal political and territorial reincorporation. In practice, cracks have grown in this consensus in the form of European-mediated dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian government and increasing elite recognition that Kosovo may never again be fully subordinate to Belgrade. Yet deeper compromise in the form of formal recognition of Kosovo's independence, surrender of control of Serb-majority enclaves, or entrusting of significant Serbian Orthodox religious and cultural sites to Priština's sovereign custodianship have not been forthcoming. This outcome has been driven, first and foremost, by the deep-seated popular narrative that Kosovo is the birthplace of the nation; culturally integral and politically essential to Serbian collective identity.

Many defining events in the early history of Serbia took place outside the present-day territory, namely the founding of the Nemanjić Dynasty in Raška to the north and the enthroning of Emperor Dušan in his imperial capital of Skopje to the south. Yet no episode is more enshrined in the national memory than the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. The much eulogized battle ended with the defeat of Prince Lazar and his armies and led to the kingdom’s vassalage to and subjugation by the Ottoman Empire. While a crushing loss for Serb sovereignty, medieval church historians portrayed Lazar's death as a martyr's victory, choosing the everlasting "Empire of Heaven" over the "Empire of Earth." As the legend relates, the prince's material and temporal sacrifice ensured that Serbs would one day redeem their ancestral homeland.\(^7^0\) This retelling was popularized through an oral tradition of epic poetry, a cultural form that has contributed markedly to the construction of the Serbian national memory.\(^7^1\) Today the site is marked by the Gazimestan monument, a medieval-style tower erected in 1953 (replacing a previous memorial that was demolished in 1941).\(^7^2\) For many religious and nationalist Serbs, it is an annual tradition to make pilgrimage on Vidovdan ("St. Vitus' Day") every June 28, the traditionally date of the ancient battle. Much in the way "Zion" became synonymous with Israel and the Jewish people, Serbian cultural identity became profoundly intertwined with the Kosovo homeland narrative.\(^7^3\)

Few deny the deep cultural penetration of the Kosovo myth in the Serbian national consciousness, but the power of this homeland narrative in modern Serbian politics is disputed. On one hand, historians have charged not only that the traditional image of the battle of 1389 in which a largely united Serb army faced the invading Turkish and presumably allied-Albanian onslaught is woefully inaccurate, but that the concomitant narrative of Serb national commitment to and collective suffering on behalf of the territory since is wantonly naïve.\(^7^4\) On the other, political scientists have argued that elite claims of existential threats to Serbian culture and identity in Kosovo, so prominent during Slobodan Milošević's rise in the late 1980s and early 1990s, represent little more than a cynical manipulation of popular passions to preserve power in

\(^6^9\) (UN Security Council, 1999)
\(^7^0\) (Anzulovic, 1999, pp. 4-5; Judah, 2009, pp. 34-37)
\(^7^1\) (Janjić, June 30, 2009; Judah, 2009, pp. 44-45)
\(^7^2\) (Jančićijević & Tošić, 1998, pp. 486-487)
\(^7^3\) (Janjić, June 30, 2009)
\(^7^4\) (Anzulovic, 1999; Malcolm, 1999; Vickers, 1998)
the face of growing disaffection with communist rule. While these scholars do recognize that such narratives would not be resonant if they were not already firmly embedded in the Serbian national memory and that their employment may limit non-nationalist policy options in the immediate term, few consider whether rhetorical alternatives were available for power seeking elite. Nor can these analyses adequately explain why homeland claims to Kosovo have remained constant in Serbian politics since Milošević’s fall.

If the political articulation of deep-seated homeland claims to Kosovo was little more than a strategy to distract public attention from the failures of Serbia’s political leadership, the incentives for ascendant democratic elite to pursue them should have been very low indeed. Under Milošević's leadership, from the wars that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia and ethnic slaughter in Croatia and Bosnia to its attempt to destroy the Kosovo Liberation Army and expel Kosovo’s majority Albanian population ending in international occupation in 1999, Serbia was reduced from a troubled but united multi-ethnic federal state to an impoverished international pariah. When presidential elections were held in September 2000, the extent of popular discontent with the Milošević regime was fully revealed. After democratic opposition leader Vojislav Koštunica handily defeated the long-standing president outright, 52.54 to 35.01%, the Yugoslav election commission attempted to falsify the results. In response, opposition parties called a general strike and gave Milošević until October 5 to step down. After massive rallies swept Belgrade and an angry mob attacked the parliament building, Milošević officially announced his resignation the next day. In subsequent Serbian parliamentary elections on December 23, the Democratic Party won 64% of the vote and Zoran Đinđić became Prime Minister. On April 1, 2001, Milošević was arrested and on June 28, Vidovdan, he was extradited to the Hague to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity, a verdict he escaped by dying of a heart attack on March 11, 2006.

