Nomadic security governance?
The characteristics and implications of the privatisation of major event security

By Hugo Rosemont

Abstract
Major international events face numerous security risks and the protective arrangements around them have become a substantial global industry. Estimates of the budgetary arrangements for the recent London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (London 2012), for example, suggest that the costs of the UK’s security operation for the event amounted to around £1.2bn ($1.8bn). This paper draws on the work of security governance and major event security scholars to examine the extent to which something called ‘nomadic security governance’ is now an important organisational feature of delivering major event security. The paper shows that this form of governance routinely involves multiple types of (corporate) private actor and that within this informal system ‘legacies’ are being created for future event organisers. The paper argues with reference to the security arrangements for recent Olympic Games that whilst individual national governments have and will continue to organise the security for large international events in very distinct ways, major event security governance displays a number of transferable or ‘nomadic’ qualities. Having discussed a possible future programme of research in this area, the paper concludes that the ways in which the private sector is now involved in major events presents challenges for the wider body of theoretical work on security governance.

Keywords
Security, public-private cooperation, major events, privatisation, nomadic security governance

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Introduction

Different theories have been developed within various research disciplines on how private actors are involved in ‘security governance’. Notable contributions have included the analysis of public-private cooperative frameworks in the defence policy arena\(^2\); the study of interaction at the international level between states, private security companies and resource extraction companies\(^3\); research on the role of private actors in the security governance of West Africa\(^4\); and the conceptual work completed within the field of criminology.\(^5\) To date, however, the complete range of public-private dynamics which exist in the security sector has not been aggregated into a single research agenda. Whilst most offerings in this field generally recognise that the levels of interaction that now routinely occur between the public and private sectors are increasing, the extent of the private sector’s involvement across the wide range of security sectors - and at the global, international, state and local levels - remains underappreciated.

To be fair, there has been a recent improvement in so far as the ‘privatisation of security’ has been debated both within and across these diverse research fields; the importance of applying an ‘interdisciplinary’ approach to research in this area has been recognised\(^6\) and a number of prominent scholars have sought to widen the emphasis away from a focus on certain types of companies or trends within the military sector.\(^7\) But rather than pursuing a genuine, collegiate quest for greater understanding or ‘joined-up’ thinking in this area, discussions around the structure and implications of public-private security interaction remain fragmented and defence-orientated. Notwithstanding the recent efforts of Abrahamsen and Williams to ‘capture the full scope of security privatization’\(^8\) in their valuable and widely-cited recent title, Security Beyond the State, even these authors choose to focus on the characterisation, operation and implications of the governance arrangements relating

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\(^1\) Elke Krahmann, States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
\(^3\) Adedeji Ebo, ‘Private actors and the governance of security in West Africa’, in Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (Eds.) Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, policies and civil-military relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp.143-158
\(^4\) See, for example, Jennifer Wood and Benoît Dupont, Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
\(^5\) Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, pp.12-13
\(^6\) See, for example, Stanger who considers the impact of privatisation in the areas of development, diplomacy and homeland security alongside the defence sector. Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy (London: Yale University Press, 2009); see also Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State. It is also worth noting that at least one research group has been established to pursue a broader field of research on security privatisation; the author is a member of the student-led Private Military and Security Research Group (PMSRG) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London
\(^7\) Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, p.2
to the activities of what they call ‘private security companies’ (PSCs). Whilst important in their own right, accounts such as this provide only one part of the security privatisation picture - as this paper on major event security illustrates.

To be clear, important frameworks have been offered for analysing the activities of what are now commonly referred to as ‘private military and security companies’ (PMSCs). But the analysis of privatisation trends within the security sector can be developed further. This paper analyses the arrangements that have been established for recent Olympics, arguing that whilst national distinctions remain prevalent in their organisation something resembling a ‘nomadic security governance’ structure - characterised by extensive levels of public-private cooperation - exists at the operational level (i.e. at the level of venue security and other operational matters) in this sector. As well as providing additional insights into how public-private security cooperation is developing in this specific field, the analysis offers an additional theoretical framework that can help to take account of the wider variety of public-private dynamics that are at play in what some call the ‘domestic’ security sector. If it is accepted that elements of ‘nomadic security governance’ exist and differ from other existing frameworks, even in a limited form, so the security privatisation research agenda might become more open to the need for inquiry into other currently-neglected areas of security.

**Why study the governance of major event security?**

Major events have become a major global industry and the security budgets associated with them are growing at a striking rate; ‘mega-events offer a bonanza of growth opportunities’ and it has been recorded that whereas for the Sydney Olympic Games $180million was spent on security operations this rose to an estimated $1.5billion for Athens 2004. Estimates of the budgetary arrangements for the recent London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games (London 2012) suggest that the UK’s security operation to protect them amounted to at least £1.2bn ($1.8bn). As the consistently declining levels of defence expenditure across Europe continue to be seen as an important topic worthy of investigation, so these seemingly ever-increasing Olympic Security budgets require greater attention and analysis.

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11 This included £455m for the policing and wider security programme and £451 for venue security. In addition, £277m was spent by the ODA on its security budget; this comprised £228m for ‘security for park construction’ and £49m for ‘security screening and operational areas’. Department of Culture Media and Sport, ‘London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games - Quarterly Report’, June 2012, Via: [http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/DCMS_GOE_QR_JUNE-2012.pdf](http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/DCMS_GOE_QR_JUNE-2012.pdf) (accessed 03.09.12), p.17
The stark and heightened threat profile associated with major international events also brings with it a requirement for scrutiny and research. As the leading terrorism researcher Professor Andrew Silke has explained; ‘[v]irtually every summer Olympics since 1972 has either experienced terrorist attacks or else has been the target for terrorist plots’\textsuperscript{12}. The terrorist attacks on the 1972 and 1996 Games - in Munich and Atlanta respectively - provided tangible evidence (if any were needed) that the symbolic character of the event makes it an attractive target for those seeking to gain publicity or cause harm. In advance of the most recent Olympics, London 2012, the authorities acknowledged that the Games would be planned on the basis that they would face a ‘severe’ risk of terrorism and organisers frequently declared that over nine million tickets would be available to the public. The combination of such a high risk profile the potential for so many lives being at stake means that major event security should be looked upon as a critically important area of security policy.

