Helping or Hurting? The Impact of Naming and Shaming on Repression in Military Regimes

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Introduction

In 70 countries political imprisonment, execution, political murders, brutality and unjustified detention are commonplace. In 32 of these countries, violations are extreme and widespread, affecting much of the population.\(^1\) The mistreatment of a large portion of the world’s population has not gone unnoticed. International actors including media outlets, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations committees frequently rely on a common tool to fight government repression – naming and shaming. Naming and shaming refers to the practice of identifying and publicizing countries’ violations of international human rights norms. Scholars have examined the effects of shaming on repression and political rights, but have found mixed results. These mixed findings suggest that naming and shaming works in some instances but is ineffective or even detrimental in others. Analyzing the impact of naming and shaming on different regime types may shed some light on these curious findings. I take a step in this direction by assessing the impact of human rights shaming on repression and political rights in military regimes.

Relatively few studies focus on the impact of naming and shaming on repression or political rights. Further, there is little to no consensus on the effect of shaming on repression or political rights. Studies show shaming increases repression (Franklin 2008), does not, on average, influence repression (Hafner-Burton 2008) and reduces repression (Hawkins 2002). Interestingly, these key studies analyze very different sets of countries. Hafner-Burton (2008) uses a global sample of all regime types, Franklin (2008) focuses on seven Latin American countries, but manages to capture all regime types and Hawkins (2002) relies on a single military

\(^1\) Statistics derived from the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett and Wood 2011). Of the 183 countries reported on in 2010, 70 (38%) received a score of three or higher and 32 (17.5%) received a rating of four or higher.
regime in Chile. I argue regime type mediates the effect of shaming such that not all regimes respond to shaming in the same manner. If the effect of shaming is conditional on the type of regime shamed, analyses of the effects of shaming by regime type are especially relevant for understanding when and how naming and shaming impacts repression and political rights.

I develop a general theory that explains how autocracies respond to naming and shaming and then discuss how this theory applies to military regimes in particular. I argue the effect of naming and shaming campaigns on repression depends on the vulnerability of the regime. More specifically, the greater the threat naming and shaming presents, the more likely leaders are to increase use of repression in an attempt to maintain control. Shaming does not present a significant threat to leaders of military regimes because it is unlikely to create domestic threats. Further, leaders in military regimes face relatively few consequences for leaving office. This implies military regimes should not increase repression in response to shaming. Naming and shaming can also threaten states’ legitimacy. Autocratic regimes that are concerned about legitimacy should improve political rights when shamed. Military regimes generally arise in response to perceived failures of the existing government; military regimes seek to improve upon the previous rule (Linz, 2000). This suggests military regimes are concerned with legitimate rule and should improve political rights after being publically shamed.

I test this theory using an autocratic dataset from 1988 to 2007. First, I develop a new index of human rights shaming using three sources: 1) Amnesty International reports 2) western media and 3) international media. I use Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) regressions to assess the effects of shaming on military regimes’ levels of repression and political rights. The findings are consistent with the theoretical expectations. When shamed, military regimes do not increase repression, however, military regimes do improve political rights.
This study is structured as follows. I begin with a review of previous work on naming and shaming. Then I develop a broad theory of how naming and shaming can function as a threat to autocratic regimes. Next, I narrow my focus to describe how military regimes are expected to respond to the threat of naming and shaming. After describing the research design used for empirical analyses, I discuss the findings. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of this study and suggestions for future research.

What we know about the effects of naming and shaming on repression?

Naming and shaming can be viewed as “shining a spotlight on bad behavior” (Hafner-Burton 2008, 690). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs) and news media frequently engage in naming and shaming by publicizing information about states’ human rights practices in an effort to draw attention to human rights violations. These international actors, especially NGO and IOs, hope to motivate improvement in states’ human rights practices. To determine whether shaming is effective, scholars have analyzed the impact of naming and shaming on repression and political rights.