Under the parliamentary leadership of Zoran Đinđić's Democratic Party (DS), Serbia began a long and painful process of domestic political liberalization and institutional reform. Yet even as this dramatic change in regime did result in a greater degree of Serbian government flexibility on the autonomy of Kosovo, no official would countenance formal partition. Although engaging in dialogue with the Albanian government in Tirana and supporting new democratic institutions in Kosovo under the stewardship of the United Nations to foster cooperation between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, Đinđić never openly expressed support for the province’s independence. Even as his administration focused on economic reform, modernization, and democratization, his Kosovo policy emphasized coexistence over independence stressing that Serbia would not accept a Kosovo government which included an army or foreign ministry nor would it relinquish state and private Serbian property claims threatened with nationalization. His assassination on March 12, 2003, presumably masterminded by Milošević loyalists in the Serbian secret police and the mob, likely unrelated to his more lenient stance, dashed international hopes for compromise resulting in Kosovo independence.

Although anti-Serb violence which followed the Yugoslav army’s evacuation from Kosovo largely subsided by 2000, attacks on Serb youth in late 2003 and early 2004 infuriated the territory’s remaining Serbs. After a Serb youth was wounded in a drive-by shooting on March

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75 (Ambrosio, 2001; Gagnon, 2004; Kaufman, 2001; Saideman, 1998; Saideman & Ayres, 2008; Snyder, 2000)
76 (Judah, 2009, pp. 343-347)
77 (Đijindjic, January 25, 2001; Radio Belgrade, November 1, 2001; Tanjug News Agency, May 10, 2002)
79 (Erlanger, 2003; Partos, 2003)
15, 2004 in the small enclave of Čaglavica outside of Priština, Serbs began blockading the streets in protest. It was then falsely reported in the Albanian press that three Albanian children had drowned while fleeing Serb attacks, sparking nine days of unprecedented violence against Serb civilians and cultural sites. The events, which Serbs refer to as the March Pogrom, ended with eleven Albanian and eight Serb deaths, 900 injured, 366 Albanians and 4,000 Serbs and Roma displaced, 800 Serb homes destroyed, and 35 Serb churches and monasteries damaged or burned to the ground. While intercommunal violence is certainly not new to Kosovo, many Serbs point out that churches, monuments, and other artifacts, which managed to survive for centuries of foreign occupation and control, have only suffered such great devastation in the last 10 years. This all occurred while they were presumably under the protection of “responsible” international administrative and security forces.

In November 2005, in an effort to break the diplomatic deadlock, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon Martti Ahtisaari, who had been instrumental in negotiating Milošević's surrender in 1999, to begin talks between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians to arrange a final status agreement. Even in the aftermath of the March Pogrom, the Serbian leadership was open to "more than autonomy but less than independence" for Kosovo. By contrast, the Kosovo Albanian leadership would accept no less than independence. From the outset, it was obvious to the Serbian delegation that the "neutral" UN mediators had already rendered their decision. Argues Slobodan Samardžić, the chief Serbian negotiator, his delegation was presented with a fait accompli. Prior to “negotiations,” it had already been agreed by the other parties that Kosovo should be independent. Their primary concern was not to receive Serbian input, but rather to elicit Serbia’s support in imposing its recommendations. As a concession to Belgrade, the plan offered substantial municipal autonomy for the Serbian enclaves with special economic and political ties to the north. Meanwhile, a major EU mission called EULEX would be deployed to assist Kosovo in the development of law and policing. The plan was presented to the UN Security Council on March 26, 2007, but its approval was blocked by Russia. Regardless, EULEX was deployed in a move widely perceived in Serbia as further bolstering Kosovo's independence bid.