Against this backdrop, the question of how to most effectively manage major event security becomes an increasingly important question; indeed from this perspective the problems arising from the high profile controversy which emerged shortly before London 2012 illustrates why research on the private sector’s involvement in major event security is needed. On the eve of the event, the UK coalition Government explained that it intended to deploy around 18,000 military personnel to protect the Games. This would be a substantially greater number than previously planned\textsuperscript{13}; a larger deployment would be needed, the Government argued, because the primary security company associated with the Games (G4S) explained at a late stage that it would not be able to provide the total number of the security officers that it had been contracted for. At the time, such was the urgency of the need to address the shortfall that there was limited discussion around the desirability of the decision to deploy so many troops on British soil in place of private security officers. During the event - which happily passed safely and was considered a major success for the UK - the military’s involvement in the security operation for the Games was hailed by the Chairman of the London Organising Committee (LOCOG) as one of the ‘defining features’ of London 2012.\textsuperscript{14} Now that the Games have passed, however, it is correct to reflect upon London 2012’s security arrangements and consider important questions about the effectiveness of the public-private cooperative arrangements that were in place and their potential implications for the future.

\textsuperscript{12} Andrew Silke, ‘Understanding terrorist target selection’ in Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey and Andrew Silke (Eds.), \textit{Terrorism and the Olympics: Major event security and lessons for the future} (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p.49
\textsuperscript{13} In December 2011, the Ministry of Defence stated that it expected to provide up to 13,500 personnel as part of the Olympic Security Operation. Ministry of Defence, ‘Military support to 2012 Olympic Games announced’, www.gov.uk (15.11.12), Via: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/military-support-to-2012-olympic-games-announced (accessed 05.03.13)
Post-Games scrutiny is also important because of the idea advanced by some scholars (including this author in so far as the public-private dynamics of major events are concerned) that structures are in place to allow the security requirements, standards and knowledge developed for one Olympics to be ‘transferred’ to subsequent events.\(^5\) As Olympic Games in particular have witnessed the introduction of unprecedented and increasingly more expensive security measures, as illustrated above, what can be drawn from an analytical perspective both in terms of how to most effectively manage security at these events and with regards to the implications arising from these arrangements? There has been a shortage of scrutiny around the implications of the existing models of governance for major event security\(^6\); it is therefore important to think more deeply about the influences which may bear upon these and the possible impacts of any ‘legacies’\(^7\) that may be being created.

To do so, this paper refers specifically to past Olympic Games to argue that that whilst individual countries continue to lead and organise the security arrangements for the major international events occurring within their national jurisdictions - often in very different ways - an over-arching system of ‘nomadic security governance’ exists around some of their key operational components. The proposition is that an informal system or ‘template’ of security governance around major event venues and systems now automatically ‘wanders’ from one event to the next, in timing with the major event season calendar, and that these dynamics carry important implications. As one London 2012 Olympic security veteran explained to the author in response to a question at a conference in March 2013, whilst national governments are ultimately responsible for Olympic security there is now a ‘mega-events caravan’ associated with this endeavour and a ‘security overlay’ model has been developed which now moves from city to city.\(^8\)

This ‘nomadic security governance’ way of thinking about major event security seeks to build upon, but differs from existing theoretical work on security governance in two main ways. Firstly, the framework recognises the wider variety of private sector actors that are now routinely involved in providing major event security; the model rejects a commonly-held view, for example, that attention


\(^6\) With the notable exception of Bennett and Haggerty’s important recent volume, Security Games Ibid.

\(^7\) The potential legacies of public-private cooperation for major event security have been looked upon in both negative and positive terms. For a critical analysis, see Minas Samatas, ‘Surveilling the 2004 Athens Olympics in the aftermath of 9/11: International pressures and domestic implications’ in Bennett and Haggerty, Security Games, pp.55-71. For a positive assessment of the opportunities associated with ‘security legacy’, see Valentina Soria, ‘Promoting the Concept of ‘UK plc’: A Public-Private Sector Olympic Challenge’, RUSI Journal, Vol.157:2 (April/May 2012). See the final section below for a more detailed discussion.

\(^8\) Response to a question posed by the author at the Two Day Security and Policing Summit in the UK, Farnborough, UK, 12-13 March 2013.
should focus on the activity of profit-making manpower-orientated security suppliers and considers the role and activity of the private operators of security as an equally significant aspect of security privatisation. Secondly, the theory takes account of - and highlights - the potentially temporary nature of certain governance arrangements in the security sector; albeit recognising how any governance arrangement may leave ‘legacies’ or be adopted by other event organisers in different contexts.

**Defining ‘Nomadic Security Governance’**

To consider how ‘security governance’ applies in the specific field of major event security, how should we think about this concept in the first place? Anyone who has tried to express how security provision is organised will appreciate the difficulty of the endeavour; Lucia Zedner has summarised neatly that ‘one of the thorniest aspects of security is its governance.’

Similarly, Johnston and Shearing have highlighted that the governance of security ‘is messier than it once was’ as ‘according to the alternative paradigm, security is no longer regarded as the sole, or even the primary, preserve of the state, its governance being exercised under plural circumstances.’

Whilst this outlook may not be universally shared, this author believes that any study concerned with security governance today should consider some of the alternative frameworks on offer.