To date, there have been only two large-N analyses of the effect of naming and shaming on repression (Franklin 2008, Hafner-Burton 2008). Focusing on seven Latin American countries, Franklin (2008) tests whether states that were recently shamed reduce levels of repression in the face of contentious political challenges. Franklin argues that pressures resulting from shaming such as increased shaming, decreased legitimacy and potential sanctions cause governments to reduce levels of repression. However, he fails to explain exactly how these pressures should result in reduced repression. Franklin finds that human rights criticism leads to
decreased repression in states that have strong economic ties with other countries, though this effect lasts only six months. Yet he also finds shaming in general leads to increased repression.

Hafner-Burton (2008) highlights three ways naming and shaming may function. First, shaming may not matter at all; it is merely cheap talk that governments ignore. Second, shaming may increase repression by inciting domestic opposition, which leaders quell with increased repression. Third, shaming functions as intended, especially for states that have ratified human rights treaties. Hafner-Burton’s (2008, 690) findings largely show that shaming does not alter levels of repression, but that “violators often improve protections for political rights after being publicly criticized.”

In addition to large-N analyses on shaming, Hawkins (2002) conducted a case study of Chile during Augusto Pinochet’s military rule. Hawkins argues shaming can threaten the legitimacy of autocratic states, conditional on the normative fit, the presence of crises and the presence of rule-oriented government actors. In response to decreased legitimacy, authoritarian regimes are expected to improve respect for human rights. Hawkins shows that naming and shaming decreased Chile’s legitimacy and ultimately led to the Chilean government to improve political rights and decrease repression.

Taken together, these studies present puzzling results. Shaming is shown to reduce repression for states with strong economic ties, increase repression, not impact repression and increase political rights. Despite these mixed findings, the above studies present interesting
theoretical stories, which, once conditioned by regime type or expanded to a large-N analysis, may offer insights as to when shaming is effective. ²

**General Theory: Naming and Shaming as a Threat**

Building on Hafner-Burton (2008) and Hawkins (2002), I conceive of naming and shaming as a threat to autocratic leaders. I argue that naming and shaming can present both internal and external threats. Autocracies’ levels of vulnerability to naming and shaming depend on 1) how leaders maintain office, 2) the consequences of losing office and 3) how much the regime values legitimacy. I expect that when shaming increases the likelihood of losing office and the consequences of losing office are dire, violent repression will increase. Additionally, autocracies that are concerned with legitimacy should improve political rights in the face of shaming. I structure the general theory according to my expectations. I begin by discussing how naming and shaming threatens autocratic leaders’ positions.

*How Shaming Destabilizes Autocracies Means of Control*

Human rights naming and shaming campaigns threaten leaders through two primary mechanisms. First, shaming encourages international actors to punish the state in violation. Naming and shaming campaigns place states that violate international human rights norms in the international spotlight. Once in the spotlight, other states and IOs are expected to apply pressure to the state in violation in hopes of improving the state’s human rights practices (Franklin 2008, Hawkins 2002, Wright and Escribá-Folch 2009). Pressure, in the context of human rights, is defined as “nonviolent activities carried out by transnational networks and states with the

² Hafner-Burton (2008) examines the effect of shaming on political rights and repression for democracies. She finds democracies do not improve levels of repression or political rights after being publically shamed.
primary purpose of improving individual rights by creating economic and political costs for a repressive government” (Hawkins 2002, 20). International actors can inflict pressure in several ways, including economic sanctions, diplomatic non-engagement, decreased aid and decreased trade. Lebovic and Voeten (2009, 80) argue that resolutions issued by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) “gave political cover for liberal multilateral aid institutions seeking to sanction human rights violators.” They show that states shamed with a UNCHR resolution experience about a one-third drop in multilateral and World Bank aid. This suggests shaming represents a direct threat to regimes that are heavily dependent on external aid or trade to maintain office. If autocracies are destabilized because of decreased aid or trade, they are likely to increase violent repression in an attempt to preempt future domestic threats.