Emboldened by support from the United Nations and major western powers, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence on February 17, 2008. Popular protests erupted across Serbia targeting foreign peacekeepers on the Kosovo-Serbia border, political institutions inside Kosovo, and foreign embassies in Belgrade. In turn, political elite within the Serbian community were quick to voice their strong opposition to Kosovo’s independence. At a rally attended by 200,000 people in Belgrade on February 21, Prime Minister Koštunica insisted, "Is there anyone among us who is not from Kosovo? Is there anyone among us who thinks that Kosovo does not belong to us? Kosovo - that's Serbia's first name. Kosovo belongs to Serbia. Kosovo belongs to the Serbian people. That is how it has been forever. There is no force, no threat, and no punishment big and hideous enough for any Serb, at any time, to say anything different but, Kosovo is Serbia!" President Boris Tadić too asserted that Kosovo's declaration was an "illegal act"

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81 (Janjic, June 30, 2009; Menkovic, July 22, 2009)
82 (Ahtisaari, March 26, 2007)
83 (Samardžić, July 23, 2009)
84 (Judah, 2009, p. 358)
86 Quoted in (Judah, 2009, p. 359)
threatening legal action against any state or institution that would recognize it. In a late February 2008 interview, Chairman of the Serb Municipalities of Kosovo Alliance Marko Jakšić declared, “It would be incredibly stupid for Serbs to keep quiet when their territory is stolen. Such messages are in the spirit and in the interest of those who proclaimed another Albanian state in the Balkans […] Asking the Serbs to keep quiet, is tantamount to treason.”

In the aftermath of Kosovo’s declaration, Serbia’s primary strategy was to contest its legality through the International Court of Justice, a strategy which Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić argued demonstrated Serbia’s commitment to peace and diplomacy over coercion. Nonetheless, he insisted, “Serbia is not willing to sacrifice its territory in order to become a EU member state. This government will never accept that, and I don’t expect any future government to address the problem differently. We are a proud, democratic country, which is peacefully defending its constitution and territorial integrity, and will continue to do so.” Even as Serbia framed the case as a question of international law alone, its deposition offered a thousand page supplementary recounting of the historical status of Kosovo since its conquest by the Ottoman Empire. Although such materials were unlikely to sway the court, their inclusion further highlights the depth to which Serbian claims to the territory are based in the national memory. The ICJ ruled in July 2010 that the declaration did not breach international law, yet Tadić still insisted, "Serbia will never recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo, since we believe that unilateral and ethnically motivated secession is not in line with UN principles."

Since early 2008, tensions inside Kosovo have subdued. International police forces continue to patrol the unofficial border between northern and southern Kosovo along the Ibar River flowing through Kosovska-Mitrovica, clashes between Serbs and Albanians have become markedly less frequent, and interethnic traffic has returned over the city’s three major bridges. Serb policemen serving under UN supervision in Serb-majority areas in the north who walked off the job also returned to work in July 2009 pending agreement on preserving a command structure independent of the Kosovo Police operating under Albanian authority in Priština. Yet in July 2011, tensions flared in the north after Priština banned the importation of Serbian goods into Kosovo and dispatched police to seize northern border crossings to enforce the new law. Clashes ensued between Kosovo Serbs and the police and international peacekeepers as Serbs erected road blocks to prevent access. In Serbia proper, the issue was given considerable air during the lead up to the 2012 parliamentary elections. President Boris Tadić called upon Kosovo Serbs "to realize the roadblocks were not a form of defense, but a threat to their interest," which would hurt Serbia on the international stage, while then-opposition leader Tomislav Nikolić charged that the president had effectively acquiesced to "an absolute handover of Kosovo into the Albanians' hands."