Researchers in this field who agree with this approach will know that many leading security scholars have increasingly adopted a sceptical attitude towards the solely ‘state-centred view of governance.’ For example, Shearing has famously argued that ‘Private governments are now ubiquitous’ and that it is necessary to move beyond the traditional paradigm. Even if one does not agree with his particular outlook, it would be difficult to reject the importance of his question:

*How are we to move theoretically to positions that recognize a diversity of governing auspices; that is, to positions that will recognize the role of the state while at the same time recognizing, and bringing clearly and explicitly into the equation, the role of non-state auspices, as well as non-state providers of governance?*

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21 Ibid., p.15
22 Clifford Shearing, ‘Reflections on the refusal to acknowledge private governments’ in Wood and Dupont, *Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security*, p.13
23 Ibid., p.11
24 Ibid., p.26
25 Ibid.
His answer is to argue in support of the development of ‘networked governance’ type thinking and advocate in favour of ‘nodal framework’ analysis which has subsequently been widely adopted.\textsuperscript{26} For example, in their aforementioned recent work Abrahamsen and Williams recognize that ‘[t]he idea of nodal structures of security governance marks a significant advance in thinking’\textsuperscript{27}, arguing that ‘Governance thus becomes a question of how these multiple actors can work together and especially of how public authorities can establish optimal relations in this new situation.’\textsuperscript{28} These latter authors offer the concept of ‘global security assemblages’ - an idea which it is argued is similar to, but does not entirely reflect, the idea of ‘nomadic security governance’ advanced by this paper - to analyse relationships in contemporary security policy. These are ‘transnational structures and networks in which a range of different actors and normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices and forms of deterritorialized security governance.’\textsuperscript{29}

If this might be considered as a description of the dynamics at play, how can we actually define ‘security governance’? Krahmann is amongst the few leading contemporary theorists on the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ to offer a concise definition.\textsuperscript{30} She sees a ‘greater role for private actors’\textsuperscript{31} and characterises ‘governance’ itself as ‘the fragmentation of political authority among a diversity of public and private actors across levels of analysis.’\textsuperscript{32} Her persuasive argument is that ‘governance denotes the non-hierarchical co-ordination of social relations and the fragmented provision of public services by a multitude of public and private actors’\textsuperscript{33}; this is an attractive conceptualisation and the remainder of this paper will consider it along such lines.

A second concept relating to this paper’s theory is what it means to be ‘nomadic’. The \textit{Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought} provides a useful reminder, defining ‘nomadism’ as follows\textsuperscript{34}:

\textit{An anthropological term for the lifestyle in which human groups follow a wandering life. It is usually restricted to livestock-keeping groups whose movements are directly related to the search for pasture.}

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp.26-28
\textsuperscript{27} Abrahamsen and Williams, \textit{Security Beyond the State}, p.85
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p.83
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p.90
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p.19
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pp.5-6
\textsuperscript{33} Krahmann, \textit{States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security}, p.37
The application of this specific anthropological analogy to major events (and in particular the security aspects of an Olympics) is not new; Boyle, for example, has identified this dynamic and concludes that ‘embodied experience is supplemented by the informal practice of recruiting members of previous organizing committees - sometimes known as “Olympic nomads” - into key positions for upcoming events.’

The question for this paper, however, is not so much whether a small cadre of major event security experts now ‘wander’ from one event to the next - this has already been theorised and clearly demonstrated. Instead, the proposition is that it is the security governance arrangements for major events (and specifically the public-private interactions which are important features of them) which have themselves become institutionalised and transferable. It is this aspect of security governance that is nomadic as opposed to necessarily all of the security measures that are implemented around each major event. Whilst some literature has previously suggested that a form of ‘transfer’ of this nature may be taking place, it cannot be said that this has yet been thoroughly analysed or widely accepted. More generally, this important discussion has not yet been properly connected to the wider literature on security governance and the related discussions on the implications of ever-increasing levels of public-private security cooperation.

Combining the two concepts above, for the purposes of this paper, ‘nomadic security governance’ for major international events is offered as follows:

A framework of operational security measures - implemented by multiple public and private actors - which builds upon past experiences and can be considered an informal ‘template’ that is transferred from one event to the next, in timing with the event calendar, and that has the aim of ensuring their safety and security.

This paper does not claim that the system is always ‘organised’ for each event in an identical way or in the sense that the host’s security authorities always pursue exactly the same security standards. Nor, indeed, does the author believe that any such ‘transfer’ should be looked upon with automatic suspicion or as a conspiracy. In short, there is clearly no formal template for major event security and as national governments remain ultimately responsible for their safety and security there will be substantial differences in different countries. However, certain elements of the security governance

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35 Boyle, ‘Knowledge networks’, p.175
36 See, for example, Fussey who suggests that ‘the evidence suggests that particular security motifs have become standardised and transferred across events and nationalities.’ Pete Fussey, ‘Surveillance and the Olympic spectacle’ in Richards, Fussey and Silke (Eds.), Terrorism and the Olympics, p.105, Klauser also identifies in this context that private companies ‘travel from place to place and from event to event with pre-established plans and designs’. Klauser, ‘Commonalities and specificities’, pp.127-8
arrangements for such events can be seen to repeatedly ‘wander’ from one to the next. They are characterised by similar types of public-private interaction which routinely involve the same categories of actors and activities, broadly attracting comparable coalitions of interest.

**Typology of ‘private sector actors’ in nomadic security governance**

The author has previously argued that the private sector’s involvement in the security of London 2012 extended beyond the *supply* contributions of the security industry; this reflected a desire to ‘look beyond’ the PMSC industry, as stated above, and is consistent with the attitude of the panel session for which this paper has been written. In the previous work, a new conceptual framework for analysing the extent of the private sector’s involvement in an Olympic Games was constructed; the UK Government was seen to either be directly involved or have an interest in three main types of private sector relationship in relation to Olympic security: interactions with the security suppliers community on capacity and capability issues (‘Private Suppliers’), interactions with the private organisations responsible for (or with a direct interest in) operational security delivery at the time of the Games (‘Private Operators’), and interactions with wider business sectors on corporate security and resilience matters (‘Wider Business’).

Whereas many widely-cited accounts on security privatisation and/or governance have advanced more traditional, sector-specific definitions or taxonomies around the PMSC industry, the ‘nomadic security governance’ model advanced by this paper seeks to accommodate a greater degree of diversity in so far as corporate ‘private sector actors’ are considered. As we shall see, the involvement of the above categories of private sector actor in major event security arrangements is evident in numerous examples. Therefore, this paper applies the same typology as it advances the theory that some governance arrangements are being routinely transferred.