I briefly discuss the United States’ decision to sanction in Sudan in 1997 to illustrate how naming and shaming can lead to international pressures. In 1996 Sudan received almost twice as much attention for poor human rights practices compared to the average level of shaming. Elliot and Hufbaur (1999, 405) indicate domestic organizations lobby their government to sanction governments that fail to comply with salient policy issues, such as “ethnic strife, civil chaos, human rights, terrorism, narcotics and others.” They suggest that domestic lobbying for human rights issues in the United States succeeded in garnering support for increased sanctions against Sudan. Although Elliot and Hufbaur’s story rests on domestic lobbying, it is likely that Sudan’s high level of global shaming played a crucial role in setting domestic human rights advocacy groups’ agendas. The US Treasury cites human rights abuses among the reasons for sanctioning

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3 I use Hafner-Burton’s (2008) composite measure of global shaming. This index is composed of three dichotomous indicators of 1) western media 2) Amnesty International reports and 3) UNCHR resolutions. The measure ranges from 0 to 3. Sudan received a score of 2 in 1996 while the average score in 1996 across 179 countries was 1.04.
Sudan in 1997. This example demonstrates one way naming and shaming can lead to international action against the state in violation of human rights norms.

Secondly, naming and shaming may threaten the government by inspiring domestic opposition. Keck and Sikkink (1999) argue international shaming is possible because domestic activists, such as NGOs, gather and transport information about human rights violations across borders to international human rights NGOs, IOs and other states. When domestic activists are able to successfully transfer information to external actors and these external actors champion the domestic actors’ causes (by engaging in shaming) a political opportunity is created (Tarrow 1998). An opportunity is created because “domestic opposition groups take heart from such reports and redouble their efforts to inform others of the extent of the problem” (Hawkins 2002, 30). Tarrow argues opportunities allow for contention because opportunities present a means of reducing or eliminating the costs of engaging in contentious acts. When the costs are lower, more individuals are likely to participate in the movement, overcoming the collective action problem generally associated with contention. Once a movement is in place, it can encourage additional movements; Tarrow relates this idea to breaking down a gate, once a movement has broken the gate, it is much easier for others to enter. The emergence of movements against the regime is a direct threat to leaders’ control. Therefore, naming and shaming may function as a political opportunity, ripe for exploitation by opposition to the regime.

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4 “President Clinton issued Executive Order 13067, finding that the policies and actions of the Government of Sudan, including support for international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, and the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” Quote obtained from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/sudan.pdf on February 20, 2012.
Regimes in which shaming can effectively create a political opening for the mobilization of domestic opposition should increase levels of repression. Several scholars have established the link between domestic threats and increased repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Regan and Henderson 2002; Keith 2010). As Keith (2010, 31) puts it, “the most significant factor in state repression may be the presence of significant domestic opposition or a perceived challenge to a regime’s hold on power.” Although most studies of state repression focus on the most extreme domestic threat, civil war, it is important to realize that the mobilization of domestic opposition is also a strong threat to the regime.

*Destabilization Conditioned by the Consequence of Leaving Office*

When naming and shaming threatens the means by which autocratic leaders maintain control and the costs of leaving office are high, I expect an increase in violent repression. Leaders that rely heavily on external funding and those that rule with constant repression should increase levels of repression when the consequences for leaving office are high. The costs of leaving office are low when leaders are able to peacefully leave office. However, when leaders are forced from office and face death, the costs are much higher. For example, military leaders face low costs to leaving office while personalist leaders face extremely high costs (Geddes 1999). Here I am suggesting that regimes’ levels of vulnerability hinge on both the ability of naming and shaming to destabilize regimes and the consequences of losing office.

*Legitimacy Concerns*

Naming and shaming can also threaten a regime’s legitimacy. I rely on Suchman’s (1995, 574) conceptualization of legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of any entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Human rights criticism occurs when international actors
perceive a state as being in violation of international human rights norms; shaming instantly signals international disapproval. Further, the domestic opposition shaming may mobilize signals domestic disapproval. Although I expect vulnerable regimes to respond to these threats with increased violent repression, I also expect that regimes concerned with perceptions of legitimacy will improve political rights when shamed. Violent repression and improvement in political rights are not mutually exclusive.