These developments were coupled with a referendum organized in northern Kosovo by local Serb authorities asking whether residents "accept the institutions of the so-called Republic

87 (Beta News Agency, 2008)
88 (B92, Beta News Agency, & Tanjug News Agency, 2008a)
89 (B92 & Beta News Agency, 2008)
90 (B92 & RTS, 2009)
91 (Beta News Agency, 2010a)
92 (Journalist, June 27, 2009)
93 (Kosovo Police Spokesman, July 1, 2009)
94 (Krstic & Bytyci, 2012)
95 (Beta News Agency, 2011; Tanjug News Agency, 2011)
of Kosovo."\(^{96}\) Held on February 13-14, 2012, unsurprisingly 99.74% voted to reject Priština's authority with a 75% turnout. Serb major of Kosovska Mitrovica Krstimir Pantić insisted, "After the referendum, it will be crystal clear to ethnic Albanians, the international community and politicians from Belgrade that it is not (just) local politicians who do not want the Kosovo institutions, but that it is the wish of the whole Serb community living in the north."\(^{97}\) Yet he referendum was condemned by President Tadić who insisted, "This move by leaders of the municipalities in northern Kosovo can only reduce the possibilities of the state, and is not in the interests of Serbs in the province." Even Goran Bogdanović, Minister for Kosovo argued, "The referendum diminishes our credibility and capacity for negotiations with the international community."\(^{98}\) Indeed, the north represents only 40,000 of the territory's 120,000 estimated Serbs, a growing number of whom are choosing to participate in the Albanian-dominated government, believing they have been abandoned by Belgrade.\(^{99}\)

Although the idea of Kosovo is deeply engrained in the Serbian national consciousness, increasing costs at the international diplomatic level to preserve territorial claims to this disputed space have clearly disincentivized aggressive policies that would deny any negotiation over its future. In the place of once indomitable claims to the territorial integrity of Kosovo, the Serbian government has indicated its openness to broad political autonomy to the province under Serbian rule and, in some instances, recognition of de facto although not de jure partition. Formally speaking, the Serbian leadership has denied any acceptance of partition with President Tadić admitting as early as October 2008, "Intellectuals in Serbia and the international public are debating the issue of a partition and this is one of the options that has been emphasized all these years in searching for a solution to Kosovo's future status. I can only think about this when all other possibilities have been exhausted, while the question if I would support this solution is today an altogether hypothetical matter."\(^{100}\)

More remarkable was newly elected nationalist President Tomislav Nikolić's statement on July 10, 2012 that "I don't think I will ever again be president in Priština, but the president of the interim authorities in Priština will also never be president in Kosovska Mitrovica."\(^{101}\) His government has continued the dialogue begun by its predecessor while insisting upon non-recognition of Kosovo's independence. In an unofficial diplomatic position paper approved by the Serbian National Assembly on January 13, 2013, the government laid out its principles for continued negotiations with Priština. These notably include extensive autonomy and executive authority for Serb-majority municipalities and extraterritorial sovereignty with international guarantees for "premises belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church, church property, and the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the territory of the province" in addition to complete demilitarization of the territory as an "autonomous province" of Serbia.\(^{102}\) These conditions have not been well-received by the Kosovo Albanian government, who fear that such surrender of authority would inevitably result in partition, but they do represent substantial movement by Belgrade toward a workable compromise.\(^{103}\)

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\(^{96}\) (Tanjug News Agency, 2012c)  
\(^{97}\) (Vujisic, 2012)  
\(^{98}\) (Ristic, 2012)  
\(^{99}\) (Lazarević, 2010; Tanjug News Agency, 2012a)  
\(^{100}\) (B92, FoNet, & Beta News Agency, 2008)  
\(^{101}\) (Tanjug News Agency, 2012b)  
\(^{102}\) (Government of Serbia, 2013)  
\(^{103}\) (International Crisis Group, 2013)
That a significant proportion of Serbia's demands vis-à-vis Priština seem to relate more directly to the territory's Serb population than to heritage sites may challenge this paper's assertion of the political primacy of homeland narratives in Kosovo. Yet if policy toward Serbs elsewhere in the region is the model, political autonomy for Serbs within an independent Kosovo should be as acceptable to Belgrade as Republika Srpska is as a constitutive Serb republic in Bosnia. While Serbian officials have frequently raised concerns over the potential weakening of Republika Srpska's constitutional status in the federation, they have not asserted territorial claims to it. Even as Serbian policymakers have asserted that their particular approach to Kosovo is meant to ensure that Serbs be recognized "as people who live there and have their rights, not as a people that are slated to be relocated one day," it is difficult to understand, absent deeper cultural considerations, why such self-determination requires Kosovo's political reincorporation.