**Types of public-private interaction in nomadic security governance**

Material relating to previous Olympic and Paralympic Games illustrates extensive private sector involvement in the security planning of these events, across multiple dimensions. The purpose of the

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38 This framework built on David Omand, ‘What is the Future for the Critical National Infrastructure?’, *RUSI Monitor*, Vol. 7:4 (May 2008). In this article, Omand outlines the importance of taking into account the contributions of both security suppliers and private operators in the protection of the CNI. The author remains grateful to Mark Erbel for past discussions on the suitability of this framework.

following section is not to provide a comprehensive description of all of the interactions that have taken place; rather it serves to illustrate how the three categories of engagement identified above are now clearly evident across all such major events.

‘Security Suppliers’

In contrast to work which focuses in large part on the implications of the involvement of the military and security services sector in security governance, the ‘private suppliers’ that are involved in major event security include these types of companies but also a wider variety of technology companies, consultancy experts and other capability providers.

In the case of Athens 2004, for example, extensive use of military assets for the Games was supplemented by substantial support from industry. For example, Samatas documents the plans to introduce a €245m command and control capability system incorporating “super-panoptic” surveillance capabilities to be supplied by SAIC and Siemens. The presence of other companies involved in providing security for these Games should not be understated; according to the US-Israel Business Initiative organisation, for example, 15 Israeli companies supplied capability to Athens 2004 in the areas of ‘venue protection, command and control rooms, maritime security, airports, urban security’. On the question of manpower resources, whilst the Games famously saw a deployment of over 10,000 army personnel it is also noteworthy that 3,500 private security officers were contracted for the Games.

For Beijing 2008, it might have been expected that limited use would have been made of the private sector by the authorities of a Communist country preparing for an Olympics. Indeed, the vast numbers of military personnel deployed - more than 46,000 servicemen according to one account - would suggest that the response was an overwhelmingly state-run endeavour. But substantial security projects were also developed in cooperation with security suppliers. For example, Fussey has documented how US companies including General Electric, Honeywell and IBM were intimately involved in ‘providing much of the technological surveillance apparatus to China’ for the Games.

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40 Samatas, ‘Surveilling the 2004 Athens Olympics’, p.56, pp.60-63
42 Frank Gregory, ‘Major event security within the EU area’ in Richards et. al. Terrorism and the Olympics, p.217
43 Will Jennings, ‘The Olympics and organisational responses to risk’ in in Richards et. al. Terrorism and the Olympics, p.151
45 Fussey, ‘Surveillance and the Olympic spectacle’, p.104
According to a separate piece of work on this subject, it has been claimed that the creation of a ‘citywide surveillance camera system for the Games’ cost over $6bn.46

The author has documented elsewhere the involvement of security suppliers in London 2012; suffice to say here that this was extensive and varied, perhaps to an unprecedented extent. For example, in addition to the £240m G4S contract, the consultancy firm KPMG was involved in the programme management of the Home Office’s Olympic Security Directorate and the US-owned corporation Rapiscan Systems provided ‘over 2000 vehicle screening, people screening and baggage and parcel inspection systems to all Olympic venues.’49

‘Security Operators’

Whereas in some accounts of security governance the State is considered the main (if not sole) purchaser of security, and therefore the only major ‘operator’ of security, a number of organisations have ‘ownership’ stakes in major event security and, by contrast, even possess direct operational security responsibilities. It is this aspect of the privatisation of major event security that sets it apart from much of the existing, defence-orientated theoretical work within the literature. The fact that such operators can be seen to ‘wander’ from one event to the next adds a ‘nomadic’ dimension.

For example, whilst there is an on-going debate around the extent to which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) - a private company - actually sets security requirements for an Olympic Games, there is evidence to suggest that it at least plays some role in the development and oversight of any country’s plans to secure an Olympics. For example, Boyle has described the mechanism developed by the IOC to share ‘institutional knowledge’ amongst event organisers who have responsibilities for major event security. The Olympic Games Knowledge Management (OGKM) - a mechanism that has recently been privatised - aims to coordinate and share knowledge between organising committees on security issues including, for example, how to control access and egress,

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46 Pete Fussey and Jon Coaffee, ‘Olympic rings of steel: Constructing security for 2012 and beyond’, in Bennett and Haggerty, Security Games, p.42
47 Rosemont, ‘Reassessing the private sector’s involvement’
48 Simon Neville, ‘G4S Olympic security contract losses increase to £88m’, The Guardian (12.02.13), Via: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/feb/12/g4s-olympic-security-contract-losses (accessed 05.03.13)
50 For example, it has been suggested that the ‘IOC make clear in guidance to potential host cities that it is their responsibility to provide a safe environment’, Jon Coaffee, Pete Fussey and Cerwyn Moore ‘Laminated Security for London 2012: Enhancing Security Infrastructures to Defend Mega Sporting Events’, Urban Studies, Vol.48:15 (November 2011), p.3312 (Emphasis original). Alternatively, Evans has stated that ‘security policy for the organisers of the Olympic Games is dictated by the IOC’, David Evans ‘The role of the private security industry’ in Richards et. al., Terrorism and the Olympics, p.164 (Emphasis added)
and how to hire security guards.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, in the formal bidding process that any aspiring Host City must complete the IOC requires answers to a set of penetrating questions on how it is proposed the Games would be protected.\textsuperscript{52} For example, Bernhard and Martin explain that the IOC ‘has made the (legal and administrative) ability to develop a consolidated command structure a requirement of the Olympic bidding process.’\textsuperscript{53} From this perspective, the IOC might itself be seen as a ‘nomad’ that seeks to ensure that security is provided for and that its own requirements are accommodated from one event to the next.