Regimes may improve political rights to send a positive signal to both international and domestic audiences. Some autocracies may be more concerned with justifying their rule to the domestic audience while others are merely trying to prevent further naming and shaming. Improvements in political rights include things such as increased participation or establishment of elections. In some cases autocracies may signal improvements in political rights without actually improving political rights. For example, the regime may establish open elections yet threaten violence to those who vote against the current regime. Despite potential false signals of improvement, efforts to send a signal imply the regime is concerned with legitimacy (Hawkins 2002).

**Human Rights Naming and Shaming and Military Regimes**

I apply the above theory to military regimes. I begin with an overview of military regimes and my expectations. Military regimes are characterized by a group of military elites that hold power. In these regimes the leader is a member of the military and other high-ranking officials are also members of the military (Geddes 1999). Examples of military regimes include Brazil from 1964 to 1985, Chile from 1973 to 1989 and Nigeria from 1983 to 1994. I argue naming and shaming does not impact levels of violent repression in military regimes because 1) military
regimes do not depend heavily on external aid or trade to maintain control, 2) naming and shaming cannot create a political opportunity and 3) the consequences of leaving office are minimal. Shaming does, however, threaten the legitimacy of military regimes by signaling that the regime’s actions are not just; shaming should lead to improved political rights in military regimes.

Military regimes are not expected to increase violent repression because they are not vulnerable to naming and shaming in ways anticipated to increase violent repression. Military regimes, unlike personalist regimes, do not rely on patronage spending to maintain office. Instead these regimes maintain control by limiting or manipulating political participation (Linz, 2000). This suggests that although shaming may result in material consequences for military regimes, material sanctions would not threaten the means by which military regimes maintain office. Further, Escriba’-Folch (2009, 14) shows that when military regimes are under sanctions, the regimes are able to “increase their non-tax revenues and taxes on goods and services” to minimize the impact of the sanctions.

Shaming is unable to create effective political opportunities in military regimes because the costs of participation in an opposition movement are too high. In order for shaming to create a political opportunity it lower the costs of participation in contention such that the collective action problem is overcome (Tarrow 1998). According to Tarrow, high levels of repression virtually eliminate opportunities for collective action. Although the finding has been debated, scholars have shown that military regimes are generally more repressive than non-military regimes (Keith, Tate and Poe 2009). These arguments indicate military regimes’ means of control is not threatened by human rights naming and shaming.
The cost of leaving office is also relatively low for military leaders. As Ulfelder (2005, 318) indicates, “officers usually have the option of continuing their careers following a return to civilian rule, so when elite rivalries or policy differences become acute, those officers are more likely to favor a return to the barracks as a means to preserve military unity.” Even if naming and shaming threatened military leaders’ means of control, military leaders are not opposed to stepping down.

When the above theory of violent repression is applied to military regimes, it is evident that military regimes should not increase levels of repression in response to human rights criticism. Military regimes are able to “shift fiscal pressure from one stream to another”, suggesting the material consequences of shame are not a threat (Escriba`-Folch 2009, 14). Naming and shaming is unable to lower the costs of participation in opposition movements because of the high levels of repression present in military regimes. Finally, military leaders do not face high costs upon leaving office. Together, these arguments imply military regimes will not increase levels of repression in response to naming and shaming.

H1: Naming and shaming has no systematic effect on repression in military regimes.

Military regimes should improve political rights when criticized for poor human rights practices because military regimes have strong concerns about the legitimacy of the regime. Here it is important to briefly discuss the role legitimacy plays when military regimes come into power. The military generally replaces the existing government when civilians “call at the barracks for support either to overthrow or defend constitutional government” (Linz 2000, 203).
Further, Linz indicates the success of a military coup depends on the level of perceived legitimacy ascribed to the military. The origin of most military regimes suggests that these regimes value legitimacy. Nordlinger (1970, 1137) supports this notion by explaining that “the [military] officers…justify their actions to others and to themselves by identifying with the nation… the officer-politicians readily come to believe in the necessity and legitimacy of their actions, no matter how self-interested and abusive they may appear to an outside observer.”