Coupled with an insistence on extraterritorial sovereignty and international protection for Serb heritage sites, a demand Serbia has not made elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, it is clear that Serbian claims to Kosovo are distinct. Even if Serbian claims vis-a-vis kin populations and heritage sites are merely instrumental to preserve national claims to Kosovo, the substantial international diplomatic and economic cost to Serbia and their endurance in the face of both regime change and democratic political turnover render standard elite politics explanations entirely inadequate. That recent Serbian governments have bowed to international resolve to preserve the territory's functional independence, the otherwise anomalous insistence that Kosovo remain a highly autonomous province within Serbia can only be fully understood within the ideational bounds of the homeland narrative.

Conclusions

Homeland narratives then have had a substantial impact upon territorial policy in Israel and Serbia, serving to both legitimate "indivisible" claims to Jerusalem and Kosovo in the face of strong international opposition and shape the contours of emergent compromise over them. Although political elites exercise considerable influence over conflict resolution processes, the prevalence of these narratives in the national memory substantially constrain their freedom to act. While both theories of elite politics and the narrative approach developed here suggest that elites are highly sensitive to challenges to their power in the form of public demands, the former is largely agnostic on mass beliefs, deeming them relevant only insofar as they affect the strategic calculations of governing elites seeking to preserve and expand their political power. As such, scholars in this tradition have difficulty substantively accounting for why elites choose to pursue certain territorial claims over others and why these claims often outlast those elites who supposedly initiate and sustain them.

Nowhere was this literature more prominent than in scholarly discussions of the disastrous intercommunal violence marking the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Rather than an expression of deep seated "ancient hatreds" between the region's ethnic groups, elite political theorists argued that ethnic violence was part of a concerted strategy to demobilize opposition movements seeking economic and political reforms that would have negatively affected elite interests. By reorienting political identities around exclusive ethnic groups, they successfully cast opposition to elite power structures as threatening to each republic's titular ethnic community. Violence was then employed as a tool of intimidation as much against ethnic others as against

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104 (Beta News Agency, 2010b; Tanjug News Agency, 2009; Zellman, 2011)
105 (Beta News Agency & Tanjug News Agency, 2013)
political moderates within each republic's now exclusively defined ethnic community. As Milošević successfully consolidated his hold on power, he and his supporters increasingly bore the costs of international recrimination and popular dissatisfaction with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. In response, the regime's stated commitment to Greater Serbia waned and the leadership grew increasingly open to compromise. From this perspective, national territorial ambitions were merely a smokescreen to postpone fundamental reforms and safeguard elite interests.\textsuperscript{106}

This argument exercises strong explanatory power in Bosnia, but falls short in Kosovo. Milošević certainly employed many of the same techniques to raise popular ire against domestic opponents and broadly stoked fears of ethnic violence against Serbs, and it was again his instinct for political survival that persuaded him to finally allow the deployment of international peacekeepers in Kosovo and the effective severing of the territory from Serbian sovereignty. Yet if the Serbian claim to Kosovo was driven by elite interest alone, why did he not relinquish it altogether as he did for Bosnia at Dayton? More importantly, why after the fall of Milošević in 2000 did the new government, headed by democrats, choose to consistently affirm the same principle claim? For elite theorists, the most plausible explanation is that the political leadership of Serbia recognized the continued resonance of this narrative for domestic Serbian audiences. Eager to solidify the legitimacy of their newly established rule against the continued skepticism of hardliners, they turned to familiar national narratives. Although not altogether damning for elite politics, that popular rejection of Kosovo independence compelled a new generation of political elite to adopt policies to this effect strongly suggests the narrative approach's comparative advantage.