The ‘Organising Committees’ (OCOGs) that operate each Olympic Games - ‘LOCOG’ for London 2012, ‘VANOC’ for Vancouver 2010, ‘BOCOG’ for Beijing 2008, etc. - are also routinely established as private companies and it may be surprising that they (rather than the public authorities) carry with them an extensive array of ‘in-venue’ security responsibilities.\textsuperscript{54} Like the dynamics that can exist between governments and operators of critical infrastructure, it appears that this relationship can often be fraught with difficulty. For example, a recent report by a UK-based think tank identified that in the case of London 2012 the Government’s ‘relationship with LOCOG was at points problematic, with some (...) feeling LOCOG was behind schedule with planning and slow to spot the G4S risk.’\textsuperscript{55}

Perhaps it should not be so surprising that the priorities of the public and private sectors do not entirely overlap; in his chapter on the ‘private security industry’s’ role in an Olympic Games, Evans states that it is important to understand that ‘security’ is not an OCOG’s main driver.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite this potential ‘conflict’ around respective roles and priorities, Governments have not been dissuaded from ensuring that OCOGs retain their security responsibilities and that they remain private organisations. Following London 2012, for example, the Home Office concluded that ‘[t]he balance between Government and Organising Committee security roles will continue to be a key issue for any future Olympic Games.’\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, in response to a question the author asked of a London 2012 Olympic security veteran about whether in future the security responsibilities of an OCOG should be ‘nationalised’, it was stated that a private company is ‘more fleet of foot’ than

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{51} Boyle, ‘Knowledge networks’, p.174

\textsuperscript{52} See, for example, the requirements for current bidders at: International Olympic Committee, 2020 Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire: Games of the XXXII Olympiad (Lausanne: IOC, 2012), Via: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/FINAL-2020-CPQ-May-2012x.pdf, pp.162-4

\textsuperscript{53} Bernhard and Martin, ‘Rethinking security at the Olympics’ in Bennett and Haggerty, Security Games, p.28

\textsuperscript{54} In recent times, it is understood that only in the case of the 2000 Sydney Games did the authorities decide that the security aspects of the OCOG’s responsibilities should be organised by the public sector.


\textsuperscript{56} Evans, ‘The role of the private security industry’, p.165

\textsuperscript{57} Private information
\end{footnotesize}
Government and so the event organiser should be left in private hands to ensure maximum flexibility. The general expectation within the governance arrangements for the operational security aspects of an Olympics based on the most recent experiences, then, is that venue security arrangements will be organised by a private entity even if they are part or even fully funded by (local or national) Governments.

‘Wider Business Sectors’

In the final category of private sector involvement considered for this paper, a variety of interactions have been established with wider sectors of business on continuity and resilience matters and these can increasingly be looked upon as routine features of major event security operations.

For example, as well as providing on-going advice and analysis to American companies on a day-to-day basis the US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) has been active in developing a specific programme of advice and activity around a wide variety of major events including the Olympics. Such was the effectiveness with which the model was looked upon in liaising with business during previous Games (including during Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008) that a similar model of public-private cooperation was established for London 2012. Details of what purported to be a ‘truly cross-sectoral’ initiative known as ‘Cross Sector Safety and Security Communications’ (CSSC) project - which included the participation of ‘twenty-three business categories from banking, insurance, security and supply chain to retail, tourism, hotels, night-time economy and media’ have recently been outlined in detail by Soria. A dedicated website which provides details about the scheme has also been launched.

There is no shortage of other organisations which assume operational responsibilities for Olympic security. The (private) operators of a wide variety of ‘existing’ venues (i.e. those used but not specifically constructed for a Games) will be routinely engaged by an OCOG and the ‘Sponsor Effect’ has been noted as bringing with it ‘a significant demand for security’ from those companies who have formed an official association with the Games. As Ruxton notes, the

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58 Response to question posed by the author at the Two Day Security and Policing Summit in the UK, Farnborough, UK, 12-13 March 2013.
60 Soria, ‘Promoting the Concept of ‘UK plc’, p.37
61 Ibid., pp.36-37
62 ‘CSSC Website’, Via: http://www.vocal.co.uk/cssc/ (accessed 06.09.12)
63 Evans, ‘The role of the private security industry’, p.169
64 Ibid.
involvement of these companies is a fundamental element of the funding structure of all modern Olympics in that local organising committees actually inherit many of the sponsorship arrangements negotiated by the IOC with leading brands such as Coca Cola and Visa. It follows from this that the security arrangements of such companies have now become a routine and transferable element of the Games’ security governance.

Characteristics of the private sector’s role in security governance

The previous section provided a brief ‘sketch’ including practical examples of the categories of private sector actors that frequently appear in the governance of major event security. Whilst only a small number of recent examples were illustrated - and these were restricted to the Olympics - some common security arrangements can be seen to exist at the operational level; it is contended that the following features have consistently emerged in major events regarding how companies have been (or are seen to need to be) involved in the security around the venues and operating systems:

Table 1. Private sector actors in Olympic Games security governance

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Private companies/entity/sector</th>
<th>Role/involvement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>Technology providers</td>
<td>Venue security capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>Manpower security suppliers</td>
<td>Venue security capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>IT security companies</td>
<td>Games systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>Technical expertise / Proj. management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Oversight / ‘requirement’ setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>OCOG</td>
<td>Venue security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Existing venues</td>
<td>Venue security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider Business</td>
<td>Insurance industry</td>
<td>CT insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider Business</td>
<td>Various business sectors</td>
<td>Emergency preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider Business</td>
<td>Sponsors</td>
<td>Corporate security arrangements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table might be criticised by those who are not convinced that aspects of security governance are transferable or who believe that there are realities which may ‘hinder the uptake of ideas and best practices.’ Whatever doubts may exist around the extent to which a formal ‘template’ of Olympic security arrangements may be transferred, however, it is the view of this author that there is now

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65 These agreements and the ‘rights’ associated with them are explained in more detail in Alastair Ruxton, ‘Structure of the Olympic Movement, the Paralympic Movement and London 2012’ in Adam Lewis and Jonathan Taylor (Eds.), *Sports Law and Practice* - 2nd Edition (Haywards Heath: Tottell, 2008)

66 Boyle, ‘Knowledge networks’, p.181
sufficient evidence to say that a basic system has emerged - now widely accepted in ‘Olympic circles’ - regarding how organisers and other relevant parties should seek to incorporate both certain capabilities and the private sector actors listed above as core elements of the security strategy of an Olympic Games, if only informally and at the operational level of venue security.