Naming and shaming threatens military regimes’ legitimacy by indicating the regime is not in compliance with standard international human rights norms. Military regimes are significantly more likely to restrict press freedom (Keith 2010), which wrongly suggests that citizens in military regimes are not aware that the regime is in violation of human rights norms. Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) norm cycle indicates that domestic activists take the first step to produce international naming and shaming campaigns by transferring information about abuses to international actors. Keck and Sikkink describe a bottom-up flow of information; states that receive international shaming likely have domestic human rights activists leaking information to the international media or international NGOs. In an attempt to maintain legitimacy, military regimes should improve their political rights as a clear signal of improved legitimacy. The regime will choose to improve political rights as a type of concession, intended “to ease the amount of pressure on the government and earn the government some legitimacy” (Hawkins 2002, 34).

H2: Naming and shaming in military regimes improves political rights.
Research Design

The data include 1,387 country-year observations of authoritarian rule in 92 countries from 1988 to 2007. I use Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) models to assess the impact of naming and shaming on repression and political rights. PCSE regression models are used to correct for correlations in the panels across time and country. I use four PCSE models. The first two models analyze the impact of shaming on repression or political rights from 1988 to 2007. The second set of models use an alternative shaming variable and spans from 1988 to 2000.

Dependent Variables

This study uses two dependent variables, one for repression and one for political rights. Repression is measured using the Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS data combines annual reports from Amnesty International and State Department reports into a five category ordinal scale, where a ‘1’ identifies countries under a stable rule of law, where physical integrity violations such as disappearance, imprisonment, torture, murder and execution are absent. States placed in category five are those in which such abuses are a common part of life, affecting all sectors of the population (e.g., North Korea), and categories 2 through 4 represent shades between these two extremes (Gastil 1980). The second dependent variable is a measure of political rights provided by Freedom House. This measure is based on “an evaluation of three subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of

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5 I use Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2012) data on authoritarian regimes.
6 The PTS data provide by Gibney, Cornett and Wood (2011) includes two ordinal indicators, one from the US State Department and one from Amnesty International. These indicators are highly correlated at .77. Some scholars simply take the average of the two indicators, however doing so creates a missing value for any observation in which either indicator was missing. Here, I rely on the Amnesty International indicator and replace the missing values with values from the State Department where possible. Data are available at
government.”

This ordinal measure ranges from one to seven, one being the best (highest level of political rights) and seven the worst (no political rights).

Shaming Variables

Shaming can come from many sources. In an attempt to fully capture international shaming, I include indicators of shaming from western media, international media, Amnesty International (AI) and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). I use these indicators to create two indices that capture how many sources shamed a state during a given year. I begin by describing each of the shaming component measures.

Western media shaming is measured using articles from Newsweek and The Economist. This variable is a count of the total number of news stories from Newsweek or the Economist that shamed a given state. Ron, Ramos and Rodgers (2005) collected this data by searching Lexis-Nexis for articles in Newsweek and the Economist that included the term ‘human rights’. Ron, Ramos and Rodgers (2005, 565) then hand-coded the resulting stories in an effort to ensure observations “were triggered because of abuses occurring within that country and not [for example] because of American support for repressive governments elsewhere.” Ron et al. (2005) coded news stories from 1986 to 2000. Following the same coding rules, Meernik et al. (forthcoming) extended the data to 2007.

The second source of the human rights shaming is international media. I downloaded news stories published from 1988 to 2007 from Factiva with the key words “human rights” in the headline or lead paragraph. I used two prominent international news sources, Reuters and

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Agence France Presse (AFP). I formatted the news stories and used a text analysis program, Textual Analysis By Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI), to code the first sentence of each news story according to the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) coding scheme.\(^9\) Using the CAMEO coding scheme, I divided the event data into two categories 1) cooperation and 2) conflict. Although scholars tend to focus on negative human rights coverage, many of the news stories were of the cooperative nature. I use only the conflictual events because I am interested in human rights naming and shaming, not positive discourse about human rights. I use the event data to create a count variable of the total number of shaming news stories a given state receives.