Indeed, the narrative approach does not charge that elite actors cannot benefit politically from employing dominant narratives; it wholly expects them to do so. Rather it insists that where politicians rely on such narratives to justify and shape territorial policies, it reinforces their limited capacity as agenda setters and confirms the causal influence of mass beliefs on policymaking. Case in point, Stacie Goddard's recent book, \textit{Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy} (2010), makes the case that the current political stalemate over Jerusalem is the result of elite efforts to justify their bargaining positions to domestic audiences. She argues that while the Israeli political leadership relied on "historical" and "secular" themes to legitimate a divided Jerusalem before 1967, afterward they shifted decisively to "religious Zionist" themes. She characterizes this move as largely tactical with the "unintended blowback effect" of locking Israeli politicians into a "single legitimate position" whereby the previously divided city became non-negotiable and indivisible.\textsuperscript{107} Although acknowledging that significant cultural factors contributed to this strategy, in attempting to prove that Jerusalem is not inherently indivisible, she fails to fully consider the implication of her argument: opposition to division of the city is broadly domestically legitimate.

As this paper has demonstrated, political elites lack the independent capacity to generate such popular legitimacy absent a substantial reservoir of national memory from which justificatory rhetoric can be drawn. While this analysis certainly confirms that Jerusalem is not \textit{inherently} indivisible, it also strongly suggests that Israeli politicians were highly unlikely to choose any other rhetorical path given the homeland narrative's obvious popular resonance. These evaluations further demonstrate that although the elite approach remains valuable to understanding particular aspects of territorial conflict protraction, it does not offer nearly the explanatory breadth nor analytic depth of the narrative approach for either Jerusalem or Kosovo.

\textsuperscript{106} (Gagnon, 2004; Saideman, 1998)
\textsuperscript{107} (Goddard, 2010)
Conversely, the narrative approach may be seen as arguing that homeland territorial conflicts are doomed to irresolution. Because homeland spaces are uniquely meaningful to the national community that claims them, competing claims to these spaces, especially those based upon others' homeland narratives, are often deemed illegitimate a priori. As Ron Hassner has argued, conflict over sacred spaces are most intractable where they are both central to a group's sense of proximity to the divine and most vulnerable to desecration (access by others compromising its sacredness). He further suggests that such spaces can only be peacefully shared where they are of little importance to all claimants or where neutral third-parties intervene to force coexistence.108 This model may be readily applied beyond purely religious sites to sites of national value; indeed they are often one-in-the-same. Secular publics frequently endow religious sites with great national value, like the Western Wall in Jerusalem, just as secular sites often take on quasi-religious significance, like the Gazimestan monument in Kosovo.

Yet because homeland narratives are broadly perceived to be an illegitimate basis for territorial claims, they are often marginalized or ignored in negotiations. The seeming indivisibility of these claims has also encouraged many policy-oriented theorists to counsel that such narratives be relegated to the realm of the metaphysical rather than the practical for their resolution.109 This approach is problematic not only because it defers academic responsibility for exploring the roots of conflict but because it counsels policymakers to ignore issues of central importance to claimant parties. Indeed, it is these popular perceptions of history and identity that condition the willingness of the state and its citizenry to engage in compromise over these spaces. Dismissal of homeland claims by international arbiters creates anxieties among domestic audiences who may doubt the neutrality of external actors and the fairness of the terms of settlement. Engagement with these ideas, by contrast, allows for the identification of those spaces that are actually resonant as homeland, which, as this analysis indicates, may still be the subject of practical compromise. As has been discussed, not only are domestic audiences in Israel and Serbia growing more willing to compromise over parts of Jerusalem and Kosovo not seen as integral to the homeland narrative, but creative solutions like extraterritorial sovereignty and "special regimes" for sacred spaces are gaining ground.

The narrative approach thus insists that any deep understanding of territorial conflict requires not only engagement with the material conditions, institutional settings, and strategic incentives amidst which policymaking takes place, but with the ideas and beliefs that give these decisions meaning and value. Because mass belief powerfully shape political actors' understanding of and engagement with strategic and material realities, neither academics nor policymakers can afford to ignore the narratives that give them expression. Whatever the stigma of nationalism, some territorial attachments may indeed be so deeply engrained in the collective consciousness that no realistic degree of elite manipulation can make them otherwise. The goal should not be to sideline these narratives as obstructionist but to engage with them as constitutive to the process of conflict resolution. Only by understanding what meanings and values these narratives actually address can the realistic scope and conditions of compromise be determined.

108 (Hassner, 2009)
109 (Goddard, 2006; Lustick, 1993; Newman, 1999; Toft, 2003)
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