Of course, providing and even validating a description of this governance system might understandably be looked upon as ‘the easy bit’. In more practical terms, why should there be on-going scrutiny of the emergence of any such system, what is the real significance of any ‘nomadic’ characteristic of this form of governance, and what might be the implications of this structure for the future? The final section of this paper addresses these questions and offers some thoughts on the possible future orientation of research in this area.

**Nomadic Security Governance – Implications and Issues**

Having offered a conceptual framework for thinking about Olympic security governance - one which recognises that whilst a number of elements are transferable at the level of venue security individual governments will be likely to organise security very differently - to what extent are the public-private elements comprising part of this system actually operating effectively? To put it mildly, the evidence would suggest that there is substantial room for improvement. For example, the delays to the implementation of the intended hi-technology security system for Athens 2004, the controversy around the deployment of surveillance technologies in China for Beijing 2008, and the failure of the main security guarding contract for London 2012 are all examples of where public-private cooperation around the Games has been suboptimal at best. Does this mean that the system of governance under discussion in this paper is not ‘fit for purpose’ in terms of translating security requirements into successful programmes? This is important to consider if we accept that some aspects of security governance are being routinely transferred.

*An effective ‘template’?*

A first major consideration, therefore, is around whether the fact that the private sector has been so extensively used to secure Olympic events - to varying degrees of success - may be contributing to inappropriate assumptions being made in so far as local planners take forward their major event security strategies. In short, planners may be tempted to take too much comfort in the arrangements, systems and best practices that have arisen from previous Games and seek to translate them into their own security environment with little questioning of their effectiveness in

67 This episode is documented in detail within Samatas, ‘Surveilling the 2004 Athens Olympics’, pp.62-65

68 The range of capabilities is documented within Pete Fussey and Jon Coaffee, ‘Olympic rings of steel: Constructing security for 2012 and beyond’, in Bennett and Haggerty, Security Games, pp.41-42
that context. The difficulties London experienced in the run up to 2012 might be understood from this perspective; prior to the Games, the provision of private security officers had become such a routine part of the Olympic venue security package that it was assumed that they would make up a significant component of the UK’s response. In late 2011, however, the requirement for the numbers of officers increased dramatically; what was the reason for this if not the peculiarities of the local situation? Despite the confidence of the contractor that it would be able to deliver upon the revised contract, we now know that there was a spectacular failure to do so.69

How might such an outcome be avoided in the future? If it is accepted that the public-private interactions under discussion are now standard parts of the security governance system, it might be better for the public authorities - as one industry figure has previously suggested70 - to commence serious and sustained dialogue with industry on such capacity issues, backed by capital resources, at an early stage. In short, if it is recognised that contract security officers will now inevitably be required for major events - as per the framework proposed above - why is it that, currently, there is no formal requirement for the authorities to work with the private sector to identify and resolve any potential manpower shortfall long before the commencement of the events? During an interview conducted for this paper, Mr Francesco Norante71 suggested that, to address this issue, the IOC’s bidding requirements could in the future usefully require prospective host cities to include in their ‘bid books’ a detailed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) outlining the respective roles and responsibilities of the different public and private actors involved in the strategy.72

**Legacies**

A second major consideration arising from this governance system is around the ‘legacies’ - and the possible implications of such legacies - that may result from it. A substantial body of analysis has already been produced on the desirability (or otherwise) of the ‘security legacies’ arising from Olympic Games in a general sense73; in more specific terms there are at least four aspects of this

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69 In a further twist to this episode, one journalist has suggested that G4S declined an opportunity to fulfil a smaller proportion of the revised contract. Adam Leach, ‘G4S turned down reduced requirement on Olympic security contract’, Supply Management Daily (30.01.13), Via: http://www.supplymanagement.com/news/2013/g4s-turned-down-reduced-requirement-on-olympic-security-contract/ (accessed 22.03.13)

70 Evans, ‘The role of the private security industry’, p.176

71 Recognised as an expert in the field, Mr Norante acted as head of security for the Organising Committees of both the Turin 2006 Winter Olympic Games and the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games.

72 Interview with Mr Francesco Norante, London, 12 March 2013.

subject which relate to the private sector’s involvement in major event security governance. Firstly, there is the direct operational security legacy that this model of governance may imply for future event organisers. It has been shown above that Olympic security budgets have grown progressively in recent years and there is a sense that this is likely to continue. Related to this, the vast scale of specific requirements can also be shown. For example, in the last three Summer Olympic Games 49,000 public and private security personnel were deployed in direct support of Athens 2004, 92,500 for Beijing 2008 and around 42,000 for London 2012. Looking to the future, the three candidate cities currently bidding for the right to host the 2020 Olympic Paralympic Games - Istanbul, Madrid and Tokyo - have committed to deploying, respectively, 43,295, 79,490 and 50,850 security personnel should they be successful when the IOC makes its decision in September 2013. The extent to which these almost overwhelmingly large (actual and anticipated) deployments are a direct result of the nomadic security governance system for the Games, and/or the expectations that have formed around them, would be an interesting additional avenue for research.

Secondly, there is the seemingly growing consensus that the use of the military for venue security is an appropriate and perhaps even a desirable way of achieving the necessary security capacity for large international events. This has a long heritage in recent Olympics and, after London 2012, for example, it was suggested in a report of a high profile UK Parliamentary Committee investigating the G4S contract affair that such was the success of the military’s involvement that the UK Government should consider using it as a ‘first choice for venue security’ in similar events in the future. Further scrutiny is needed to examine whether this is really a desirable option for either the UK or future major events in view of prior, sensible warnings about using the military to counter-terrorism. In particular, could there be a risk that whilst the UK’s use of its military for London 2012 appeared to

Vol.1:1 (March 2013); Soria, ‘Promoting the Concept of 'UK plc'; and Samatas, ‘Surveilling the 2004 Athens Olympics’. See also the short discussion in footnote 17 above.