The third source of naming and shaming is Amnesty International, an international NGO that “has developed a general reputation since its founding in 1961 for accurate reporting” (Forsythe 2006, 193). Amnesty International uses background reports and press releases to disperse information on human rights concerns. AI background reports require groundwork in the given country and upon completion are “sent to human rights professionals, UN officials, academics, and feature journalists” (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005, 561). AI press releases are shorter in length, aimed at the general public, and focused on current human rights matters (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). Once again, Ron et al. collected this data from 1986 to 2000 and Meernik et al. (forthcoming) have extended it to 2007.

UNCHR resolutions are the final measure of human rights shaming. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006, was an international organization that focused on publicizing states human rights practices in the form of resolutions. The UNCHR used different types of resolutions, such as advisory, confidential and

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\(^9\) For more information on both TABARI and CAMEO, see [http://eventdata.psu.edu/software.dir/tabari.html](http://eventdata.psu.edu/software.dir/tabari.html).
public (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). I use only public resolutions because advisory and confidential resolutions do not adequately capture naming and shaming. Using Lebovic and Voeten’s (2006) data, I create a dichotomous variable coded ‘1’ if a state was the target of a public resolution from the UNCHR in a given year and ‘0’ otherwise. This variable ranges from 1986 to 2000.

From these three component measures, I construct an 1) an index using all the shaming variables that extend to 2007 and 2) an index composed of all sources of shaming, despite temporal limits. These indices capture how many sources shamed a state in a given year. I create dichotomous indicators of shaming from the three human rights naming and shaming count measures by coding an observation as ‘1’ if any shaming occurred and ‘0’ otherwise. For the first index, henceforth global shaming index, I combine the dichotomous indicators of western media, international media and Amnesty International. This variable ranges from zero to three; zero indicating a state was not shamed by any of the three sources of shaming and three indicating all three sources shamed a state. This global measure ranges from 1988 to 2007. The second index, global shame with UNCHR resolution, combines all measures of shame. The resulting index ranges from zero to four and spans from 1988 to 2000. Finally, I interact each shaming index with a dichotomous indicator of military regimes derived from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2012) to create two measures that capture shaming directed towards military regimes.

Control Variables

Scholars have shown that higher levels of economic development are correlated with lower levels of repression (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). I control for economic development using Gross Domestic Product per capita in US constant dollars. This indicator was taken from the World Bank and logged to account for decreasing marginal returns. Population is associated
with increased repression. Poe and Tate (1994) argue larger populations allow for more instances of abuse and create strains on national resources. I control for population using an indicator from the World Bank that measures the total population by country. This control is also logged.

Threats to the state have also proved to influence repression. Civil war, arguably the most extreme threat a regime can face, is consistently found to increase levels of repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Regan and Henderson 2002; Keith 2010). I control for civil war using a dichotomous indicator of civil war derived from the Correlates of War project. Interstate war has also been linked to increased repression (Poe and Tate 1994). Once again, I use Correlates of War data on interstate war to construct a dichotomous indicator coded ‘1’ if the state was engaged in an intrastate war and ‘0’ otherwise.

**Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1988-2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Shame Index</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Shame (with UNCHR Resolutions)</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*Shame</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*Shame (with UNCHR Resolutions)</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regimes</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International War</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>10.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: UNCHR = United Nations Commission on Human Rights
Results

Overall the results indicate that shaming does not impact military regimes’ levels of repression but does have some impact on military regimes’ levels of political rights. The first set of models, presented in Table 2, use the global shame index and span 20 years. It is important to keep in mind that for both dependent variables, higher values are worse (indicate more repression and disrespect for political rights) and lower values are better (represent lower levels of repression and more respect for political rights). Model 1 examines the effect of military shaming on levels of repression. The interaction term is insignificant, suggesting shaming conditioned by military regimes does not influence levels of violent repression. Figure 1 shows this relationship. This non-finding offers some support for the hypothesis that shaming military regimes does not lead to increased repression. As expected, population and civil war are associated with an increase in repression while GDP per capita is associated with lower levels of repression.