74 Daniel Bernhard and Aaron K. Martin, ‘Rethinking security at the Olympics’ in Bennett and Haggerty, Security Games, p.25
75 Ibid., p.27
78 House of Commons, Home Affairs Select Committee, ‘Olympics security’, p.10
79 Wilkinson famously argued, for example, that ‘It must be a cardinal principle never to commit the army to take over responsibility for the tasks of restoring and maintaining public order unless it is absolutely beyond doubt that the civil police can no longer cope.’ Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (Abingdon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005), p.125
be successful, the use of such assets on a more routine basis - or indeed a wider scale - could encourage further the ‘securitization’\(^{80}\) of what is supposed to be a sporting event?

Thirdly, those involved in the security governance arrangements for major events have frequently stated a desire to improve for the hosting country the levels of public-private cooperation and security infrastructure that exist. This was perhaps most apparent in the case of London 2012 - the CSSC project referred to above clearly had that objective in mind - but this dynamic has also appeared at other events; in the case of Athens 2004, for example, it was claimed that the investment in new security capability for the Games would help to develop the security infrastructure of the country.\(^{81}\) As noted above, one author has been extremely critical of the long-term impact of these security measures on Greece\(^ {82}\); further, more balanced analysis like that recently produced by Giulianotti could validate whether this has been the experience in every case.\(^ {83}\)

Finally, analysis has been completed on the efforts of Governments to achieve ‘security governance legacies’\(^ {84}\) following the events they host. Whilst the subsequent promotion of US security capability associated with Salt Lake City 2002 remains a famous example - especially in so far as US influences subsequently clearly bore upon Athens 2004 - this dynamic became most recently apparent in view of the economic legacies that the UK Government is seeking in the security sector following London 2012. In January 2013, the Home Office advertised that it would seek to recruit a ‘Director of Security Industry Engagement’ in an attempt to achieve this; according to the job description for the position, ‘the Director will identify and develop security export opportunities in key markets overseas and maximise the security legacy of the 2012 Olympic Games.’\(^ {85}\) The UK security machinery’s ambition to achieve an economic legacy for the country after the 2012 Games was reinforced at a conference hosted within the confines of the Home Office’s March 2013 ‘Security and Policing Exhibition’ held in Farnborough, UK. The programme for the event described the final panel session as follows\(^ {86}\):

> The final session will look in more detail at how the Government’s relationship with the security industry may develop, including using Games security success to promote the UK’s world-leading

\(^{80}\) It has been argued that the Olympics have already undergone such a process. Bernhard and Martin, ‘Rethinking security at the Olympics’ in Bennett and Haggerty, Security Games, p.23

\(^{81}\) Soria, ‘Beyond London 2012: The Quest for a Security Legacy’, p.38

\(^{82}\) Samatas, ‘Surveilling the 2004 Athens Olympics’

\(^{83}\) Giulianotti, ‘Six security legacies of major sporting events’

\(^{84}\) Boyle, ‘Knowledge networks’, p.179


\(^{86}\) ‘Outline Agenda’ for Two Day Security and Policing Summit in the UK, 12-13 March 2013, Via: http://www.securityandpolicing.co.uk/files/2013/03/Security-and-Policing-Website-Agenda07.03.13.pdf (accessed 15.03.12), p.4
CT, policing and security capabilities. This is a growing agenda within the Home Office, with clear support to work more closely with the security industry to boost UK security exports.

It is clear, therefore, that efforts are now being made to promote UK capability in the context of the country’s London 2012 experience. Indeed, it appears that attempts may be being made to try to ensure that the way in which London handled Olympic security in 2012 will be adopted as the standard model from henceforth - Mr Francesco Norante suggested in interview that the UK developed the ‘most structured’ security governance framework ever devised for an Olympic Games, and that London is doing more than any host city before it to promote UK capability after the event.  

87 The fact that Governments routinely seek to promote ‘their’ capability along such lines is clearly one legacy of major events that should be considered in more depth.

A Security-industrial complex?

A third consideration for future research around the security governance model for major events is whether there is validity in the proposition that something resembling a ‘security-industrial complex’ may have coalesced around them, how transferable such a system may be, and what implications might result from it. Whilst the difficulty of empirically testing the existence of such a ‘complex’ has long since been identified, it might be a worrying development if the budgetary and policy arrangements for such events became unduly influenced by a coalition of public and private interests which had established an active preference for ever increasing levels of expenditure in this field. In the on-going absence of detailed empirical research into such dynamics, however, it could be reasonable to request that the critics of such a supposed system tone down the ferocity of some of their assertions.

Application to other large events

Fourthly, this paper has focused on the security governance arrangements around the Olympic and Paralympic Games. It is obvious and right, therefore, to acknowledge the potentially unique character of this event and question whether the proposed model of ‘nomadic security governance’ is applicable to other large sporting (or indeed other types of) events. Space does not allow for a

87 Interview with Mr Francesco Norante, London, 12 March 2013.
88 The idea that dynamics similar or amounting to a ‘security-industrial complex’ exist in the major event security field has been advanced by authors including Molnar and Snider, ‘Mega-events and mega-profits’, p.162; Samatas, ‘Surveilling the 2004 Athens Olympics’, p.60; and Boyle and Haggerty, ‘Spectacular Security’.
thorough examination of this important issue, but it is clear that there has been (and continues to be) a conscious effort on the part of some involved in the major event security arena to transfer expertise to other large events; the open acknowledgement of the efforts underway to ensure that the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games benefit from lessons arising from London 2012 is just one useful example of the salience of this issue. This consideration is also important because questions are increasingly being asked around the extent to which any high-profile international event may (inappropriately) displace the routine security arrangements of the country within which it is based. For example, there have recently been reports of substantial requirements relating to the upcoming G8 Summit in Belfast and the expectation that the event will draw upon at least 2,000 police officers from the rest of the UK. In any such scenario, whose security should be protected if a competition over resources should ever arise?

**Balance between national and nomadic security arrangements**

At the same time as advancing the idea that a nomadic security governance structure characterised by extensive levels of public-private cooperation transfers from one major event to the next, this paper recognised that many of the plans developed around them by public security authorities will differ from country to country. This tension would benefit from greater research and clearly surfaced during an interview with Mr Francesco Norante. Having managed security at two recent Olympic Games, Mr Norante argued that there continues to be a lack of set ‘definition of security boundaries’ for Olympic Security and that it is invariably looked upon as ‘a national responsibility’ by the IOC. Furthermore, Mr Norante was sceptical around the degree to which security knowledge or best practice is actually transferred from one event to the next; whilst ‘some experiences can be transferred’, this sort of activity is ‘not ordered’ and there is no ‘official’ transfer or communication by the IOC or other organisations in this respect.

Nevertheless, a number of common characteristics relating to Olympic security governance were revealed in conversation with Mr Norante. For example, it was stated that Olympic security budgets were regarded as ‘always a mix of OCOG and Government’ expenditure and that, with respect to the management of contract security, the ‘same issues repeat themselves from Games to Games.’

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90 See, for example, the recent announcement that Glasgow 2014’s security budget was revised following a review of the arrangements for London 2012. ‘Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games security cost up 200%’, *BBC News* (18.12.12), Via: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-20769485](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-20769485) (accessed 19.03.13)


92 The insights appearing in the following two paragraphs were all provided by Mr Norante in an interview on 12 March 2013 in London.
Crucially, he referred to the significant security role that is invariably played by the OCOG - always a private company - in managing security. Whilst history shows that the OCOG can ‘enlarge or restrict its role’ from a security perspective, it always possesses a significant stake in the successful implementation of venue security arrangements. More research into the dynamics that exist within the security structures of Organising Committees could be warranted as a result of their central role in the proposed system of nomadic security governance.

**Connection with wider academic debate**

Finally, from a more theoretical viewpoint, there would be value in connecting and exploring further the field of major event security privatisation alongside the wider existing academic debates on security governance.\(^93\) From this author’s perspective, the idea of ‘nomadic security governance’ advanced in this paper most closely resembles the concept of ‘global security assemblages’ recently proposed by Abrahamsen and Williams; indeed, one might ask whether this governance model is not simply one example of the type of ‘assemblage’ they are describing. However, such a conclusion would be too simplistic as the governance of major event security differs substantially from models presented in different contexts. For example, it is clear that the ‘nomadic’ elements of Olympic security governance adopt an inevitably *temporal* dimension in the sense that they are time-limited and that they can be expected to ‘wander’ every four years; whilst this may end up also being the case in other areas of security governance, this will not necessarily occur by design. Secondly, this paper has recognised that whilst the ‘nomadic’ elements of security governance are found at the operational level of venue security, each individual nation hosting such events will bring its own security architecture and processes to the table; there are therefore limits to the extent which, for example, these new structures are genuinely transnational or global (as some might have it) in view of, in this case, the IOC’s preference for security to remain a national responsibility. Lastly, the author has developed his previous work to suggest that the most significant (corporate) private actors that are involved in the security governance frameworks of major events include but extend beyond private security *suppliers* of capabilities. In the spirit of looking ‘beyond PMSCs’, there would be benefit in exploring or ‘mapping’ to a greater degree the wider variety of private companies that are now involved in securing such events - and other sectors of security more generally.

**Conclusion**

The paper offered a proposed model of ‘nomadic security governance’ and, in so doing, questioned whether the existing theoretical frameworks that have been offered in this field are sufficient for

\(^93\) There have been contributions in this direction - see, for example, Giulianotti and Klauser ‘Security Governance and Sport Mega-events’ - but these do not yet go far enough in the view of this author.
analysing all aspects of public-private security interaction. An additional model was provided which takes account of the specific characteristics of major event security governance - in particular what are seen to be some of its ‘nomadic’ qualities - and which can help to provide greater understanding of how a wider variety of companies are now involved in the delivery of security in the contemporary setting. Whilst it cannot be concluded that a set, standard model or ‘template’ of security governance transfers across all areas of security - or that it ‘wanders’ unaltered from one event to the next - an argument has been made (drawing on Olympic examples) that the operational venue security arrangements for major international events are now broadly similar, if not identical in certain areas, including in the sense that they involve the same categories of (if not identical) private actors and interests. The real significance of this theory in the author’s eyes is not around whether there may be a ‘conspiracy’ at play, but revolves around whether the venue security arrangements that now appear at each Olympics - those which frequently draw on large security workforces and hi-tech security and surveillance technologies - will be effective, appropriate and suitable for all local conditions.

Regardless of this and the impact of other ‘legacy’ considerations, extensive levels of privatisation have been shown to exist in major event security and these can be seen to extend beyond the ideas expressed in some of the more traditional inquiries and academic disciplines. In the same way that Abrahamsen and Williams have argued that studies on the privatisation of security must look beyond the military sector, so this paper concludes that future research agendas relating to the privatisation and governance of security should include but look beyond research on the PMSC industry. As important as on-going analytical attention to that sector of the security industry may be, there is a much wider field of security privatisation demanding greater attention; major event security is just one of many additional fields.

In conclusion, it is recommended that all those concerned with this field should consider the validity of establishing a broader inquiry and moving beyond the preoccupation with the governance of PMSCs (or other related manpower-orientated sectors); in short, there would be benefits in the emergence of a much wider canvass of inquiry into public-private security cooperation. The aim of this suggestion is not to dismiss the importance of the previous work in this area but to argue that the case of major event security shows that that no ‘one size fits all’ framework for studying security governance is sufficient. Our field could do well to ask whether there is any good reason why multiple models of security governance theory - and for that matter why many more avenues of research into other areas of security privatisation - cannot co-exist.

HDR, 24.iii.13
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