Model 2 tests whether shaming military regimes leads to improved political rights. The interaction between military regimes and shaming is significant and negative, suggesting that shaming military regimes leads to improved political rights. I rely on Figure 2 for substantive interpretation of this interaction term. Figure 2 shows that at the lowest levels of shame, military regimes do not improve political rights. However, as the level of shaming increases, military regimes improve political rights. A shift from no sources of shaming to all three sources of shaming changes the predicted political rights score from 5.5 to 4.9. This finding provides support for my second hypothesis which indicates military regimes should improve political rights as a result of naming and shaming because military regimes are highly concerned with
legitimacy.

The second set of models, see Table 3, use the shaming index that includes UNCHR resolutions. Unfortunately the inclusion of UNCHR resolutions limits the temporal domain, causing the analyses to cover 13 years, from 1988 to 2007. Overall, the results do not change very much despite the alternate shaming measure and limited temporal domain. Model 3 shows that the military shame interaction term is not significant, indicating that when shamed, military regimes do not increase repression. See Figure 3. Once again the control variables, with the exception of international war, are significant in the expected directions.

Model 4 shows that military shaming is associated with improved political rights. Figure 4 clearly shows that military regimes improve political rights when shamed. The Figure 4 shows that an increase from no sources of shaming to four sources of shaming results in a one point drop in the political rights indicator. Given the political rights variable only contains seven points, this is a large effect. In sum, the results suggest that military regimes do not increase violent repression when shamed, but do improve political rights.

**Conclusion**

This study develops a theory that explains how autocracies should respond to human rights naming and shaming. The argument is applied to and tested on military regimes. Military regimes are not expected to increase repression in the event of naming and shaming because shaming does not credibly threaten military leaders in ways expected to increase repression. Military regimes are, however, vulnerable to the damage shaming can cause to the regime’s

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10 Interestingly, Figure 1 and Figure 3 reveal an unexpected pattern for military regimes. It appears that at low levels of shame military regimes increase levels of repression, yet at high levels of shame decrease repression. This suggests that perhaps the relationship between military shaming and violent repression is quadratic.
legitimacy. Military regimes are expected to improve political rights when targeted with naming and shaming campaigns. The analyses support these expectations.

Examining whether shaming leads to domestic protests is an interesting avenue for future research. A key causal mechanism advanced in the theoretical section on this paper is the ability of shaming to create a domestic political opening. This causal mechanism is not unique to the theory presented here; many scholars suggest shaming creates domestic threats. However, this relationship has not been tested empirically.
Table 2: PCSE Repression and Political Rights Models, 1988-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Repression (Model 1)</th>
<th>Political Rights (Model 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.44)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Shame$_{it-1}$</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime*Shame$_{it-1}$</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime$_{it-1}$</td>
<td>.46*</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International War$_{it-1}$</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War$_{it-1}$</td>
<td>.70*</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.08)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.05</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Population$_{it-1}$</td>
<td>.24*</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wald Chi2: 432 | 26  
Rho: 0.45 | 0.81  
R-Squared: 0.33 | 0.59  
Observations: 1181 | 1186

Note: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients are above the standard errors. Asterisks indicate <.05 (one-tailed). All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) models use pairwise selection and are specified to correct for ARI autocorrelation. All non-military autocracies are the baseline.
Table 3: PCSE Repression and Political Rights Models, 1988-2000

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
<th>Repression (Model 3)</th>
<th>Political Rights (Model 4)</th>
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<td>-.02</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
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<td>-.31*</td>
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<td>(.11)</td>
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<td>Military Regime at-1</td>
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<td>.51</td>
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<td>(.35)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.23*</td>
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<td>.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>860</td>
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</table>

Note: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients are above the standard errors. Asterisks indicate p < .05 (one-tailed). The Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) models use pairwise selection and are specified to correct for AR1 autocorrelation. All non-military autocracies are the baseline.
References


